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ABSTRACT  
   
More than a decade after the events of September 11, the kinetic conflict between 
U.S. forces and Islamist extremist groups continues, albeit in a more limited fashion. In the 
post 9/11 decade there has been increased recognition that factors such as globalization, 
economic insecurity, regional political unrest, and the rapid advancement and diffusion of 
communication technologies will continue to influence the nature of international warfare 
for the foreseeable future. Industrial, interstate wars between sanctioned armies (Kilcullen, 
2007; Tatham, 2008) is giving way to asymmetric forms of conflict exemplified by the 
conflict between the U.S. and its allies, and al Qaeda and ideological affiliates like al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (Kilcullen, 2004; Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).  This 
shift has brought counterinsurgency (Petraeus, 2008) tactics to the forefront of policy 
discussion.  A result of this focus on counterinsurgency efforts is increased interest in 
strategic communication (stratcom) (Nagl, Amos, Sewall, & Petraeus, 2008; Paul, 2009) and 
the function of narrative (Roberts, 2007) in kinetic conflict (Zalman, 2010).  The U.S. has 
been said to be "losing the battle of narrative" to the extent that the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs has spoken of the need to "supplant the extremist narrative" (Mullen, 2009).  
Understanding how narrative functions in ideologically driven organizing (IDO) remains 
under developed, however.  Little empirical research has examined how al Qaeda's use of 
narrative contributes to organizational success.  Drawing on the tradition of narrative in 
organizational communication scholarship (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Ashcraft & Mumby, 
2004) this project interrogates al Qaeda's use of narrative from an identity perspective, 
exploring the ways in which narrative is constitutive of identity at individual and 
organizational levels.  The analysis focuses on public communication produced by al Qaeda, 
intended for various stakeholder audiences including potential recruits, the broader Muslim 
  ii 
community, and adversaries such as the United States and its allies.  This project makes 
practical contributions to U.S. public policy and countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts, 
offering rigorous empirical examination of the ways in which al Qaeda uses narrative to 
construct individual and organizational identity. Theoretical contributions are made by 
extending existing organizational scholarship into a currently under-developed area: 
ideologically driven conflict. 
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CHAPTER 1 
COMMUNICATIVE ASPECTS OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
America has been seeking for some time to establish its Crusader military presence in 
the Islamic world. Support for the Zionist entity has been one of the means to 
establish such a presence, since this entity is a foothold of the Crusader invasion of 
our Islamic world…With the advent of the current administration to the White 
House, the malicious Crusader spirit reached its climax in supporting Israel.  In view 
of its arrogance and tyranny, this idiotic administration did not expect to face this 
mighty Islamic resistance, thanks to God.  Such resistance reached its prime with the 
blessed New York and Washington conquests. 
—Ayman al Zawahiri, 2005 translation of audio tape released by al-Qa'ida-affiliated 
Al-Sahab Corporation. 
Introduction 
The quote above is indicative of the discursive construction of the conflict between 
al Qaeda (AQ) and the United States as presented in al Qaeda’s public rhetoric.  Despite 
significant military and political effort and vast conventional military and economic 
superiority on the part of the U.S. and its allies, al Qaeda and ideologically affiliated 
organizations have continued to engage Western forces in conflict for nearly two decades1 
(“1998 U.S. Embassies,” 2016).  Regional and global security challenges are also posed by 
Daesh (Beinart, 2014), an extremist group that evolved from an offshoot of al Qaeda in Iraq, 
(al Tamimi, 2014; Felter & Fishman, 2007).  
The security environment that evolved after the 9/11 terrorist attacks produced 
significant inquiry into factors contributing to al Qaeda’s continued operation.  Despite the 
overwhelming force superiority of U.S. and allied forces, al Qaeda remained a significant 
security risk.  Post-2003 saw the organization evolve from a single group to a series of 
regional ideological “franchises.”  Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates continued to carry 
out operations, recruit new members, and - central to this research project - publicly 
                                                 
1 More than two decades if one puts the starting point for al Qaeda activity as the failed Yemen Hotel 
bombings in 1992.  The first major successful attack by al Qaeda against a U.S target is the U.S. Embassy 
bombings in 1998, however (Wright, 2006) 
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promote their ideology (Brachman, 2010; Riedal, 2007).  The effectiveness of al Qaeda’s 
media strategies in particular were viewed as a significant and unexpected threat (Archetti, 
2010a).  Among security experts, the perception became that the U.S. was left playing “catch 
up in a propaganda market dominated by al Qaeda” (deYoung & Pincus, 2008, ¶ 5).   
Security analysts argued that AQ’s media-savvy communication strategies created a 
unique advantage over the more conventional and outdated strategic communication tactics 
employed by the U.S. and allies (Archetti, 2010a; Combating Terrorism Center, 2009; Lynch, 
2006).  This perception led policy makers and military officials to take a greater interest in 
the communicative aspects of violent conflict (Corman, Trethewey & Goodall, 2008; 
Combating Terrorism Center, 2009).   How was it that an organization (comparatively) 
lacking resources could develop and promote such an effective “brand?” (Archetti, 2010; 
Helmus, Paul & Glenn, 2007).  Despite the apparent theoretical relevance, however, 
organizational communication scholars have been slow to interrogate extremist forms of 
organizing such as al Qaeda.  Organizational approaches have much to offer the study of 
ideological extremism - principally notions of identity and relationships between identity and 
organizational operation.  
In organizational studies, there is a strong tradition connecting identity creation and 
maintenance to organizational survival (Alvesson & Empson, 2008).  Identity positions an 
organization within its environment and orients it to various stakeholder audiences, 
(Brickson, 2000; Kuhn, 2008; Scott & Lane, 2000) distinguishes it as an entity and serves as a 
“classification device whereby members understand who and what we are” (Foreman & 
Parent, 2008, p. 225).  Identity construction has consequences for organizational 
identification, (Van Dick, 2004) recruitment, member retention, motivation, commitment, 
and reputation (Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 1994; Whetten & Mackey, 2002).   
  3 
While organizational identity research has made significant strides since Albert and 
Whetten’s (1985) foundational article, few communication scholars have interrogated non-
corporate forms of organizing.  Even fewer have examined ideologically driven 
organizations (IDOs) (Dougherty & Huyser, 2008).  Whether they are common, non-violent 
forms of ideologically centered organizing such as churches and mainstream political parties, 
or threats to the international security environment such as Islamist extremist groups, the 
impact and prevalence of ideologically driven organizing in the current socio-political 
environment suggests more research focusing on these types of groups is important.  
This project will examine the processes of identity construction in an IDO.  To 
accomplish this, the proposed project focuses on the violent Islamist extremist group al 
Qaeda as an example of an IDO with a significant impact on the international security 
environment over the last decade.  Drawing on the perspective that organizational identity is 
a narrative construction (Brown, 2006; Chreim, 2005; Czarniawska, 1998), a narrative 
analysis of al Qaeda’s public discourse is conducted to examine the identity construction 
processes in an IDO.  Approaching identity from a narrative perspective offers benefits for 
theory and praxis.  A narrative perspective on organizational identity complements and 
extends inquiry not just into the nature of collective identities, but also into the process of 
organizing (Brown, 2006), extending current organizational scholarship into an under-
explored but increasingly relevant context—that of ideologically driven organizing.   In 
regard to praxis, understanding identity as a narrative construction provides a rich 
exploration of the structure and function of identity in IDOs on which future counter 
terrorism efforts may be grounded.   
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Rationale 
There are two areas of concern for this project.  The first is pragmatic.  Security 
experts (Amr & Singer, 2008; Tatham, 2008), scholars (Corman, Trethewey & Goodall, 
2008), and the U.S. military (United States, 2006) agree that following 9/11 the shape of 
international warfare has irrevocably changed for the near future.  Globalization, economic 
insecurity, regional political unrest, and the rapid advancement and diffusion of 
communication technologies continue to change the nature of international and intranational 
conflict (Fenstermacher & Leventhal, 2011; Mayfield, 2011; Tatham, 2008).  Commonly 
known in security studies as “asymmetric warfare” (Lambakis, 2004; United States, 2006), 
the types of conflicts Western nations face are no longer likely to take the form of 
traditional, interstate warfare between sanctioned armies (Gartenstein-Ross & Barr, 2016; 
Hoffman, 2004; Kilcullen, 2007; Tatham, 2008; Worth, 2016).  Instead, regional instabilities, 
terrorist groups, and insurgencies—made up of enemies that can blend into civilian 
populations and are extremely flexible and adaptive—are the main challenges the U.S. and its 
allies face.  In the conclusion of one RAND publication, “Counterinsurgency (COIN) and 
stability operations are prominent in the contemporary operating environment and are likely 
to remain so in the future” (Helmus, Paul & Glenn, 2007, p. iii).  
Emblematic of this evolving security climate is the protracted conflict between al 
Qaeda and its ideological affiliates, and the United States and its allies.  Initially and 
unfortunately dubbed “the global war on terror” or GWOT by the George W. Bush 
administration, it has since been relabeled “the war on terrorism” or simply “the long war” 
(Kennedy & Lucas, 2005; Reese & Lewis, 2009).  What began with the invasion of 
Afghanistan in response to the events of 9/11 has broadened to encompass an overarching 
struggle against “Islamist extremism” (Roper, 2008).  This struggle includes major military 
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actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as operations in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa 
(United States Africa Command, 2009), and trans-Saharan Africa (United State European 
Command, 2007), costing the United States nearly 7000 military personnel (iCasualties.org) 
and more than $3 trillion (Reuters, 2011).  In spite of these expenditures and significant 
criticism of U.S. policy from both domestic and foreign sources, former Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta was cited as cautioning that the “war on terrorism” is far from over and that al 
Qaeda and similar extremist groups remain a threat to the security of the United States and 
its interests (Panetta, 2011; Riedel, 2007; 2010). 
The protracted nature of the conflict and the perceived effectiveness of al Qaeda’s 
public message campaigns (Brachman 2010; Casebeer & Russell, 2005) led to 
acknowledgment in U.S. policy circles that force superiority—the common term in military 
doctrine for having a significant advantage with regard to troop numbers and resources—is 
insufficient to effectively combat insurgent forces and deal with asymmetric warfare contexts 
(Hart, 2008; Mayfield, 2011; Nagl et al., 2008).  U.S. and allied actions decimated the 
financial and military capability of the original al Qaeda group (AQP).  Yet senior members 
remained at large for years.  The group continued to carry out attacks, and as previously 
discussed, continued to publicize and promote their ideology.  The organization responsible 
for the 9/11 attacks responded to U.S. action by shifting from a single group with 
centralized control to a new model that—alongside the remnants of the original group, al 
Qaeda Prime (AQP)—included regional groups with their own leadership (McCormick, 
2014; Riedel, 2010).   
  6 
These regional groups, commonly called “franchises” were associated and at times 
publicly allied with the al Qaeda name.2  (Feiser, 2004).  Groups like al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
carried out actions consistent with the ideological mandate that characterized al Qaeda 
Prime’s (AQP) goals (Feiser, 2004).  AQP would later cut ties with AQI, and the Iraqi-based 
group reformed and renamed itself several times through a complicated and violent 
organizational shift before declaring the existence of the Islamic State (Hubbard, 2014; Zelin, 
2014). 
Interest in the psychological and communicative aspects of violent conflict is not 
new.  Classical war theory from Sun Tsu to Clausewitz contains missives on the importance 
of political, discursive, and psychological tactics in waging conflict (Hallorhan, 2007).  The 
relationship between force and diplomacy (Schelling, 1966) is one of the strongest traditions 
in political science.  No study of World War I or World War II is complete without 
exploring the significant role of propaganda (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006) used by both Allied 
and Axis forces.  Perceived effectiveness of al Qaeda’s public discourse in keeping the 
organization relevant on the international stage, recruiting new members, and growing new 
“franchises” is merely the most recent example of the role of communication strategies and 
information operations in modern violent conflict (Casebeer & Russell, 2005; Goodall, 
2006).  Much of the current rhetoric in policy circles concerned with extremist 
communication strategies, however, has unfortunately drawn from the arena of American 
business practices (Argenti, Howell, & Beck, 2005; Helmus, Paul & Glenn, 2007).  This 
                                                 
2 The full history of the complex and shifting relationships among extremist groups that allied or at least acted 
in general support of al Qaeda’s ideology is beyond the scope of this project.  For more about the evolution of 
al Qaeda’s franchises (and the infighting that often resulted between them) see Farrall (2011), Hellmich (2011), 
Reidel (2007; 2010) 
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trend has led to the inclusion and application of concepts like advertising and marketing in 
an arena—violent ideological conflict—for which they are ill suited.  Influence of business 
and marketing precepts has also created a common perception among policy makers that the 
communicative aspects of warfare can be “won,” as if al Qaeda and the United States are 
simply in a battle of “brands” (Helmus, Paul & Glenn, 2007) competing for a market share.  
Readers trained in the social sciences may have an adverse reaction to these sorts of 
statements.  There are good reasons for this response, since many security experts and policy 
makers grossly misunderstand and misapply communication concepts in their rhetoric and 
strategy (Corman, Trethewey & Goodall, 2008).  Unfortunately, there is scant empirically 
based research grounded in a communication perspective with which to challenge these 
trends (Corman, 2011).  
Most communication scholarship concerned with the post-9/11 conflict focuses on 
U.S. policy language (Kellner, 2007) and media (Lewis & Reese, 2009).  Little attention has 
been paid to the Islamist organizations’ discourse (see McCants, 2015; Rogan, 2010; 
Rowland & Theye, 2008 for exceptions).  The lack of research exploring violent extremism 
from a communicative perspective has significant real-world implications: Policy decisions 
and communication strategies derived from flawed or incorrect assumptions and conclusions 
may in turn be ineffective or even detrimental.  The projected proliferation of asymmetric 
conflicts, along with global trends in political unrest and social movements such as those that 
took place in Mexico (al-Jazeera, 2014), Hong Kong (BBC, 2014), and the American 
Midwest (Mackey, 2014), suggests a need for a better understanding of the discursive 
strategies inherent in ideologically driven types of organizing (Goodall, 2006).  
The second area of concern for this project involves extending current 
organizational theory beyond its focus on vocational—generally corporate—or non-profit 
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organizations (Young, 2001; 2003).  Ideologically driven organizing is neither recent nor 
limited to violent groups originating in non-Western countries.  Mainstream political parties, 
religious organizations, youth groups, and social movements are examples of common non-
violent organizing constructed around prevalent North American ideologies.  Hate groups, 
cults, religious sects, extreme nationalism such as the “alt-Right,” (slpcenter.org) and 
separatist anti-government movements like Sovereign Citizens, however, are also be 
examples of ideologically driven organizing.  These potentially (or actively) violent forms of 
ideologically driven organizing, and others like them exist throughout North America and 
Europe and present significant threats to individuals and the stability of democratic societies.     
Changes in corporate climate and workplace culture are also pushing the boundaries 
of member identification with employer organizations (Hannan, Baron, Hsu, & Kocak, 
2006).  In his exploration of Amway, Pratt (2000) cites the existence of cults such as 
“Promise Keepers, Branch Davidians and the Heaven’s Gate cult” (p. 456) as the impetus 
for more research into organizations that can “evoke such strong bonds with their 
members” (p. 456).  He also points to the vein of research in organizational communication 
examining emotions and identity in “total” institutions (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; 
Hochschild, 1983; Tracy, 2000) that impact members’ relationship with organizations.  
Changes in business culture indicate Pratt’s work remains highly salient as a recent article by 
the New York Times (Kantor & Streitfeld, 2015) suggests shifts toward more extreme norms 
of member identification in corporate organizations.  Exploring the corporate culture of the 
massive online retailer, Amazon.com, the authors found Amazon “conducting a little-known 
experiment in how far it can push white collar workers.”  Amazon may not be wholly unique 
among large corporate entities.  The authors refer to the company as part of the “vanguard 
where technology wants to take the modern office: nimbler and more productive, but 
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harsher and less forgiving.”  An Amazon employee, interviewed for the article, stated, 
“Organizations are turning up the dial, pushing their employees to do more for less money, 
either to keep up with the competition or just stay ahead of the executioner’s blade” (Kantor 
& Streitfeld, 2015 p. 14,15).   
Corporate organizations should not be considered analogous to violent extremist 
groups of course.  This trend in the modern corporate workforce, however, may be 
indicative of increasing pressure on many in the workforce to incorporate organizational 
goals into their own individual identity.  Since members’ loyalty and commitment to an 
organization are potential outcomes of strong identification with an organization (Foreman 
& Whetten, 2002), more emphasis in management may be placed on fostering organizational 
identification (Edwards, 2005).  Despite the rich tradition of organizational research 
concerned with identity and identification concepts (Edwards, 2005), organizational scholars 
have been slow to interrogate non-corporate forms of organizing in their research.  Scott 
(2013) makes an effort to investigate “hidden organizations,” including secretive government 
organizations, ideological extremist groups, and religious organizations, but his work is 
concerned with developing a typology for classifying types of groups based on how 
“hidden” or “visible” they are and does not explore the operations or identities of these 
organizations in depth.  Even Pratt’s (2000) seminal work in examining a multi-level-
marketing (MLM) organization with fewer concrete bureaucratic structures explores the 
organizational identification in the context of a for-profit vocational organization. 
Even more so than in corporate organizations where financial benefits provide potential 
incentive for member action, ideologically driven organizations—particularly violent 
extremist groups where common activities may place members’ lives in real jeopardy—have 
reason to manage member identity and encourage member identification.  Whether in a 
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corporate organization or an IDO, it is to an organization’s advantage to, “inculcate 
individuals with organizational values” (Pratt, 2000, p. 457) so that they may continue to act 
in the best interests of the organization (Ashforth, Rogers & Corley, 2011).   
One of the key factors that influence member identification is the strength and 
coherence of the organization’s identity.  Given the hostile environment and active kinetic 
conflict al Qaeda members have faced, the group's continued existence, its recruitment 
success, and the spread of its ideology (Berger, 2012) suggests, among other things, a well-
constructed organizational identity (Burke, 2004; Farrall, 2011; Fishman, 2010).  By exploring 
the processes through which an extremist organization like al Qaeda constructs 
organizational and individual member identity in their discourse, this project hopes to offer 
insights into how other types of organizations create and regulate member identity and 
identification to the organization’s benefit (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  
This study will examine the construction of organizational and individual member 
identity in al Qaeda’s public discourse from a communicative perspective.  There are both 
pragmatic and theoretical contributions to be made by this project.  First, an empirical study 
of extremist discourse grounded in a communicative perspective has practical benefits for 
improving policy decisions in asymmetrical, ideologically driven conflicts (McCants, 2015).  
As highlighted by a report from the Government Accountability Office (2006), United States 
Department of State public diplomacy programs intended to engage Muslim audiences have 
suffered from a lack of coherent strategic communication practices, (Diplomacy, 2006; 
Gregory, 2008) hindering potentially beneficial outcomes.  Secondly, this project extends 
current organizational theory by offering insight into identity construction and regulation 
processes in ideologically driven organizations.  Specifically, interrogating the ways in which 
  11 
al Qaeda constructs both organizational and member identity allows comparison to previous 
research on identity construction (e.g., Chreim, 2005; Foreman & Parent, 2008).  
This project is organized as follows: To contextualize al Qaeda as an organization, 
the next chapter provides an introductory primer of the key events and thinkers influential in 
the development of al Qaeda as an extremist group.  Chapter Three offers a similar brief 
history of the rise of Daesh and justifies the exclusion of from the scope of this study.  
Chapter Four presents a theoretical framework in which to position the study and proposes 
research questions to guide the study.  Chapter Five details the methodology used to analyze 
the and answer the research questions.  Chapters Six and Seven provide the answers to the 
proposed research questions.  Chapter Eight will discuss theoretical implications of the 
findings, acknowledge the limitations of this work, and offer directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AL QAEDA: AN IDEOLOGICAL PRIMER   
To the layperson and the majority of the American media, the events of September 
11, 2001 appeared as sudden and unexpected as they were horrifying.  September 11th is 
often compared to the Kennedy assassination as a traumatic event in the experience of a 
generation that marks a clear point with a ‘before’ and ‘after’ in the public consciousness. 
With regard to U.S. foreign policy, the events of 9/11 signify a massive shift in focus and 
language, the effects of which are still being felt 15 years later.  Public perception aside, the 
events of September 11 had their origins in a socio-political system developed decades 
before 2001 (Haynes, 2005).  The group directly responsible for the hijackings had been 
operating since the 1980s, and the ideological building blocks that Usama bin Laden and 
Ayman al-Zawahiri - the two key figures of the group that orchestrated the events on 9/11 - 
utilized to justify their actions and frame their war on the “far enemy,” – extremists’ term for 
the United States and its allies (Burke, 2004; Gerges, 2009) - were laid long before that.   
The recent impetus for the growth of al Qaeda as an active terrorist organization are 
generally traced to the Cold War and the United States ongoing policy of containment3 with 
regard to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Mohamedou, 2011).  To mitigate and undermine 
Soviet influence in the region, the U.S. encouraged, financed, and even trained local Arab 
fighters to engage in conflict with Soviet forces (Roy, 2004).  Those fighters would form part 
of the core of al Qaeda’s mujahidin responsible for the attacks on 9/11 (Reidel, 2011).   
The ideological history of political Islam that the leaders of al Qaeda would draw on, 
however, stretches back much further, through political activists (or terrorists, depending on 
                                                 
3 Containment was hardly limited to Afghanistan.  Cold War policy impacted Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, 
and Cuba. 
  13 
which account one reads) and ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayd Qutb and 14th 
century radical scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (Haynes, 2005; Reidel, 2011).  This chapter explores 
the broader ideological foundations of al Qaeda’s modern ideology beginning with Egyptian 
activist and eventual founder of the Society of Muslim Brothers Hassan al-Banna, and 
ending with al Qaeda Prime’s public face and front man, Usama bin Laden.  
In many organizational studies, this chapter would be devoted to a review of the 
history of the organization in question.  Most organizational communication research 
conducted in the U.S. focuses on corporate entities.  In such studies, this chapter would be 
devoted to detailing the period extending from the company’s founding to the present day, 
focusing on the events leading up to and surrounding some major milestone in the 
organization’s lifespan, such as rebranding (Lievens, van Hoye, & Anseel, 2007), a merger 
(Terry, Carey & Callan, 2001) or an IPO (Gulati & Higgins, 2002).  Illustrating the history of 
an ideologically driven extremist group, however, is a more complicated endeavor than 
detailing the growth of a corporation.   
Ideological Foundations 
The group known as “al Qaeda” that claimed responsibility for the attacks on 9/11 - 
later labeled al Qaeda prime (AQP) by the U.S. intelligence community when the group 
began to splinter and form ideologically similar offshoots that operated in other areas such 
as North Africa - is generally agreed to have operated between 1988 and 2011 (Mohamedou, 
2011; Wright, 2006).  The ideological roots of the particular form of Islamism espoused by al 
Qaeda, however, can be dated back to the 14th Century (Halverson et al., 2011).  
The term “form” of Islamism is significant.  Islamism is a broad scale, extremely 
heterogeneous socio-political movement (Bayat, 2005; Halverson, 2010; Mozaffari, 2007; 
Snow & Byrd, 2007).  This depth and richness has given rise to a great deal of scholarly 
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treatment which contains - like Islamism itself - numerous diverse traditions (Mozaffari, 
2007).  One of the common failings of Western media coverage, policy language, and 
counter terrorism strategy has been to treat Islamism as a homogeneous philosophy, 
synonymous with al Qaeda’s ideology.  This erroneous view ignores the wide range of 
ideological traditions - and conflicts - contained within the greater umbrella of Islamism 
(Gerges, 2009; Reidel, 2011).   
Narrowing the focus to the rise of modern Islamism in the post-colonial era also fails 
to simplify approaches to Islamism effectively.  Islamism is an extremely broad label that 
includes peaceful, popular Islamic governance efforts, not just extremist groups.  Even 
limiting the scope of analysis to explicitly violent extremist Islamist groups yields a 
continuum of political ideologies, ethnicities, and stated goals.  Islamist groups exist for 
distinct and varied purposes (Mozaffari, 20007).  Many of them are regionally or locally 
focused and many of them espouse ideologies that conflict with each other.  Hezbollah and 
the Islamic State (Daesh), for example, are both considered Islamist extremist groups, and 
the United States considers both to be terrorist organizations, but Hezbollah is a Shia group 
and Daesh – a Sunni group – is known for its violence against Shiites.  Hezbollah operates in 
Lebanon and was founded primarily as a reaction to the Israeli occupation.  In contrast, 
Daesh’s stated goals include conquering and ruling territory in Iraq and Syria (al-Tamimi, 
2014; Hashim, 2014).  Further, both groups are ideologically incompatible with al Qaeda.  
As Baylouny (2004) discusses, Islamist groups defy neat categorization by economics 
or even religiosity as Islamists and their supporters are not quantitatively “more religious” 
than non-Islamists (p 43).  In order to present some kind of typology of the numerous 
groups operating in Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Nigeria 
and elsewhere, Gerges (2009) highlights three distinct ‘strands’ of Islamism: internal, global 
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and irredentist.  He argues that these three strands distinguish the ways in which Islamist 
groups differ regarding objectives, strategy and tactics (p. 2).  Gerges (2009), however, is 
merely one classification.  Baylouny (2004) states, “even within the same state, movements 
can have radically opposed motivating agendas (p. 44).  For this reason, Baylouny and others 
(Bayat, 2004; Gerges, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2004) approach Islamism as a broad political and 
social movement with numerous groups and trends rather than a single coherent ideology. 
Consistent with this approach, while the current project understands al Qaeda as a violent 
Islamist extremist group, no suggestion is made that al Qaeda or its offshoots are 
representative of the whole of Islamism, or even violent Islamist extremism writ large.  
Indeed, as the next chapter discusses, al Qaeda’s focus on the “far enemy” represents a 
significant shift away from most Islamist organizations that have historically been concerned 
with what al Qaeda leaders refer to as the “near enemy” – local regimes (Gerges, 2009).  Al 
Qaeda and its franchises (McCormick, 2014; Mendelsohn, 2011) are not a monolithic 
representation of Islamism as conservative Western policy language would suggest.  They are 
clearly defined, ideologically driven organizations with distinct goals, identity, geographic 
location, history and methodology of action4.  This project approaches the study of al Qaeda 
as one example of an ideologically driven organization, attempting to avoid gross 
oversimplification of a complex – and often conflicting – set of ideologies, some violent, 
many not, constructed and supported by the numerous organizations considered part of the 
modern Islamist movement.   
This chapter, therefore, is not intended to serve as a complete history of Islamism as 
a social movement or an attempt to organize the multiple ideologies and the organizations 
                                                 
4 For in-depth treatments of the diverse nature of the modern Islamist movement writ large including, history, 
divisions, and internal conflicts, see al-Zayyat (2004), Baylouny (2004), Gerges (2009), Halverson (2010), 
Haynes, (2005), Kepel (2002), Mozafari (2007), and Roy (2004). 
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that support them in the current security landscape.  That task is beyond the scope of this 
document.  Since this project is concerned with al Qaeda’s public discourse, what follows is 
a brief overview of relevant thinkers and events that influenced al Qaeda’s elites - especially 
Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri - and contributed to the foundations of al Qaeda’s 
ideological position.  It should also be made explicit that this section is concerned primarily 
with the development of al Qaeda’s ideology and should not be considered a complete 
accounting of the events that led to the founding and operation of the group itself.  Instead, 
this chapter focuses on the key contributions that the elites of al Qaeda drew upon in 
constructing al Qaeda’s unique form of Islamist ideology.  
The Muslim Brotherhood 
In 1928, Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949) founded the Egyptian Society of Muslim 
Brothers, an organization that grew to include branches in the Middle East, Africa, South 
Asia and other regions (Leiken & Brooke, 2007).  Initially the Brotherhood was conceived in 
a politically charged and contentious Egypt, rooted in the post-colonial decade and in 
reaction to remaining British presence in Egypt.  The existence and rapid growth of the 
Brotherhood is relevant to a better understanding of al Qaeda’s Islamism primarily in that it 
is credited with ushering in an era of what is generally considered “contemporary Islamism” 
(Euben & Zaman, 2009; Mura, 2012).  Born in the wake of the height of British colonial 
power, the form of Islamism that developed in Brotherhood discourse and politics was 
highly nationalist in origin, and distinctly anti-colonial and anti-West in its rhetoric.   
While al-Banna’s initial efforts were distinctly grass roots, building membership 
through focus on social welfare and tarbiyya (preaching and educating), the Society would 
eventually grow into a legitimate political actor.   The organization evolved but the emphasis 
on resistance remained and the relationship between the Brotherhood and Egypt’s 
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government has historically been contentious, oftentimes violent (Euben & Zaman, 2009: 
Kepel, 2002).  The Egyptian government attempted to disband the Brotherhood on multiple 
occasions, subsequently arresting and torturing many of its members.  In response, more 
radical factions of the Brotherhood were created that would later contribute members 
directly to al Qaeda (Leiken & Brooke, 2007).  The Brotherhood was also responsible for 
some of the formative experiences of noted Islamist writer Sayyid Qutb, whose writings 
contributed significantly to al-Zawahiri’s own ideological roots.  
The Muslim Brotherhood’s remaining emphasis on national and local action 
contributes to strained, even antagonistic contemporary relations between the Brotherhood 
and Islamists who follow bin Laden and al Zawahiri (Leiken & Brooke, 2007).  Many Sunni 
Islamists who align ideologically with al Qaeda deride modern Muslim Brotherhood 
members for rejecting global jihad and seeking to be part of a legitimized nationalistic 
government and (semi) democratic processes.  Further, unlike later Islamist thinkers, al-
Banna’s writing was mostly free of a moral component.  Particularly in comparison to 
ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, al-Banna was more of a pragmatist, focusing on reform 
rather than revolution in regard to the secular state (Euben & Zaman, 2009).  Aside from 
giving rise to a new form of political Islamist activism, the Muslim Brotherhood provided 
training and formative experiences for later noted Islamists such as Qutb and al Zawahiri.  
Qutb and Signposts 
  Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) was an Egyptian author whose prolific writings would form a 
significant influence on the thinking of al Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 
(al-Zayyat, Abu-Rabi, & Fekry, 2004).  A prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood 
during its early years, Qutb was hanged in 1966 for plotting to assassinate the Egyptian 
president, Gamal Abdel Nasser.  His imprisonment and execution by the state made him a 
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martyr in the eyes of many Islamists both inside and outside the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Leiken & Brooke, 2007).  Although deeply opposed to British power in Egypt, Qutb - 
unlike al-Banna – was not merely interested in state level reform.  Qutb argued Islamist 
organizations should not be limited to actions on a national scale.  Instead, he argued that 
there was an ongoing moral struggle between Islam as a monolithic entity and “the West” - 
also conceptualized as a singular antagonistic entity.  Qutb spent two years studying the 
American education system and returned to Egypt espousing a viewpoint of Islam as under 
attack by a morally bankrupt, pro-Israel West (Euben & Zaman, 2009).   
This perspective and the accompanying moral component to Islamist rhetoric 
became one of the most significant contributions to later Islamist ideology made by Qutb.  
He framed what he saw as an inherent conflict between the Muslim world and the West, 
arguing that the whole of modern world – including Muslim countries – had fallen into 
jahiliyyah (Shepard, 2003).  Jahiliyyah is a term normally applied by Islamic scholars to the time 
before Islam was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad.  Roughly translated it means 
‘ignorance of the divine state.’  Qutb believed that jahiliyyah was not just a description of a 
past historical state.  Nor, he argued, did it refer solely to Arabic peoples in the time before 
the revelation of the Quran.  Rather, he used jahiliyyah as a condemnation for what he viewed 
as a pervasive moral bankruptcy in contemporary societies.  This bankruptcy was prevalent 
not just in the West but in Muslim countries, countries that Qutb argued had repudiated 
God’s sovereignty and replaced it with human rule (Euben & Zaman, 2009).  Qutb viewed 
political philosophies - especially democracy - as rejecting the rule of God.  Secular 
(especially democratic) rule was therefore responsible for returning the world to a state of 
ignorance and moral decay which was resulting in the corruption of the Ummah (the 
broader global Muslim community).  For Qutb there was no distinction between 
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Communists, Arab nationalists, Muslim monarchs, or Western democracies.  All privileged 
the rule of man over divinely inspired law and therefore, all were jahili.  
Qutb’s solution to this state of moral decay was one which many scholars suggest 
draws on the work of Ibn Taymiyya.  A 14th century medieval Hanbali Muslim scholar 
(Henzel, 2005; Halverson, 2010), Ibn Taymiyya is remembered for postulating that Muslims 
had a right to overthrow non-Islamic governance even if doing so lead to Muslim casualties.  
The Hanbali School is the smallest of the four orthodox schools of Sunni jurisprudence 
(fiqh).5  The strictest and most conservative school of fiqh in Sunni Islam, adherents refuse to 
accept jurist interpretations or community consensus for the basis of Islamic law, relying 
instead on weaker–or less agreed upon–Hadiths (sayings and customs attributed to the 
prophet Muhammad) (Ramadan, 2006).  Ibn Taymiyya wrote at a time when the Mongols 
had conquered large sections of Islamic territory (Henzel, 2005).  Although they professed 
conversion to Sunni Islam, the Mongols still ruled using their traditional “Yassa” code rather 
than Shariah.  Ibn Taymiyya viewed this conversion as false and issued a fatwa declaring jihad 
against the Mongols, arguing it was not merely permissible but obligatory for Muslims to 
overthrow them.   
Drawing on Ibn Taymiyya to argue that many governments in Islamic countries were 
similar in their “falseness” to the Mongols, Qutb would later write that the only solution to 
this state of jahiliyyah was for Islamic law to be the sole source of legislation and for these 
false governments to be overthrown.  Like Ibn Taymiyya, Qutb believed it was not only 
Muslims’ right, but their duty to throw off all other forms of governance other than a 
                                                 
5 There are four major orthodox schools of fiqh in Sunni Islam: Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki and Shafi’i (Mack, 
2012). Fiqh is concerned with morals, observance of rituals, and social legislation in Islam (Glasse, 2008). It is 
beyond the scope of this project to explore the intricacies of Sunni jurisprudence but important to reiterate that 
Islam is not a homogeneous religion that is without a singular political authority or rigid hierarchy such as the 
Catholic Church. For an excellent exploration of theology and creed in Sunni Islam, see Halverson (2010) 
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singular version of Islamic law (Henzel, 2005).  It should be noted such an interpretation of 
Islamic law does not actually exist.  Islam jurisprudence relies on ongoing interpretation, 
discussion and argumentation and varies widely not just across different sects of Islam, but 
by country and region (Mack, 2012).  There is no singular, agreed up, interpretation of 
Shariah that exists across the whole of Muslim culture.  
Qutb, however, believed there was only one “true” Islam and that it should be 
enacted in all aspects of life.  This perspective, where a singular Islamic identity superseded 
all other identities - national, ethnic, etc., - would be a key aspect in al Qaeda’s justification 
for their global campaign against the West.  A significant component of that belief – and one 
that would play a major role in inspiring generations of jihadists including the eventual 
leaders of al Qaeda – is the view that jihad was not a collective duty “governed by strict rules 
and regulations (similar to just war theory in Christianity, international law and classic 
Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh)” but an individual one (Gerges, 2009, p.4).  
  Gerges (2009) argues that Qutb was the first contemporary radical thinker to 
revolutionize the concept of jihad, understanding it as “waging an eternal armed struggle 
against every obstacle that comes into the way of worshipping god and the implementation 
of the divine authority on earth” (p. 5).  In contrast to al-Banna and the majority of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, whose focus remained at the national level, Qutb viewed nationalism 
itself as a philosophy that was jahili and was, therefore, something to be overthrown through 
violence.  In his memoir, Ayman al-Zawahiri writes that Qutb’s ideas, especially about the 
sovereignty of God, as well as his violent death, “lit the first spark of jihadi fire” (Gerges, 
2009, p.5).  Although he clearly influenced the leaders of al Qaeda, Qutb championed a 
struggle against what bin Laden and Zawahiri would consider the “near” enemy rather than 
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what they termed the “far enemy6.”  By focusing their group’s actions on fighting the United 
States, Zawahiri and associates took their movement in a much different direction than 
recommended by Qutb, a direction Zawahiri would justify by arguing that the near battle 
can’t be won without taking into account “global hostility” (Kepel & Milelli, 2008).  
Abdullah Azzam 
  Like Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
an author.  His books The Defense of Muslim Territories and Join the Caravan brought a distinctly 
territorial aspect to Islamism (Hegghammer, 2008).  One of Azzam’s major ideological 
contributions to what would become al Qaeda shifted the target of jihad from the “enemy 
within” to the external enemy (Hegghammer, 2009) or from the greater jihad to the lesser 
jihad.  In Islamic exegesis, the greater jihad is considered an internal struggle to better one’s 
self in pursuit of God (Halverson, 2010; Killkullen, 2005).  Azzam argued that it was more 
important to conduct jihad against external enemies, specifically the occupation of Muslim 
territories by foreign aggressors.    
Some scholars (Burke, 2004; McGregor, 2003) suggest that Azzam’s writings helped 
redefine the Palestine/Israel conflict.  Palestine, in Azzam’s eyes, was not merely a struggle 
over the borders of a single state but a microcosm of the larger battle to free Muslim lands 
from non-Muslim forces (Hegghammer, 2008).  Although it would be al-Zawahiri who 
would shift he concept of Islam’s enemy from the “near” (regional governments) to the 
“far,” (the United States and western allies), Azzam’s writings paved the way for bin Laden 
and allies to discursively construct a global-scale fight against outside forces, namely those 
they felt were occupying Muslim territories - the ‘Jews, Crusaders, and their allies’ 
(McGregor, 2003) and frame it as a sacred conflict – jihad.  
                                                 
6 Recall this refers to the United States and Israel 
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The second major ideological contribution Azzam made situated the struggle against 
the Red Army within the missionary and messianic interpretation of Islamic history (Kepel, 
2009).  Like Qutb, Azzam imbued the struggle against the Soviets with a moral component, 
although his concern was Afghanistan and the Soviets, not Egypt and British colonialism.  In 
his work, Defense of Muslim Territories, Azzam calls the conflict against the Soviets a duty that 
should be undertaken by Muslims worldwide.  This approach led to the transcendence of the 
role of the Arab mujahidin as agents of the U.S. in the Cold War (Kepel, 2009) and would be 
a key building block in how al Qaeda came to view itself as fighting a global conflict on an 
international scale.  
Beyond ideology, Azzam made significant contributions to extremist efforts as an 
organizer, helping develop what would become known later as the global jihad.  He was 
extremely active in the Afghan conflict against the Soviets, not in physical combat but in 
writing, preaching, and using his influence to convince other Muslim countries to send men 
and money to Afghanistan (Hegghammer, 2008).  After a formal break with the authority of 
the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Azzam collaborated with the – at the time – relatively 
unknown Usama bin Laden.  Together, they organized Maktab al Khadamat or the Service 
Bureau (Hegghammer, 2008; Saghi, 2008).  The goal of the Service Bureau was facilitation.  
It assisted Arab volunteers and coordinated the distribution of new recruits to training 
facilities and battlefields for the jihad in Afghanistan (al Zayyat et al., 2004; Hegghammer, 
2008).  The Service Bureau, and its creation of Arab combat units as well as an international 
Islamist identity that transcended more local national and ethnic identities (for a time), would 
serve as the direct forerunner of al Qaeda (Hegghammer, 2009).  It would also, however, 
serve as a point of contention between Azzam and bin Laden.  Bin Laden wanted to train 
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exclusively Arab forces while Azzam thought the goal should be to draw fighters from all 
over (McGregor, 2003).  This split eventually paved the way for bin Laden’s work with  
Ayman al-Zawahiri 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s second in command under bin Laden and leader of 
the group since bin Laden’s death, serves as a point of connection between Azzam and the 
Islamist guerillas of the 1990’s (Kepel, 2009).  Lacking the media presence of the more 
charismatic bin Laden, and thus given less attention by Western press, al-Zawahiri is still 
generally thought to be the driving ideological force behind much of al Qaeda (Lacroix, 
2009).  Although he never officially allied himself with Azzam, al-Zawahiri’s own writings 
draw directly on Azzam and Qutb to argue that jihad should be considered the sixth pillar of 
Islam7 (Lacroix, 2009).  He argued that jihadist efforts should focus on the far enemy, 
represented by the United States and its allies – though this belief would not be developed 
until later in his life.  
An activist from a young age, al-Zawarhiri joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, part of 
the Egyptian jihadist movement.  Founded by a former Muslim Brotherhood member, the 
group was responsible for assassinating Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981.  Zawahiri 
believed in the goal of an Islamic state in Egypt, Afghanistan and the Sudan (Lacroix, 2009).  
Like many Islamists during Anwar Sadat’s presidency, al-Zawahiri was imprisoned and 
tortured.  Some historians suggest it was this experience that led him to become so inspired 
by Qutb’s work (al Zayyat et al., 2004).  Much of Zawahiri’s own radicalism is deeply 
influenced by Qutb’s writings (Gerges, 2009).  This influence is unsurprising, since Qutb 
specifically intended to make an impact on the next generation of Islamists, writing 
                                                 
7 The five pillars or central tenets of Islam are the demonstration of faith, prayer, charity, fasting, and the 
pilgrimage to Mecca 
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Milestones for “this vanguard” of Muslim youth in order to provide them “landmarks” on 
their journey to free Muslim societies from jahiliyyah (Gerges, 2009).  
  Like many Islamists at the time, Zawahiri’s focus was on the “near enemy” – regional 
governments.  The 1970s to mid-1990s saw militant Islamist groups working to dismantle 
local, secular social and political orders and replace them with theocratic ideologies.  
Zawahiri’s commitment to overthrowing the near enemy manifested in actions against the 
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak’s regime (Gerges, 2009).  The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and the U.S. response would shift bin Laden’s attention to the West, but al-Zawahiri in the 
early 90’s was still intent on establishing a more Islamic state in Egypt (al-Zayyat et al., 2004).  
By the mid-1990s, however, many Islamist efforts were facing defeat at the hands of local 
Muslim government security forces and the movements were losing momentum.  In 1995 
both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri were forced from the Sudan, and they moved to 
Afghanistan after bin Laden negotiated an arrangement with the Taliban (al-Zayyat et al., 
2004).  
During this period, jihadist groups faced significant opposition and many fractured or 
disbanded. Out of this fragmentation came the transnationalists - among them bin Laden 
and Zawahiri – who would soon gain prominence in Islamist circles.  Emboldened by the 
retreat of the Russians from Afghanistan, Islamists like bin Laden turned their energy and 
goals outward.  It was around this time that Zawahiri claimed he realized that jihad failed 
against the near enemy because the members of the Islamist groups had isolated themselves 
from the broader Muslim community.  In doing so, he suggested, they failed to mobilize the 
Ummah (al-Zayyat et al., 2004; al-Zawahiri, 2001).   
Zawahiri also posited that no significant gains could be made against local 
governments without first defeating Western and Israeli forces in the Middle East (the 
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“Zionist-Crusader alliance”) (Gerges, 2001).  Zawahiri blamed the West, particularly the 
United States, for propping up corrupt non-Muslim governments, arguing that Muslim 
societies would never be free until the Western forces controlling even supposedly “Islamic” 
regimes had fallen (al Zayyat et al., 2004).  This focus on the U.S. and Israel – known as al-
Adou al-Baeed, the Far Enemy (Gerges, 2009, p.1) – would become a hallmark of al Qaeda’s 
ideology and the driving force behind their operational tactics.  
In 1998, in conjunction with bin Laden, Zawahiri formed the International Islamic 
Front for the Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (al-Zayyat et al., 2004), issuing a fatwa 
claiming it was compulsory for all Muslims to fight Americans, including civilians, and take 
their money.  For Zawahiri, the only acceptable form of jihad was armed struggle, and the 
purpose of that struggle was to confront the true threat to the greater Muslim community, 
the “Zionists, the Crusaders and the communists” (al-Zayyat et al., 2004, p. 63).  Al Qaeda 
was not officially formed so much as it coalesced out of the ongoing training and operations 
efforts that al-Zawahiri and bin Laden created.  
Usama bin Laden 
The ‘face’ of the 9/11 attacks, more has been written by Western authors about 
Usama bin Laden than other members of al Qaeda (Bergen, 2002).  Born in Riyadh in 1957, 
bin Laden was part of the generation of Saudis that benefited from the sudden and massive 
influx of oil revenue (Saghi, 2008).  His family was extremely wealthy, and bin Laden’s early 
‘career’ mainly consisted of financing the Syrian Muslim Brothers in their efforts to 
overthrow president Hafez al-Assad (Saghi, 2008).  Later, when the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan, bin Laden was one of many Arabs who took it upon themselves to support the 
resistance.  Most scholars (Bergen, 2002; Wright, 2006) seem to agree that bin Laden was 
barely involved in the physical conflict.  Instead, because of his family’s wealth and his 
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connections, he became known among young Saudis for encouraging support (mostly 
monetarily) of the mujahidin (Saghi, 2008).  This trend continued when he worked with 
Abdullah Azzam to create Maktab al-Khadamat.  There too, bin Laden served primarily as the 
financier while Azzam was the driving ideological force.  Much has been written elsewhere 
about the role the Afghan jihad played in creating the groups that would become the 
mujahidin (Burke, 2004a).  The most important takeaway in regard to this project is that in its 
efforts to cost the Soviets the most amount of money and manpower, the United States was 
at least partially responsible for training and arming the Afghan fighters who would 
eventually go on to utilize the skills they developed against the Soviets, applying them in an 
ideological conflict with the United States and its allies.   
The power vacuum created by the looming end of the Soviet occupation and their 
retreat from Afghanistan also contributed to a divergence between bin Laden and Azzam 
that led to bin Laden and al-Zawahiri collaborating and (it is speculated) Azzam’s eventual 
assassination (Wright, 2006).  In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and bin Laden offered the 
assistance of his Arab fighters to protect the borders of Saudi Arabia.  In bin Laden’s mind, 
the Land of the two holy cities (Mecca and Medina) should have protected by Arab Muslim 
fighters.  Instead, the Saudis looked to the West and accepted an international coalition of 
troops led by the United States which led to the establishment of U.S. bases within the 
borders of the Kingdom.  For bin Laden, U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia was 
unacceptable.  He and many other Islamists viewed the move as an occupation of historical 
sacred ground by a non-Muslim power (Lacroix, 2008).  It was around this time bin Laden’s 
focus began to shift to the West, while Zawahiri was still concerned with establishing an 
Islamic state in Egypt (al Zayyat et al., 2004).  In 1998, however, Zawahiri, having given up 
his efforts in Egypt, formed the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and 
  27 
Crusaders with bin Laden.  Al Qaeda - simply “the base” was born in a suburb of Peshawar, 
Pakistan.  It was originally conceived as a training camp, hence the name (McCormic, 2014) 
that would stick and go on to become infamous.  
Anwar al-Awlaki    
American-born al-Awlaki was best known for his charismatic presence and 
effectiveness in recruiting new members to work toward al Qaeda’s goals and became one of 
al Qaeda’s most visible members, contributing significantly to the media presence of al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  Al-Awlaki was seven when his parents returned to 
their home country of Yemen where he stayed for the next 11 years, attending school before 
coming back to the United States to attend university in Colorado.  A popular imam outside 
of D.C., (Berger, 2011) al-Awlaki would initially be viewed by the press as a model moderate 
Muslim (Shane & Mekhennet, 2010).   
The extent of his involvement with extremist groups prior to 9/11 is still contested, 
and there are conflicting accounts regarding his role in radicalizing individuals (Berger, 2011).  
The aspects of al-Awlaki’s life relevant to this project, however, are fairly well documented.  
He left the United States in 2002 (Berger, 2011) to move to the United Kingdom (Shane & 
Mekhennet, 2010) where the rhetoric of his speeches grew more extreme, urging distrust of 
non-Muslims.  In 2004, he returned to Yemen (Schmidt, 2008) and was imprisoned in 2006 
in connection with the kidnapping of a Shia student and participating in an al Qaeda plot to 
kidnap a U.S. military attaché (Shane & Mekhennet, 2010).  
In 2006, he also produced Constants on the Path of Jihad, an audio recording which was 
published on the web and had significant influence in extremist circles (Berger, 2011).  In 
Constants, he expanded on Arab-language al Qaeda discourse, updating it with his own 
interpretations.  According to al-Awlaki, jihad “was not merely a matter of political 
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grievances; it is also for fighting those who do not accept Islam” (Berger, 2011 ¶ 35).  For al-
Awlaki, jihad was more than a defensive action, it should be conducted for the promulgation 
of Islam.  This view would become integrated into al Qaeda’s public rhetoric and echoed by 
other al Qaeda elites in their public discourse (Shane, 2016).  By 2010, al-Awlaki was 
regularly appearing in official al Qaeda produced media and the leader of AQAP released a 
public statement claiming al-Awlaki as one of their own (Brachman, 2016).  
Although noted for his influence in recruitment, al-Awlaki’s greatest legacy remains 
his significant online presence.  Fluent in both English and Arabic, charismatic and well 
spoken, al-Awlaki is generally viewed by the intelligence community as one of al Qaeda’s key 
public propagandists (Brachman, 2016) and operations leaders (Schmitt, 2015).  At the time 
of his death by a U.S. drone strike in 2011, al-Awlaki had a massive internet presence with 
appearances in nearly 2000 extremist videos, many of which were ‘fan videos’ made by 
individuals who were sympathetic to al Qaeda’s ideological position, but not actually 
members (Burke, 2016).  He is also credited with inspiring individual extremists and 
members of Deash to this day.  Shane (2016) writes:  
His influence has lived on into the Islamic State era, enhanced by his status as a 
martyr for Islam in the eyes of his admirers.  His massive internet presence has 
turned up as a factor in several attacks since his death, including most recently the 
San Bernardino shootings and the Orlando nightclub attack as well as a significant 
number of terrorism cases on both sides of the Atlantic.  Despite his long association 
with al-Qa`ida and that network’s rivalry with the upstart Islamic State, al-Awlaki has 
been embraced by the Islamic State and its followers, and he continues to inspire 
terrorism from beyond the grave (¶1) 
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Adam Gadahn 
Born Adam Pearlman, Adam Gadahn or “Azzam the American” was also a U.S. 
citizen who grew up in Oregon and California.  Though raised in a family that identified as 
Christian with grandparents who were Jewish, he converted to Islam as a teenager living in 
California (Khatchadourian, 2007).  In 1998, Gadahn moved to Pakistan (CNN library, 
2016).  There is little public record (currently) of how Gadahn came to be a member of al 
Qaeda, but what is relevant is that it did not take long for him to become a prominent public 
figure for the organization (Khatchadourian, 2007).   
Unlike al-Awlaki, Gadahn was not thought to have been a senior strategist.  
Although considered one of bin Laden’s closest operatives (Khatchadourian, 2007), 
Gadahn’s role was primarily that of a spokesperson.  As a convert, he was described as 
having particular zeal for al Qaeda’s cause (Kamolnick, 2015).  Before he was killed in a 
drone strike, Gadahn was heavily8 involved in as-Sahab, al Qaeda’s media arm (Whitlock, 
2008).  Acting as translator, producer, spokesperson, and “cultural interpreter,” Gadahn is 
credited with producing and influencing multiple al Qaeda videos and responsible for the 
high quality of English subtitles as well as U.S. pop culture references that appear in some 
(Kamolnick, 2015; Khatchadourian, 2007). 
On the fifth anniversary of 9/11, al Qaeda published a video featuring Gadahn 
wherein Ayman al-Zawahiri referred to him as a, “perceptive person who wants to lead his 
people out of darkness into the light” (Khatchadourian, 2007, ¶ 1).  As Khatchadourian, 
writes, al Qaeda had never given such an endorsement to one of its members, let alone an 
American.  Gadahn’s zealotry and his repeated call for U.S. citizens to embrace Islam and 
                                                 
8 It is somewhat unclear the extent to which Gadahn was involved in the creation of as-Sahab, but he was 
featured in the group’s first produced pieces of media. 
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join al Qaeda’s efforts clearly made an impression on the senior leadership.  Despite his 
visibility, however, analysts suggest that Gadahn’s death was not significantly detrimental to 
al Qaeda’s operations as a whole, though some suggest there was a decrease in quality in as-
Sahab productions.  His contributions to al Qaeda itself are seen as largely in providing a very 
public western face and an excellent conduit to reach out to Western audiences – whether 
adversarial, or potential recruits.9 
Summary 
This project is partially motivated by the oft-heard question voiced in media 
coverage and policy circles about “what makes al Qaeda’s communication so successful?”  
Organizational scholars (Czarniawksa-Joerges, 1998, Karreman & Alvesson, 2004, Mumby, 
1988) conceptualize ideology as a key site for organizational control and one of the ways 
organizations influence and regulate member identity (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  To 
support the intended goals of this project, this chapter briefly highlights major influences in 
the development of al Qaeda’s unique organizational ideology.  Since the focus of this 
project is on the discursive construction of organizational and member identity, an 
exhaustive history of the actions of the group are beyond the scope of this project and can 
be found elsewhere.  Many security studies have already examined the group’s military 
history in detail (McCormick, 2014).  This chapter was included primarily to help familiarize 
readers without a experience in counter terrorism with sufficient background to 
contextualize this project.   
Empirical research projects are often lengthy in execution.  In between the original 
conceptualization of this project and its completion, a splinter of the group al Qaeda in Iraq 
                                                 
9 In terms of understanding the process of radicalization for domestic counter-terrorism efforts, however, 
Gadahn provided a vital case study. See Sageman (2004) 
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eventually broke away and were ‘disowned’ by the al Qaeda franchise (Joscelyn, 2014; 
Mendelsohn, 2011).  The group, which changed names several times and has been known as 
‘The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,’ ‘The Islamic State in Syria’ and finally ‘The 
Islamic State’ operates with a distinct ideology that is disparate from al Qaeda’s (Bymann, 
2015).  Known in Arabic as Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, the group rose to 
violent prominence and captured significant territory in Syria and Iraq in 2013-2014.  The 
next chapter provides an overview of Daesh and its connection to al Qaeda prime.  Chapter 
three also includes relevant differences in the goals and ideology of Daesh and al Qaeda and 
offers an explanation for why Daesh is not included in the scope of this project.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ISLAMIC STATE/DAESH 
This project explores narrative construction of identity in al Qaeda’s public 
discourse.  Given recent events in Iraq and Syria, however, it is worth addressing ad-Dawlah 
al Islamiyah fil-‘Iraq was-Sham, the violent extremist group commonly referred to in U.S. media 
as the Islamic State (IS).  The group was at one time allied with al Qaeda, operating as a 
semi-formal offshoot of al Qaeda in Iraq (Globalsecurity.com).  Since its inception, IS has 
gone through several name changes, known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and, most recently, it has re-branded itself the 
Islamic State.  The international security community, however, generally refers to the group 
by the acronym for their name in Arabic, “Daesh.”  This label is an example of strategic 
communication: Daesh is similar to an Arabic word that means “to crush under foot” 
(Sommers, 2014), an association the group itself does not want.  Using the acronym is a way 
to de-legitimize the group’s actions and claims of representing Islam as a whole and is 
common among U.S. military partners in Gulf States (Sommers, 2014).  Publicly labeling the 
group Daesh also denies their desired status as a legitimate state, which undermines one of 
Daesh’s central goals.  The rest of this project will utilize the label Daesh. 
Origins of Daesh 
The following chapter provides a brief overview of the origin of Daesh, its alliance 
with al Qaeda and where it differs in goals and ideology from al Qaeda.  The first section 
discusses the group’s origins as a splinter of AQI and its evolution to Daesh.  The remaining 
sections discuss why including Daesh – despite the availability of significant amounts of 
public discourse produced by the organization – in the data for this project is beyond the 
scope of the proposed study. 
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Daesh is a Salafi militant group currently operating in Syria and Iraq whose goal is 
the establishment and expansion of a caliphate – or Islamic state – governed by Daesh’s 
particular interpretation of Islamic law (stanford.edu).  Salafism is an ultra-conservative 
movement within Sunni Islam that encourages members to emulate the Prophet Muhammad 
and his earliest followers, the al-salaf al-salih or ‘pious forefathers’ (Amman, 2015).  Salafism 
is associated with a strict, literal approach to Islam.  Salafists10 are broadly categorized into 
three groups: purists who avoid engaging in political action; activists who seek to bring their 
views into the mainstream political arena; and extremists – like al Qaeda and Daesh – who 
comprise a small if well-known violent minority (Amman, 2015).  In 2014, Daesh 
accomplished their stated goal of establishing a caliphate, announcing the creation of an 
“Islamic state” and named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph (Furlow & Fleischer, 2014).  
Although the legitimacy and longevity of the caliphate remains a point of extreme 
contention both within Muslim communities and security analysts, at the time of writing this 
section, the caliphate still exists. 
 Similar to many organizations considered part of the modern Islamist movement, 
the origins of Daesh are somewhat convoluted.  Daesh’s history can be divided into three 
fairly distinct time periods, however.  The first, from 2002-2006, encompasses the 
beginnings of the group under the leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born 
Salafi extremist who trained groups of militants but held no significant national or 
organizational allegiance (Teslik, 2006).  The second period – from June 2006 to roughly 
December 2011 – is often described as one of decline for the group (Lewis, 2013) as 
Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. strike and Iraqi Sunnis protested the presence of foreign 
fighters in the group.  In contrast, the final period, from early 2012 until 2015 was marked by 
                                                 
10 For more about the relationships between schools of Islamic thought, see Halverson (2010). 
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significant expansion, territory gain, media presence and increasing world-wide attention 
given to their territorial gains and violent tactics (Reuters, 2015). 
2002-2006 
Comparatively less is known about Abu Musab al Zarqawi than other major figures 
connected with al Qaeda.  Zarqawi’s influence on the broader Islamist movement is still a 
subject of debate, and it was not until he was credited with the formation of Jama’at al Tawid 
wa’al-Jihad (JTJ) that most intelligence sources agreed on his activities (BBC.co.uk, 2004).  
Until that point, Zarqawi was painted as having little allegiance to a particular cause or 
nation.  Most analysts suggest that he was primarily involved in training fighters for the 
broader Islamist movement and was more focused on the “near” enemies of Israel and the 
Jordanian government than supporting the quest to defeat the “far enemy” that was the 
hallmark of al Qaeda’s (AQP) ideology (Bergen, Felter, Brown & Shapiro, 2008).   
Disagreement over the main target of extremists’ efforts would be an ongoing point 
of tension between Zarqawi and AQP leadership and was likely at least partially responsible 
– along with the extreme violence Zarqawi’s organization would employ – for the brief 
nature of the partnership between Zarqawi and bin Laden (Bergen, et al, 2008).  This 
difference, however, did not stop bin Laden from apparently providing Zarqawi with funds 
to set up a training camp to train fighters even before any type of formal alliance was formed 
(Kirdar, 2011).  In 2001, after the American strikes on Afghanistan, Zarqawi and his men 
moved to Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Kurdish areas of Iraq (Kirdar, 2011).  When the U.S. 
invaded Iraq, JTJ was one of the most prominent and active groups engaged in attempting to 
drive coalition forces back out of the country and disrupt the government transition.    
Zarqawi and bin Laden reached a formal agreement in October of 2004, and JTJ was 
renamed Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn more commonly known in English as Al 
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Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Felter & Fishman, 2007).  Before continuing, a point should be made 
to clarify the label “al Qaeda in Iraq.” From the Center for Combating Terrorism Website: 
There has never been an organization with the name “al-Qa`ida in Iraq.” This name, 
however, has referred to the fighters in al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, Tanzim al-Qa`ida fi Bilad 
al-Rafidayn, Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin, Hilf al-Muttaybin, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 
and now finally the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). During the first 
Falluja battle, these fighters fought under the name al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, under the 
command of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi then declared his bay`a (oath) to 
Usama bin Ladin, and Bin Ladin accepted it in October 2004. At that point, the 
organization’s name was changed to Tanzim al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. This article 
refers to all these fighters as AQI.  (Knights, 2014, ¶ 19).  
For the sake of brevity, however, since Zarqawi’s group operated under an official 
and public alliance with al Qaeda and because the majority of the security community still 
refers to the organization as ‘al Qaeda in Iraq’ (AQI) this paper will do the same.  
While many Sunnis in Iraq were initially sympathetic to AQI’s stated goals of driving 
coalition forces out, the groups violent tactics were a point of significant criticism from local 
populations and AQP leadership (Bergen, et al, 2008) and were a major point of contention 
between AQI and AQP.  AQI’s willingness to target fellow Iraqis and popular Sunni leaders 
and their incitement of sectarian violence drew criticism from al Qaeda leadership and the 
local populace.  In addition, the perception that most of the fighters and too much of the 
leadership of AQI were foreign – Zarqawi himself was Jordanian – led to significant 
backlash from other local radical groups that had praised AQI’s actions in the past (Bergen, 
et al, 2008).  As criticism mounted, AQI joined an umbrella network of other Iraqi Salafist 
groups in a move intended to present the organization as more “Iraqi.”  Ultimately, however, 
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the symbolic gesture made little difference in public perceptions of the group.  No 
significant changes were made in leadership or tactics and support declined further.  In June 
of 2006, Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike (Felter & Fishman, 2007).  
2006-2011 
 In the wake of Zarqawi’s death, AQI promoted Abu Ayub al-Masri, an Egyptian, to 
be Zarqawi’s successor.  The promotion failed to diminish criticism that AQI was composed 
primarily of foreigners, however, and in response Masri convinced several other groups to 
merge with his, declaring the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).  Though the 
group still operated nominally under the AQI brand (De Young & Pincus, 2007), Masri 
placed Abu Uma al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi (not the same al-Baghdadi who Daesh would later 
name the caliph), at the head of ISI in hopes that it would quiet the perception that AQI was 
a foreign organization (Fishman, Brown, Shapiro, & Bergen, 2008).  Like previous attempts, 
this move was also unsuccessful, and the foreign presence in leadership and membership 
continued to alienate local Iraqis (Fishman, et al., 2008).  
Local resistance to ISI contributed to the development of a Sunni movement in the 
Anbar Province known as the Anbar Awakening.  Anbar tribes in the region began to 
cooperate with U.S. forces against ISI and AQI, making a significant impact on the 
insurgency’s ability to operate or continue providing security and enforcing its hold over the 
areas where it operated.  In 2008, some reports suggested that coalition forces had killed 
approximately 2,200 AQI members and taken 8,800 prisoners (Kirdar, 2011) and by the 
spring of 2009, the U.S. was funding nearly 100,000 local Sunnis to fight AQI.  AQI’s 
position deteriorated rapidly after that, as local fighters working with the U.S. engaged in a 
vigorous campaign against the group, warning potential recruits not to join and assassinating 
current known members.  AQI was further weakened when a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid killed both 
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Masri and Abu Uma al-Baghdadi.  After the raid, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed control of 
AQI, but the group lost most of its credibility and operational capability and was largely 
irrelevant until coalition forces withdrew in 2011 (Lewis, 2013).  
2012-2015 
The withdrawal of coalition forces marked a major turning point for AQI.  Without 
the pressure of allied troops, the group began to increase its operations again, and the 
number of attacks grew significantly in 2012 and 2013 (Hashim, 2014).  Local politics played 
a role in the growth of the group’s activities too as Sunnis in Iraq began protesting the Shiite 
Maliki government in the Anbar province (Zachary & Masters, 2014). The ongoing Syrian 
civil war also provided an excellent opportunity for AQI.  The group used the conflict in 
Syria both as a training ground to school new fighters and tool for expansion to claim new 
territory in Syria (Zelin, 2014).  Then, in April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced AQI 
operations in Syria.  At this point, the group’s name was officially changed to the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Zachary & Masters, 2014).  Baghdadi claimed that AQI had 
also created the al-Nusra front in Syria, saying the two groups were now merged into one.  
Both the al-Nusra leadership and al Qaeda prime (AQP) leadership, however, disputed this 
claim (Thomas, 2013; Zelin, 2014a).  While the conflict in Syria is credited with reviving the 
Iraqi extremist movement, it also contributed to the eventual split between the still nascent 
Daesh and the al Qaeda leadership (Byman, 2015).  AQP - in the form of Zawahiri - 
officially renounced any connection with ISIS/Daesh in February of 2014 (Thomas, 2014).  
In terms of organizational strategy, the split with al Qaeda Prime was ultimately a 
good choice for Daesh.  The group grew in size and power as it continued operations in 
Syria and Iraq.  Despite being in conflict with nearly everyone – including the governments 
of Iraq and Syria, tribal groups and militias in Iraq, the Kurdish Pesh Merga, and various 
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rebel groups in Syria – Daesh made large territorial gains beginning in January 2014.  By 
March, it seized Mosul (BBC.co.uk, 2014a).  On June 29, 2014, after conquering territory in 
Syria, Daesh officially declared a caliphate, naming Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph and 
changing their name to the “Islamic State” (Pizzi, 2014).  Then in May of 2015, Daesh seized 
Ramadi, the capital of the Anbar province.  At present, the group’s territorial gains have 
slowed but it is still considered an extreme and active threat to the stability of the region 
(Reuters, 2015,) though not directly to the United States (Byman, 2015).  
Daesh and al Qaeda 
The affiliation between al Qaeda Prime (AQP) and Zarqawi’s organizations that 
created the nucleus of AQI is largely agreed by security experts to have been more an 
alliance of strategic convenience than an ideological marriage (Kirdar, 2011).  Major 
differences – most significantly over whom should be the primary target of jihadist 
campaigns – between bin Laden and Zarqawi existed from the start and were never resolved, 
merely laid aside in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Hashim, 2014).  Zarqawi was 
much more concerned with the near enemy, regional governments such as Jordan and Israel 
that he saw as a threat to Muslim populations in the Middle East.  AQI was also virulently 
anti-Shia, well beyond even al Qaeda’s general anti-Shia ideology (Hashim, 2014).  Indeed, 
AQI – later Daesh – would be known and widely criticized for their violence against 
multiple local groups, not just U.S. and coalition forces.   
Significant disagreement between AQI and AQP also existed over what each group 
viewed as the end goal of jihadist efforts.  As discussed in chapter two, bin Laden saw the 
U.S. as the root cause of problems in the Middle East, responsible for propping up the 
“apostate” local Muslim regimes (Gerges, 2009).  With strategy based on a long-term vision, 
al Qaeda prime leaders believed that targeting the United States and other western allies 
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would eventually result in the U.S. removing support from those local regimes and 
withdrawing from the region, creating a power vacuum and political vulnerabilities that al 
Qaeda could exploit.  AQI may have wanted the Americans to withdraw from the Middle 
East, but the group was primarily concerned with the local landscape.  The ultimate goal of 
AQI leadership focused on a victory that included not only driving the coalition forces out 
of Iraq but also establishing a territorial hold under a Caliphate.  This desire to gain and 
govern physical territory and administrate it constitute the most significant difference 
between Daesh’s methods and al Qaeda’s.  While al Qaeda generally prefers large-scale 
dramatic attacks against strategic or symbolic targets, Daesh employs a strategy based on 
territory control, steadily consolidating and expanding its position (Beinart, 204; Byman, 
2015).  Daesh, “seeks to conquer; thus it deploys artillery, massed force, and even tanks and 
MANPADS as it sweeps into new areas or defends existing holdings” (Byman, 2015, ¶ 22). 
Ideological Incompatibility 
By the definition of this project, Daesh is an ideologically driven organization.  
During the period of time they were officially allied with AQP the group regarded 
“secularism, nationalism, tribalism, Baathism and other ideological commitments as 
violations of Islam” (“Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State” ¶ 37).  Daesh 
declared themselves committed to spreading their own extremist interpretation of Islam with 
the ultimate goal of eliminating all other systems of belief globally (Hashim, 2014).  Because 
of this Daesh is generally considered an extremist Islamist organization, advocating and 
attempting to enforce their own violent Salafi Islamist ideology on their controlled 
territories, employing exceptionally public and violent tactics.  There is no denying the 
danger Daesh continues to represent regionally (Beinart, 2014; Byman, 2015).  Daesh’s 
methods are incredibly violent, even compared to other Salafist groups, and they have 
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committed numerous atrocities such as public beheadings (Reuters, 2015a).  
Much has been written about the group’s savvy in utilizing new communication 
technologies and social media to publicize their goals and ideology (Hashim, 2014).  In its 
iterations as both AQI and Daesh, the group has been extremely prolific with regard to 
public communication.  Significant amounts of data exist for exploration by social science 
scholars.  Despite the sheer amount of data available, however, AQI and its current 
organizational form Daesh, are not included in this study.  While much remains to be done 
examining identity construction in Islamist extremist groups, the current project is focused 
on al Qaeda as the major ideological forerunner to groups like Daesh.  Studying Daesh 
without first examining al Qaeda would be neglecting a rich and vital part of modern 
extremist Islamist history.  From a practical perspective, including Daesh in a study focusing 
on al Qaeda would make the scope of the project unwieldy as it would by necessity become 
a study contrasting the construction of two distinct ideologies.  At present, intelligence 
experts suggest not only are al Qaeda and Daesh not ideologically compatible, the two 
groups are in direct competition for resources, fighters and ideological “clout” (Byman, 
2015).  Thus, despite a past alliance with AQP and operating (nominally) under the AQI 
moniker, the ongoing ideological disagreements, significant conflict over goals and operating 
tactics, and eventual split from any formal relationship with al Qaeda make including Daesh 
beyond the scope of the proposed project.  
In sum, Daesh is not (and some might argue never has been) truly ideologically 
compatible with al Qaeda.  While Daesh offers significant opportunity for study by 
organizational communication scholars, this project is intended to focus on al Qaeda as a 
significant factor in the modern Islamist extremist movement.  Because of the history of 
these two groups, it is possible to study al Qaeda without first focusing on Daesh.  It would 
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be irresponsible, however, to examine Daesh without first studying al Qaeda.  Ergo, while 
exploration of the narrative construction of identity in Daesh’s public discourse is a logical 
next step for researchers in this area, this particular project is concerned solely with 
examining al Qaeda prime and will not include an analysis of Deash’ organizational identity.  
The next chapter offers a theoretical grounding for this project and suggests research 
questions to guide the study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL GROUNDING AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter outlines a theoretical framework for an approach to studying 
ideologically driven organizations (IDOs), with emphasis on the context of violent 
asymmetric conflict.  The first section of this review discusses research influencing policy 
making in the context of asymmetric warfare, paying attention to the growing field of 
strategic communication.  Following that, recent scholarship exploring al Qaeda and violent 
ideological extremism from a variety of perspectives is reviewed, highlighting problematic 
trends, tensions, and gaps in the literature that suggest the need for a more specific 
conceptualization of al Qaeda.  An argument is then made for an organizational 
communication approach to studying ideologically driven extremism.  Specifically, this 
review focuses on the salience of identity concepts as a lens through which to study 
ideologically driven organizing.  Lastly, research questions are proposed to guide the study. 
Policy Influences  
Strategic Communication 
 One of the outcomes of the post 9/11 security environment and the spread of al 
Qaeda’s ideology is the growing attention paid to the communicative aspects of violent 
conflict in military and policy circles (Argenti, Howell, & Beck, 2005; Corman, 2011; Darley, 
2007; Hughes, 2007; Krawchuk, 2006; Lapidus, 2004; Louw, 2003; Mullen, 2009).  Tatham 
(2008) suggests that one of the major consequences of the growth of asymmetric conflict is 
that, “Conveying information messages to specific audiences, in order to affect behavioral 
change for specific political objectives may well prove more decisive in future battles than 
the placement of bombs and bullets on a target” (p. 1).  
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Definition disagreement.  Currently, the collection of practices, policies and 
scholarship associated with communication in the context of violent conflict is being 
gathered under the umbrella term, “strategic communication” or “stratcom” (Corman, 2011; 
Tatham, 2008).  Stratcom has become something of a buzzword in security circles, and there 
is little consistency in its definition.  Definitions of strategic communication range from 
simplistic, “communication that is aligned with a company’s strategy” (Argenti, Howell & 
Beck, 2005) to much more detailed conceptions such as Tatham’s (2008): 
A systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, 
operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences, 
identifies effective conduits, and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through 
those conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behavior (p.3).   
Underlying, if implied in these definitions is the concern with persuading and 
influencing behavior.  Depending on how encompassing the definition of persuasion is, 
strategic communication can be used to describe activities as diverse as advertising, political 
speeches, public diplomacy – itself a complicated and often contested general term for 
multiple forms of communication strategies (Gregory, 2005; Kennedy & Lucas, 2005; 
McHale, 2010; Nye, 2008) – information operations, marketing techniques designed to 
induce specific behaviors, social media efforts, and propaganda (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006).  
Historical foundations.  The origins of the Western tradition of persuasive 
communication can be traced back to the sophists of Greece, although most scholars ground 
the birth of modern strategic communication or “stratcom” efforts in the propaganda of 
WWI and WWII (Hallorhan, 2007; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006).  Present-day studies of 
strategic communication efforts generally avoid the term “propaganda,” however.  In the 
denotative sense, “propaganda” merely means to disseminate or promote a particular idea.  
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The history of labels for focused communication efforts falling in and out of fashion in 
terms of acceptability may serve to explain the current popularity of “stratcom” as well as 
the lack of agreed-upon understanding of just what strategic communication is.   
Offering a definitive conceptualization of stratcom, however, is beyond the scope of 
this study.  While defending a singular position on a definition of stratcom may have 
significance for government departments justifying budgets, in the context of extending the 
field of research, overly rigid definitions may hinder theoretical growth.  Ultimately, stratcom 
can be considered the most recent term applied to a range of purposeful communicative 
efforts intended to influence or persuade particular audiences (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006).  
This chapter reviews influences, practices, and policies currently falling under the “stratcom” 
label.  
American corporate influence.  The growing trend centering stratcom in military 
and public diplomacy efforts indicates a positive change in policy making direction, away 
from total reliance on kinetic force (Argent, Howell, & Beck, 2005; Casebeer & Russel, 2005; 
Corman, 2011, Corman, Trethewey, & Goodall, 2008).  The effectiveness of stratcom as a 
field of research and practice is currently undermined, however, by the application of models 
drawn from American corporate practices.  Prevalent during the George W. Bush 
administration, this trend has resulted in imposing concepts such as branding, (Edwards, 
2009) message control, and audience segmentation (Helmus, Paul & Glenn, 2007) on 
government public diplomacy and military stratcom efforts.  These fields are still largely 
grounded in the message influence model or “magic bullet” model of communication that 
assumes communication is the transmission of messages from a sender through a channel to 
a receiver.  “Noise” may interfere with the transmission, but as long as the message is 
received, communication will be successful (Corman, Trethewey & Goodall, 2007).  
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Reliance on the message influence model led to strategies emphasizing repetition of 
messages, an obsession with “message control” (Corman & Dooley, 2008), and a belief that 
better “branding” of U.S. policy will solve the “message problem” (Argenti, Howell & Beck, 
2005; Helmus, Paul & Glenn, 2007).  Problematic results of this trend are exemplified by 
statements such as, “The nation that has produced Microsoft, Apple and Google now finds 
itself playing catch-up on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter with an extremist group rooted in 
7th century Arabia” (Gaouette, 2014 ¶ 6).  Secretary of Defense Gates was quoted multiple 
times lamenting that, “The U.S. is being out-communicated by a guy in a cave” (DeYoung & 
Pincus, 2008, ¶ 5).  In a RAND report extolling the virtues of business stratcom models’ 
applicability to public diplomacy and military contexts, Helmus, Paul & Glenn (2007) write, 
“Businesses seek to create products or provide services that meet the needs and satisfy the 
desires of the marketplace” (p. 58).  
Unfortunately, the metaphor of the business model is flawed when applied to armed 
conflict.  Civilian populations in theaters of combat are not customers choosing between 
two brands of ideology.  Policy making that fails to recognize the complexities of the 
discursive landscape has far reaching negative consequences.  Overly simplistic, business-
based models of stratcom are more likely to fail in the context of ideologically driven conflict 
because they do not respond to the complexities of communication as a meaning-making 
process (Corman, Trethewey & Goodall, 2007; Jones, 2006).  Meanings – unlike messages – 
cannot simply be transferred from sender to receiver.  Instead, receivers of a message “create 
meanings from messages based on factors like autobiography, history, local context, culture, 
language and symbol systems, power relations and personal needs” (Corman, Trethewey & 
Goodall, 2007. p. 156).  Messages are always interpreted within larger, ongoing 
communication systems, never understood in a vacuum. 
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In the context of violent international conflict, reliance on inaccurate communication 
models has implications both for policy creation and theory building.  Practically, efforts to 
develop strategic communication practices that fail to take into account the meaning-making 
and process aspects of communication risk ineffectiveness.  With regard to theory building, 
stratcom as a field is still emerging, and would benefit from efforts to increase the depth and 
robustness of research into asymmetric kinetic conflict (Tatham, 2008).  At present, the lack 
of theoretical robustness in stratcom efforts in the context of asymmetric warfare could be 
mitigated at least in part by the inclusion of an organizational communication perspective.  
An organizational communication perspective addresses constitutive aspects of 
organizational discourse and responds to the complexities of communication as on-going 
processes of meaning making, rather than a static representation of reality (Fairhurst & 
Putnman, 2004).   
At present, however, communication scholars have been reluctant to interrogate 
communication processes during violent international conflicts.  Most studies of the post-
9/11 conflict in the communication discipline have been conducted from a domestic 
perspective focused on American mass media (Lewis & Reese, 2009) or political rhetoric 
(Kellner, 2007).  The majority of research exploring violent extremism and al Qaeda in 
particular has been conducted from a variety of perspectives and theoretical traditions 
outside the communication discipline.  The next section offers a brief overview of this 
research, reviewing strands of current research exploring violent Sunni extremism and al 
Qaeda.  
Researching ‘al Qaeda’ 
Existing scholarship examining al Qaeda is diverse.  The events of 9/11, the 
phenomenon of international terrorism, and al Qaeda’s role have been examined via the lens 
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of intelligence analysis (Stewart, 2010), international relations (Snyder, 2011), military policy 
and practice (Kilcullen, 2007; Tatham, 2008), religious studies (Euben & Zaman, 2009; Roy, 
2004) individual biographical studies (Kepel & Milelli, 2008; al-Zayyat et al., 2004), and 
behavioral sciences, (Borum & Gelles, 2005).  The variety of paradigmatic perspectives has 
resulted in significant variation in the conceptualized of al Qaeda (Sutton & Vertigans, 2006).  
Al Qaeda has been described as everything from an isolated terrorist group (Gunaratna, 
2010) to a social movement (Bayat, 2005).  It is emblematic of a new type of terrorism 
(Gunaratna, 2010).  It is not an example of a new form of terrorism (Spencer, 2010).  It is a 
bureaucratic organization (Kurzman, 2002) or mostly a media message (Brachman, 2008).  It 
is a group, a movement or even a faith (Sutton & Vertigans, 2006).  
  This lack of clear conceptualization regarding al Qaeda and ideologically affiliated 
organizations has led to eclectic and often contradictory theoretical development.  The 
diversity of existing research is also offers decision makers contradictory analyzes.  This is 
problematic in that it potentially contributes to ineffective or harmful policy (Tatham, 2008).  
Counterterrorism efforts founded on the assumption that a group’s motivations are 
inherently religious in nature, for example, may be counterproductive if the group is more 
concerned with impacting secular economic and political policies.  Misunderstanding an 
organization’s stated goals – for example; spreading an ideology, or holding and governing 
territory – can have consequences for intervention strategies.  Similarly, limiting focus to 
individuals and their psychology (Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller, Knezevie, & Stankov, 2009) 
lacks explanatory power for why ideologically driven movements – regardless of ideological 
type – exist, flourish, or fall apart and what tactics groups espousing those ideologies might 
use to further their goals.  
 
  48 
Although research examining al Qaeda and the broader Islamist movement has 
contributed to understanding aspects of the ongoing post 9/11 kinetic and ideological 
conflict, some scholars (Bayat, 2005) point out problematic trends in current approaches to 
studying al Qaeda and ideologically similar organizations.  One problem is the tendency to 
utilize language such as “Islamic terrorism” or “Islamic fundamentalists” when describing al 
Qaeda or similar groups (Armstrong, Chin & Leventer, 2008).  These and similar labels 
reaffirm self-claimed righteousness or religious justification for the extremists’ cause.  
Automatically ascribing religious motivations also fails to acknowledge the complexities of 
historical, local, political, and ethnic factors that contribute to particular groups’ ideologies 
and stated goals (Armstrong Chin & Leventer 2008; Freeman, 2009).   
Even scholars who are careful to make a distinction between Islam as a religion and 
Islamism as a political tradition often approach the latter as a singular movement (Bayat, 
2005), ignoring the many divisions between particular groups based on ethnicity, nationality, 
or stated goals (Roy, 2004).  This trend also ignores what scholars have argued in regard to 
the absence of real religious motivation in al Qaeda’s ideology, pointing out that the targets 
of 9/11 were commercial and security centers, not religious ones (Blanchard, 2007).  
Conflating use of religious discourse with purely non-secular, religious motivations – without 
further interrogation into context – (Roy, 2004) hinders analysis and policy development, 
encouraging incorrect conclusions about an organization’s goals and what actions they may 
take to further them.   
The presence of explicitly religious rhetoric in the development of an organization’s 
ideology, however, should not be considered irrelevant.  In the context of al Qaeda, citations 
from the Qur’an and Hadith are a staple of the group’s media.  As will be discussed in later 
chapters, religious terminology is often used in al Qaeda’s media to frame the kinetic conflict 
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between the organization and the U.S. or other adversaries.  As described below, however, 
this project focuses on the intersection of ideology and organizing.  Thus, religion is 
understood as an ideological system offering principles of social norms and order for its 
adherents.  Further, while religious language and imagery are present throughout al Qaeda’s 
discourse, the organization’s stated goals – chiefly the removal of U.S. and allied forces from 
Muslim territories – can be considered secular in nature.  In sum, this project treats the 
religious rhetoric in al Qaeda’s discourse as part of the organization’s larger ideological 
position.  The next section defines ideology and its role in organizing and explicates how this 
project approaches notions of ideologically driven organizing.  
Ideologically Driven Organizing   
This project diverges from existing studies of Islamist extremism by taking an 
organizational communication approach to studying kinetic conflict and conceptualizing al 
Qaeda as an ideologically driven organization (IDO).  Both religious and political 
philosophies can be approached as constituting forms of ideology.  This project is concerned 
with the ways in which ideology functions regardless of the particular ‘brand’ or flavor.  In 
the communication discipline, ideology can be understood as a mechanism through which 
social actors are discursively addressed “as subjects” (Therborn, 1980, p. 15).  Ideology 
provides a sense of what it means to be a social (or organizational) actor.  It “addresses and 
qualifies subjects by giving them an overall sense of the limits and possibilities of the social 
world” (Mumby, 1987, p. 118).  Ideology helps social actors understand “the way things are” 
by telling its adherents what exists, “what is good, what is bad and what is possible” 
(Trethewey, Corman & Goodall, 2009, p. 4).  At its core, ideology is approached to by 
referring “to a basic, often unexamined, system of ideas about how things are or ought to be, 
which circulate in public discourse” (Trethewey, Corman & Goodall, 2009, p. 4).  
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The critical tradition of organizational scholarship views ideology as serving several 
distinct political functions through which it constructs and legitimates power structures in a 
social setting (Giddens, 1979, Mumby, 1987).  Trethewey et al., (2009) label these functions, 
“naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing and structuring” (p. 4).  Ideology ‘naturalizes’ by 
turning socially constructed ideas into taken-for-granted norms.  When something is 
naturalized, it becomes the default or assumption of how things “just are” in the social 
world.  ‘Obscuring’ denies contradictions or other perspectives in existing systems of 
meaning (Trethewey, Corman & Goodall, 2009, p. 5).  Mumby (1987) points to the division 
between the political and the economic to highlight the way in which ideology has 
legitimated the removal of the democratic process from the work environment.  The 
hierarchical nature of business organizations is explicable in terms of “effectiveness” and 
“efficiency” (p. 119), and the power structure is viewed as “rational.”  The third function of 
ideology, ‘universalizing,’ presents, “the interests or concerns of those in power as the 
interests of all group members” (Trethewey et al. 2009 p. 7).  Dominant groups within 
organizational cultures are those with the power to structure meaning formations for the 
whole of the organization (Mumby, 1987).  This function of ideology allows elites in social 
settings to maintain their power without resorting to overt mechanisms of control.  
These three functions – naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing – work in concert to 
enable a fourth, known as ‘structuring.’  Eisenberg, Goodall, and Trethewey (2007) describe 
structuring as a form of control that is “subtle and indirect, but highly effective …  [It] 
works most effectively when the world view articulated by the ruling elite is actively taken up 
and pursued by subordinate groups” (p. 171).  Put another way, structuring is the process of 
creating rules in an organization that preserve and reify the ideology.  In sum, ideology is 
grounded in the organizing practices of social actors, constituting subjects through its 
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ordering of these practices (Mumby, 1987).  Ideology articulates social reality in terms of the 
interests of the dominant groups and is thus inexorably tied to power in any given social and 
organizational context. 
Individual organizations may be shaped by and advance vastly different or opposing 
ideologies, but ideology serves similar functions at all sites of organizing, regardless of other 
types of variation in groups.  Take the Roman Catholic Church and Hinduism, Norse 
mythology and Protestantism, al Qaeda and Daesh, the Democratic Party of the United 
States, and the Communist Party of Russia.  At first glance these organizations have little in 
common.  Varied membership, distinct geographic regions of influence, diverse bureaucratic 
structures, methods of operation, and stated goals are just a few of the distinctions between 
these forms of organizing.  Each ideology, however, serves the same functions for their 
adherents: naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing, and structuring the social environment 
within each social context, not just internally within the organization, but across the social 
landscape writ large.   
Not all organizations exist to perpetuate their ideology, however.  For example, a 
western Protestant church-funded organization is more likely to have an explicitly stated and 
publicly supported ideological position than a corporate organization that exists to make 
profit for its shareholders.  With regard to the function of ideology in organizations, the 
concern of the majority of organizational researchers has been within visible, corporate 
organizations – organizations publicly accessible and visible the public eye (Scott, 2013).  
These types of organizations largely exist to produce a product or provide a service, 
competing with similar organizations for a finite share of a bounded market, with the 
ultimate goal of turning a profit.  In this organizational context, ideology furthers the actions 
and goals of the company (profit), primarily shaping ‘the way things are’ to ensure maximum 
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productivity and ultimately, profit.  In contrast are organizations where the “product” is the 
ideology itself and the organization exists to reproduce and spread that ideology.  Such 
organizations are referred to as being ideologically driven.   
For the remainder of this project, al Qaeda is conceptualized as an ideologically 
driven organization (IDO).  An IDO can be understood as a form of organizing wherein the 
actions of the organization are intended to further the existence or spread of a particular 
ideology.  Services or products may be offered – such as a Christian Church hosting a soup 
kitchen – but the intended outcome of the services is to support the organization’s ideology 
(which may include a narrative of charity) rather than the reverse.  Unlike extremist groups 
that seek to claim and govern physical territory (Daesh), al Qaeda’s goals remain singularly 
focused on removing the U.S. and western influences from Islamic territory and 
perpetuating their particular ideological position without offering significant efforts at 
governance.  This project argues that the goals of al Qaeda as an organization are primarily 
ideological in nature.  
Another way to define IDOs occurs at the limits or boundaries of membership.  In 
an IDO, ideology does significantly more than shape a member’s organizational reality.   
Ideologically driven organizations can be viewed as those where ideology addresses the social 
actor as subject beyond the organizational context; where the organizational identity may 
always salient.  The salience of an ideologically driven organizational identity is not bounded 
by a particular location or time frame.   Members of IDOs never truly ‘clock out’ from the 
organization like an employee working in a corporate organization who may be able to shed 
(to varying degrees) the ideological structuring of the organization when they leave the 
office.  In this sense, IDOs may share similarities with “total institutions” (Tracy, 2000).   
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The majority of IDOs, however, lack the immediate financial incentives that even a 
cruise ship employee or prison guard receives (Tracy, 2005).  While financial benefits have 
been documented as one aspect of suicide bomber recruitment (Esterbrook, 2002), most 
fighters in groups like al Qaeda have little or no monetary motivation.  Decreasing financial 
resources and lack of bureaucratic structure suggest highly irregular or non-existent payment 
directly to the individual (Zelin, 2014).  An initial reading of the data reveals emphasis on 
values of poverty and lack of material possessions, and harsh criticisms of material wealth 
and materialism constitute significant aspects of al Qaeda’s identity narratives.  
This lack of immediate financial reward raises questions about what motivates 
members to act on behalf of the organization where material benefits are rare or non-
existent.  The organizational operating environment is hostile, even deadly.  Members 
regularly face the possibility of extreme bodily harm in the pursuit of organizational goals.  
Exploring member motivation to further organizational goals is the focus of a rich area of 
organizational communication scholarship concerned with identity development in and of 
organizations.  Scholars researching organizational identity have long been concerned with 
the relationships between members and organizations and the influence of identity on these 
relationships (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Bartel, 2001; Brown 1969).  The next section 
reviews research concerned with the tradition of organizational and individual member 
identity and its impact and influence on member actions in support of organizational goals.    
Identity 
This project is grounded in the perspective that communication is constitutive of 
organizing (Bisel, 2010).  Therefore, identity construction is very much a communicative act 
for organizations (Czarniawska, 1998; Rekom, Corley, & Ravasi, 2008; Scott, 2013).  This is 
true in the pragmatic sense as “communication vehicles” like advertising and public relations 
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“are used to disseminate identity features” and in the broader constitutive sense, “where 
identities are constantly negotiated, shaped, and reshaped” based on relevant interactions 
with others (Scott, 2013, p. 55).  Identity concepts are considered highly central to 
organizational research (Alvesson, Ashcraft, & Thomas, 2008) and are thus key to exploring 
IDOs.  Identity speaks, “to the very definition of an entity” (Albert, Ashforth & Dutton, 
2000, p. 13) and underlie many organizational behaviors (Ashforth, 2001).  Because identities 
situate people and groups as well as offer an answer to the question “who are we?” or “who 
am I?” they allow entities to differentiate themselves from one another and thus interact 
effectively (Albert, Ashforh & Dutton, 2000; Ashforth, 2007).  In organizational 
communication research, identity scholarship is concerned with the relationship between the 
organization and its members.  
The roots of this research trace to early works by Taylor (1911), who made an 
argument for individuals and organizations becoming “identical” via the “close, intimate, 
personal cooperation between the management and the men” (p. 26).  Later, Barnard (1938) 
wrote of the “coalescence” between organizations and individual members “that generates a 
sense of individual conviction and a willingness to devote increased effort to the 
organization” (Ashforth, Harrison & Corely, 2008. P. 326).  This curiosity – originally 
grounded in a motivation to increase member productivity – grew into a rich theoretical 
tradition in the communication field exploring a range of organizational behaviors and the 
construction and interaction of identity on multiple levels (Alvesson, 2012; Rekom,  Corley, 
& Ravasi, 2008).  
Individual, Social, and Organizational Identity 
  Scholars suggest that identity at the individual level addresses psychological motives 
“for locating and learning about the self, for maintaining integrity between self and behavior 
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both within and between situations and over time, and for attaining a positive sense of self 
through differentiation and betterment” (Ashforth, 2001, p. 56).  Identity “is crucial to how 
and what one values, thinks, and feels” (Albert, Ashforth & Dutton, 2000, p. 14) and is what 
provides an individual’s unique sense of self.  Many factors go into the shaping of an 
identity.  Individuals may have identities structured around ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, 
religion, education, and work or occupation (Bartel, Blader, & Wrzesniewski, 2007). 
Individual identities are shaped via interaction with others and membership in 
groups.  This process is referred to as an individual’s social identity (Scott, 2007).  While 
much of the organizational studies literature views individual identity and social identity as 
distinct constructs that function separately if simultaneously, Weiland (2010) argues that they 
should be viewed as closely linked and that identity construction as a whole can be 
approached as a “normative activity through which socially acceptable ideals of whom one 
should be are woven into an individual’s understanding of who they are” (p. 504).  This 
perspective draws from early work by both Mead (1934) and Giddens (1991) and 
acknowledges the impact of ideologies on identity construction via the shaping of those 
socially acceptable norms of behavior.  By qualifying the broader social world an individual 
inhabits, the normalizing and universalizing functions of ideology shape individuals’ 
identities (Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004; Trethewey, Corman, & Goodall, 2009).  Ideology 
influences judgments about what it means to be a member of an organization or society.  
Those judgments then guide individual actions and perceptions.  Within organizations where 
membership is largely voluntary, such as al Qaeda, these functions act in similar ways for all 
members, regardless of position within the organization (Weiland, 2010).11 
 
                                                 
11 For more about resistance to or dissonance with organizational ideology, see Brown & Humphreys (2006) 
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 Social identity is the sense of self which derives from an individual’s membership 
“in a social group (or groups)” combined with “the value and significance attached to that 
membership” (Tajfel & Turner, 1978, p. 63).  Social identity helps to answer the question, 
“Who am I in relation to this group?” (Ashforth et al., 2011) and places value on being a part 
of the ingroup, while devaluing outgroup identities.  Organizational membership contributes 
to construction of social identity by allowing individuals to distinguish between groups with 
whom they do and do not affiliate and identify (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Bartel, 2001).  
Individuals may belong to church groups or political parties and may be employed by one 
company while being a client of another.  All of these memberships or relations further help 
define the “us” vs the “them” for individuals (Bartel, 2001).  For members of ideologically 
driven organizations, individual identity is inherently tied to and influenced by their role in 
the organization and identification with that organization’s ideology.   
Identification   
Incorporating characteristics of an organization’s identity into the construction of a 
member’s individual and social identity is referred to as identification (Elsbach, 1999).  
Ashforth & Mael (1989) originally conceptualized identification as, “The perception of 
oneness or belongingness to some human aggregate” (p. 21).  Later theoretical development 
led to a more comprehensive understanding of identification as the process “by which 
people come to define themselves, communicate that definition to others, and use that 
definition to navigate their lives, work-wise or other” (Ashforth et al., 2008, p. 334).  Or as 
Edwards (2005) puts it, identification can be viewed as a “key psychological state reflecting 
the link that exists between the organization and employee” (p. 207).  
During World War II, companies such as Shell Oil implemented programs to foster 
employee identification.  Shell offered members a monetary stake in the organization’s 
  57 
success.  An outcome of the company’s action was workers internalizing company values.  
This internalization motivated workers to promote the organization’s goals as their own 
since the organization was, in a sense, a part of them now (Scott, Corman & Cheney, 1998).  
Thus, identification is often considered a desired outcome of the member-organization 
relationship as it allows, “people to persuade and be persuaded” (Cheney, 1983, p. 342) and 
serves as a key factor in influencing action by organizational members on behalf of the 
organization.  Later research in organizational identification would draw associations 
between identification of members and antecedents of organizational distinctiveness and 
prestige, absence of intra-organizational competition, and willingness to encourage family 
members (specifically children) to join the organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992).  Research 
also suggests that stronger identification with an organization will impact the way members 
handle perceived threats to an organization’s identity (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).   
Organizational identification can be understood as a, “Key psychological state 
reflecting the underlying link or bond that exists between the employee and the 
organization” (Edwards, 2005, p. 207).  The relationship between member and 
organizational identity and the process of identification therefore has potential explanatory 
power regarding attitudes and behaviors in the workplace (Alvesson, 2010; Cheney & 
Tompkins, 1987).  Influencing, even regulating member identities has also been linked to 
organizational control (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  Employees are enjoined to develop 
self-images deemed “congruent” with managerially defined objectives (p. 1).  This form of 
control is “concerned with ‘managing the insides’ – the hopes, fears and aspirations – of 
workers, rather than their behaviors directly” (Deetz, 1995, p. 87).  The desired outcome of 
identity management and influence is to encourage employees to act in ways beneficial to the 
organization.   
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Focus on influencing and managing processes of identity and identification has 
grown even more salient with the rapid expansion of the information technology industry, 
economic downturn, evolving hiring practices, and a global economic market (Alvesson, 
2012).  Empirical changes in contemporary organizations like the expansion of the service 
sector, the increase of knowledge work, and a recent growing trend in extreme 
organizational cultures has led to a development in organizational research away from 
understanding organizational “activity in material and substantive ways to constructing 
organizational activity as increasingly occurring in the imaginary realm” (Karreman & 
Alvesson, 2004, p. 150).   
Illustrative of this shift - at least in the private sector - is a recent article in The New 
York Times.  Titled Inside Amazon: Wrestling big ideas in a bruising workplace (Kantor & 
Streitfeld, 2015) the piece explores (as much as it can in a company with strict NDAs) a 
punishing corporate culture that seems to pride itself on the mental and emotional 
destruction of its members in services to the company’s goals.  The article describes a 
significant break from historical traditions of bureaucratic, industrial modes of management 
which designed “work processes that minimize the (intellectual) effort and skill necessary for 
the worker to carry out his or her work” (Karreman & Alvesson, 2004, p. 150).  While not 
an academic study, Kantor and Streitfeld’s (2015) writing points to a directional shift in 
management practices and organization-employee relationships and may suggest that 
modern corporate organizations are increasingly seeking to blur the lines between traditional 
managerial thinking and what organizational researchers previously classed “total 
institutions” (Tracy, 2000).   
This is not to suggest that corporate entities are in danger of becoming IDOs.  It 
does, however, point to a potential paradigm shift as corporate organizations seek greater 
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influence, managerial control, and regulation of member identities in order to maximize 
intellectual and physical output from their members.  Knowledge-intensive12 companies such 
as Amazon already, “typically draw heavily upon cultural-ideological modes of control” and 
use member identity and the “corporatization of the self” as a mode for managerial control 
(Karreman & Alvesson, 2004, p. 151).  In sum, strategies of identity regulation and member 
identification present in IDOs may also appear - in less severe forms - in corporate 
organizations.  If the culture of Amazon, one of the largest and most successful companies 
currently operating in the U.S. market, is indicative of future trends in the ways organizations 
seek to regulate member identity, studying IDOs may offer insight into identity regulation in 
more common corporate organizations. 
IDOs may lack significant managerial oversight, bureaucratic structure, highly 
formalized and defined employee positions, extensive rules and processes for work flow and 
punitive measures for poor employee performance (Mintzberg, 1983) that exist in a typical 
vocational organization.  Therefore, managing the ‘insides’ of IDO members becomes even 
more crucial as identification takes the place of common configurations of member control 
present in corporate organizations (Alvesson, 2012).  Identity regulation and self-
management resulting from members’ identity work therefore becomes intrinsic to the 
survival and continued operation of the organization.   The more a member identifies with 
an organization and constructs their social identity within elite-inspired discourses, the more 
a member’s range of decision making may be influenced to coincide with organizational 
goals (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  Internalization of values is described by Dutton et al., 
(1994) as occurring when “a member’s self-concept has incorporated a large part of what 
                                                 
12 It should be noted Kantor & Streitfeld (2015) explored the white-collar side of Amazon’s corporate culture 
and did not address conditions faced by warehouse workers and manufacturers employed by Amazon 
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they believe is distinctive, central and enduring about the organization into what they believe 
is distinctive, central and enduring about themselves” (p. 242).  Given the relationship 
between organizational and individual identity, examining identity at the organizational level 
is important to understanding more fully the influences on individual identity and the 
process of identification (Alvesson & Willmott, 2001; Brown, 2006).  
Organizational Identity 
In communication research, organizational identity was first conceptualized by 
Albert & Whetten (1985) as the “central, enduring, and distinctive” (CED) characteristics of 
an organization (Whetten, 2006, p. 220).  Functionally similar to individual identity, (Gioia, 
1998) organizational identity works “to define the group and differentiate it from relevant 
‘outgroups’ (typically in ways that edify the ingroup), providing a foundation for member 
commitment to the group and action on behalf of the group” (Ashforth et al., 2011, p. 
1145).  Whetten (2006) argues that these CED characteristics function as organizational 
identity claims that signify an organization’s “self-determined and self-defining unique social 
space and are reflected in its unique pattern of binding commitments” (p. 220).   
Interest in organizational identity has grown significantly in the last three decades 
due to the centrality of the concept to organizational existence and function (Foreman & 
Parent, 2008; Ran & Duimering, 2007).  Poorly constructed, ambiguous, or conflicting 
identities carry serious repercussions for organizations (Foreman & Parent, 2008).  These 
repercussions may include reduced legitimacy and access to resources (Hsu & Hannan, 
2005), sub-par performance (Voss, Cable, & Voss, 2006), and most relevant to the proposed 
study, weak member identification (Foreman & Whetten, 2002).  Conversely, positive, or 
strong organizational identities have been linked to positive members’ self-concept (Dutton 
& Dukerich, 1991), member commitment (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997) and strong member 
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identification with the organization (Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 1994).  Perceptions of 
organizational identity can also influence member adaptation to organizational change 
(Creed, Dejordy, & Lok, 2010; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Hannan et al., 2006) and learning 
(Brown & Starkey, 2000).  Organizational identity is a key factor in organizational 
performance and is even more salient in the context of ideologically driven organizing where 
identification processes are central to the organization’s success.  
Organizational identity has been explored in a variety of contexts including firms 
(Kuhn, 2008), banks (Chreim, 2003), educational institutions (Humphreys & Brown, 2002), 
HIV/AIDS care organizations (Golan, Sillince, 2007), non-profits (Golden-Biddle, 1997), 
high technology research and development companies (Nag, Corley & Gioia, 2007), and 
military organizations (Lievens, Van Hoye & Anseel, 2007).  Scott (2013) attempts to guide 
the discipline toward more in-depth exploration of identity in what he calls “hidden” 
organizations – organizations whose membership and identity are not easily accessible or 
deliberately hidden from the public.   
Scott’s book acknowledges that American society is full of organizations – from 
clandestine businesses to gangs to anonymous support groups – that manage or even 
obscure their identity much differently than “visible” organizations such as for-profit 
companies (p. 8).  Scott’s work is not an empirical study but a conceptual work intended to 
shed theoretical light on these less visible types of organizations by developing a framework 
to rethink “the contemporary landscape by focusing on the communication of identity 
among a much broader spectrum” (p. xi).  Scott (2013) is quick to point out – rightly so – 
that this changing organizational landscape has significant consequences for society.  What 
he oversells, perhaps, is the idea that clandestine organizations are in any way new.  Gangs, 
paramilitary organizations, anonymous societies, anonymous political donors, illegal 
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businesses, all of these types of organizations existed before organizational scholarship 
gained prominence in modern social sciences.  For as long as humans have been organizing, 
common sense tells us some of them organized for secret or less than legal purposes.  What 
Scott does offer, however, is a helpful framework for organizational scholars going forward, 
acknowledging that there are myriad ways in which different types of organizations present 
and manage organizational and individual identity.  
As a lens through which to examine identity construction in ideologically driven 
organizations, however, Scott’s (2013) work has limitations.  His stated intent is to develop a 
typology of organizations based on a continuum from “transparent” to “dark.”  He 
predicates this continuum on three criteria, or axis: organizational visibility; member 
identification; and relevant audience (p. 84).  Citing researchers such as Abrahms (2008) that 
call for newer non-rational models and classifications of extremists not based on chain of 
command, internal communication structure, and specialization, Scott (2013, p.82) points to 
terrorism research as justification for development of his typology.  This project agrees with 
Scott’s conclusion that newer models of extremist organizations should focus on identity, 
but the “visible vs. hidden” continuum has limited application in the context of studying a 
group like al Qaeda.  With its highly visible ‘brand,’ leaders, allies, and a media publishing 
arm, al Qaeda constructs significant portions of its identity for the public eye.  Further, 
classifying al Qaeda (and other ideologically driven organizations) in regard to member 
identification requires treating “relevant audience” as both an independent and dependent 
variable.  For example, members of al Qaeda (or similar groups) might be extremely vocal 
about their membership within local territories controlled by or sympathetic to the 
organization, but still hide or obscure that identification outside those territories or online, 
where the ‘audience’ might be global, and include security forces or enemy combatants.  
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Further, placing al Qaeda or similar organizations on a visible to hidden spectrum tells 
researchers very little in regard to anything else about the organization.  
Understanding that organizations may have multiple identities (Moingeon & Soenen, 
2002; Scott & Lane, 2000; Scott, Corman & Cheney, 1998) and organizational members may 
also have multiple identification targets (Scott, 1997) is key to developing a nuanced 
understanding of how organizational identity is constructed (Scott, 2013).  It is important to 
be conscious that some aspects of organizational identity in extremist organizations will 
always remain hidden to the public – and by extension to researchers.  Currently, the 
majority of theoretical development and empirical research in the organizational 
communication discipline has focused on vocational and corporate institutions who fall very 
much on the “transparent” end of Scott’s (2013) typology.  While Scott calls for more 
research into all types of hidden organizations, this project focuses its attention on the 
dearth of communication scholarship exploring identity construction in ideologically driven 
organizing.  The proposed project seeks to explore this under-developed area in order to 
better understand identity construction in al Qaeda as representative of certain extreme 
forms of ideologically driven organizing.  
Narrative and Identity  
In policy.  Military and policy circles and security studies are increasingly concerned 
with the concept of narrative (Archetti, 2010a; Casebeer & Russell, 2005; Corman, 2011; 
Zalman, 2010).  Along with stratcom, narrative has become a buzzword in policy language 
and security studies of asymmetric warfare (Roper, 2008).  Narratives, security studies argue, 
play a central role in the “war of ideas” (Amr & Singer, 2008; Leuprecht et al., 2009).  The 
Global Strategic Trends (2010, p. 81) report offers this analysis:   
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In conflict and confrontation, most actors will place considerable emphasis and 
dependence on the psychological rather than just the physical. All military activity, 
including force, will continue to be designed to influence, and is likely to be planned 
and executed in support of a campaign narrative. Technology will enable the 
development of extensive social networks that in turn will multiply opportunities for 
those seeking to achieve influence through the distribution of recorded images. This 
imagery, combined with simple, fluid narratives, can shape both local and global 
perceptions. 
Rhetoric utilized by the military generally views narrative as a kind of object constructed and 
employed by extremists like kinetic weapons.  “The jihadist narrative is widely propagated on 
the internet and calls for Muslims worldwide to join its struggle” (McCuller, 2011, p. 7).  
Narrative is also viewed as a tool with which to combat al Qaeda.   McCuller goes on to 
argue, “…the West must seize the initiative in the war of ideas by developing powerful and 
emotive counter-narratives that de-glorify the jihadist movement” (p. 8).  Some intelligence 
studies claim that the U.S. is losing the ‘battle’ of narrative (Case & Pawlack, 2010), and the 
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke of the need to “supplant the extremist 
narrative” (Mullen, 2009).  Leuprecht et al (2009) suggested that U.S. counter insurgency 
(COIN) strategy needs to “better tailor” counter narrative strategy in order to defeat “the 
jihadist narrative” (p. 1).  Missing from this language and much of the current policy and 
strategic communication discourse is an understanding of communicative processes, and the 
structure and function of narratives in complex socio-political landscapes like kinetic 
warfare.   
This lack of theoretical robustness has significant implications for the success of 
COIN efforts.  Without consistent understanding of the construction and function of 
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narrative as a form of discourse and how narratives operate in ideologically driven 
organizations and kinetic conflicts, policy makers and military leaders risk confusion and 
failure when it comes to designing and implementing strategy and policy.  A growing body of 
scholarship exists exploring organizational identity through the lens of narrative (Ashcraft & 
Mumby, 2004; Chreim, 2005; Coupland & Brown, 2004; Currie & Brown, 2003; Czarniawska 
& Wolff, 1998; Foreman & Parent, 2008).  While this work is relevant to existing and future 
stratcom efforts engaging violent IDOs, at present, communication scholars have been 
reluctant to extend narrative analysis to extreme forms of organizing.  This project seeks to 
bridge the theoretical gap in approaches to the use of narrative by ideologically driven 
organizations by extending current organizational theory to the conflict between al Qaeda 
and the U.S. and its allies.  
In communication scholarship.  The linguistic turn in the social sciences (Sewell, 
2010) and humanities placed narrative in the forefront of many disciplines such as history 
(White, 1973), anthropology (Geertz, 1988) psychology (Sarbin, 1986) and philosophy 
(MacIntyre, 1981) and organizational studies (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000).  In the 
communication field, narrative approaches draw from the conception of people as 
storytelling animals, or homo narrans (Fisher, 1984).  Narrative, then, is not just a form of 
reciting or accounting experienced events, but the way in which human beings organize their 
experience and create meaning (Bruner, 1991).  In an organizational context, narratives serve 
many functions.  They have been linked to structuration, parallel and reflexive to the 
organizational framework as an accompaniment to change in an organization’s structure 
(Browning, 1991).  Narratives are central to the process of sensemaking as methods by 
which employees organize and relate events (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Weick, Sutcliff, & 
Obstfeld, 2005).  They carry organizational values as members construct narratives that 
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reveal how they “ought to behave as participants in their unique organizational culture” 
(Meyer, 1995, p. 210).  And, relevant to this project, narratives are used to construct 
identities at multiple levels – individual, group, and organizational (Brown, 2006; Humphreys 
& Brown, 2002; Gabriel, 2000).  These ordering and meaning making functions position 
narratives as “the main source of knowledge in the practice of organizing” (Czarniawska, 
1997, p. 5).  
Early scholarship examining the relationship between narrative and identity in 
organizations is concerned with the existence and function of “myth” and “story” 
(Polkinghorne, 1988).  The conceptualization and exploration of “narrative” appears 
inconsistently until later shifts in the communication discipline.  Bowles (1989) suggests that 
work organizations rival the church “in dictating the meanings by which people are expected 
to structure their social interaction” (p. 405) and explores the emergence of a new “form of 
mythology” (p. 405).  Boje (1991, 1994, 1995) approaches organizations as “storied” and 
“storytelling” and focus on the role of individual stories in and as constitutive of, 
organizations.  Interest in organizational change resulted in a vein of scholarship focusing on 
the relationship between stories present in an organization and the direction or progress of 
an organization’s change (Browning, 1991; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Humprehys & Brown, 
2002; James, 2001).  Other researchers examined stories or narrative and organizational 
values (Ezzy, 1998; Gabriel, 1995; Meyer, 1995).  Storied discourse has also been linked to 
sensemaking processes in organizations (Boyce, 1995; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Weick et al., 
2005) and management action (Jameson 2001).  
Focus on narrative as a particular form of discourse within organizations along the 
lines of Mumby’s (1987) work comes later, conceptualizing identity within organizational 
contexts as being discursively produced, sometimes by competing entities (Czarniawska & 
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Wolff, 1998; Czarniawska, 1998).  From a narrative perspective, organizational identities are 
discursive constructions (Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004) in that they (the identities) are 
constituted by the multiple narratives that “their participants author about the organization” 
(Brown, 2006, p. 731).  In this context “discourse” refers to everyday talk and text -- the 
documents, conversations, electronic media, and public relations material produced by an 
organization.  Collective identities are the result of repeated “identity work” (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2002; Ashforth, Harrison & Corley, 2008) performed by organizational members 
but also by official organizational entities on behalf of that organization.  The more often an 
identity is enacted or re-enacted, the more it is constructed via organizational discourse, the 
more salient it becomes for stakeholders and the more likely they are to experience it 
(Anteby & Molnar, 2012; Scott & Lane, 2000).  
While organizational scholarship moves toward expanding our understanding of the 
role of narrative in corporate organizations, there is a significant gap in the literature 
regarding the ways in which organizational identity is constructed in other types of 
organizing.   This project examines the construction of organizational and individual identity 
in the context of extreme ideologically driven organizations.  To further understanding of 
the role of narrative in processes of identity construction in al Qaeda’s public discourse, two 
research questions are proposed to guide the study.  
RQ1: How is narrative used to construct individual member identity in ideologically 
driven organizations?  
RQ2: How is narrative used to construct an organizational identity in ideologically 
driven organizations? 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY  
This project works within the theoretical framework of organizational identity and 
identification to examine the ways in which ideologically driven organizations utilize 
narrative to construct individual and organizational identity.  To accomplish this goal, data 
from an existing database of public statements and documents produced by al Qaeda and 
affiliated groups is examined.  This database was created and organized by a research group 
the author of this dissertation was a member of for six years while a graduate student at 
Arizona State University.  This study employs a qualitative research method of textual 
analysis conducted from a narrative perspective (Boje, 2001; Brown, 2006; Chreim, 2005; 
Fisher, 1984).  
A qualitative approach offers two significant benefits.  First, there has been little 
theoretical development in organizational studies focusing on non-corporate organizations.  
As a result, there is insufficient theoretical robustness in the field to support testing of 
hypotheses.  A qualitative approach offers an opportunity to build theoretical rigor so that 
future studies can develop and test hypotheses regarding organizational identity in IDOs.  
The second benefit of a qualitative approach is the potential for gaining deep understanding 
of the data (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990).  This is necessary for a research project asking, 
“what is going on here?”  (Creswell, 2007).  The rest of this chapter will discuss in greater 
depth the utility of applying a qualitative methodology focusing on narrative, arguing for a 
new way of conceptualizing narrative in the data.  Following that, data collection and analysis 
procedures are detailed.   
Rationalizing a Qualitative Approach 
Organizational scholarship explores the ways in which corporate organizations shift 
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the locus of control from outward, bureaucratic measures that regulate member behavior, to 
managing members’ “insides” and creating “consensual approval” to influence and regulate 
member identity and attitude (Karreman & Alvesson, 2004, p. 152).  Managers (or 
organizational elites) increasingly seek to manage member identification (Dutton, 1994) by 
targeting “relations, emotions, identity formation and ideology” (Karreman & Alvesson, 
2004, p. 152).  This concern with regulation of identity is particularly relevant “in complex 
and uncertain organizational situations that demand a high degree of decentralization” (p. 
152).  One of the key sites of organizational influence on member identity is ideology 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988, Mumby, 1987).  The proposed project draws on the vein of 
organizational scholarship that approaches ideology - and by extension identity - as narrative 
constructs (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004; Boje, 1994, 1995; Brown, 
2006; Gabriel, 1995; Mumby, 1987).    
Understanding narrative as a particular form of discourse allows the use of discourse 
analysis techniques (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000a; Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004; Fairclough, 
2005) which provide a rich accounting of the data.  Qualitative analysis provides researchers 
with tools to capture the complexities of identity construction processes and better 
understand the ways in which narrative functions in organizational discourse (Boje, 2001; 
Tracy, 2010).  A qualitative approach acknowledges narratives of identity may function in 
complex, even contradictory ways (Boyce, 1995; Browning, 1991).  They may be present in 
discourse as fragments, and multiple narratives may be constructed simultaneously rather 
than producing identity as a singular, static object (Brown, 2006; Gabriel & Griffiths, 2004).  
 Despite the richness of the narrative tradition in the communication field and 
organizational studies, little consistency exists with regard to the definition, 
conceptualization, and methodological approach to “narrative.”  Therefore, before 
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discussing data selection and analysis, the next section of this chapter presents a brief history 
of approaches to narrative in the social sciences and offers justification for understanding 
narrative as a particular form of discourse composed of a system of stories (Halverson, 
Corman & Goodall, 2011).  
Narrative Approach 
Communication scholarship has contributed significantly to the study of narrative 
forms of discourse, and narrative function in social and organizational contexts (Bruner, 
1991; Fisher, 1984, 1985; Lucaites & Condit, 1985; McDonald, 2014; Mumby, 1987).  There 
is, however, little coherence in approaches and definitions of narrative and its cognates such 
as story, tale, account, myth, fiction, fantasy and saga (Gabriel, 1995).  More consistency is 
needed for conceptual and analytical clarity of narrative construction of identity in 
organizational contexts (McDonald, 2014).   
Inconsistent approaches to understanding and defining narrative and similar 
concepts reduces the rigor of narrative research (Tracy, 2010), opening the door to 
misapplication of terminology, weakening comparisons across work, and hindering 
theoretical development based on past scholarship.  Consequently, in the context of policy 
making, varied approaches increase the chances of confusion in pragmatic implementation 
of theory, potentially hindering the effectiveness of strategic communication efforts.  To 
fully clarify the epistemological position of this project, the next section reviews relevant 
approaches to narrative research.  
Historically, concern with the form(s) of narrative has been the central focus of 
disciplines such as narratology, literature, and film and media studies (Chatman, 1978).  
Narratology as a formalized discipline originated with the Formalists, particularly Propp’s 
work on folktales (Morphology of the Folktale, 1928, English translation 1958).  In studying the 
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ontological features of narrative, the Formalists proposed the terms fabula and sjuzhet to 
describe the events of the story (fabula) and the form of how the events are recounted 
(sjuzhet).  The Formalist’s focus on components would influence structuralists such Barthes 
and Levi-Strauss.  Barthes’ work advanced the study of narrative by positing that a key 
aspect of narrative was its function as a sense-making system for the audience.  For Barthes, 
a narrative has no “fixed” meaning independent of reader interpretation (Barthes & Duisit, 
1975).  Rather, it is the reader who gives the narrative meaning.  
Later scholars, particularly in film and media studies, combined narratology and the 
idea of a sense-making system with elements of cognitive science.  Film studies theorists like 
Brannigan (1992) argued that narrative “is a perceptual activity which organizes data into a 
special pattern which represents and explains experience” (p.3) called a schema.  Schema are 
patterns of organization created and utilized by the audience to order the data being 
acquired.  Schema are developed by members of a group, society, or organization via 
education, experience, and social interaction as well as exposure to similar narratives.  
Narrative understanding, therefore, is an individual process, but schema may be cultural 
phenomena and shared across multiple individuals through discourses that take the form of 
narrative.  This perspective understands narrative as both an object that is produced, and a 
particular form of discourse that includes schema developed by organizational members.   
Functionally, narrative also acts as a means by which ideological functions are put 
into play (Mumby, 1987) and is an integral part of the processes that allow organizational 
members to order and make sense of events (Weick et al., 2005).  Therefore, cogent 
definitions of narrative must take into account both form and function.  This project derives 
the approach to narrative from work done by members of the Center for Strategic 
Communication at Arizona State University.  Narrative, Halverson, Corman & Goodall 
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(2011) argue, is understood as  
…a coherent system of interrelated and sequentially organized stories that share a 
common rhetorical desire to resolive a conflict by establishing audience expectations 
according to the known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical form.  Not all 
conflicts are resolved, but the desire to do so drives the trajectory of the story form, 
much as a goal drives a course of action. (p. 13-14) 
Narratives are a legitimate and appropriate means for representing actions and events 
in organizations (Czarniawska 1997; Humpreys & Brown, 2002) which possess generative 
theoretical utility (Pentland, 1999).  Narratives have both “descriptive” and “explanatory” 
power (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).  As Humphreys and Brown (2002) argue, “by focusing 
on stories, we are better able to identify plurivocal native interpretations” (p. 426) of events.  
If identity regulation serves as a form of managerial control (Karreman & Alvesson, 2004) 
and identity is constructed narratively (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Brown, 2006), then 
narrative can be understood as both a discursive product and the site at which identity 
regulation occurs.  Thus, focusing on the appearance and construction of narratives in 
organizational discourse offers potential for better understanding the ways in which narrative 
is used as a form of organizational control of member and organizational identity.  
Data 
Pragmatism and concern for theoretical rigor simultaneously influence the choice of 
textual analysis for the methodology for this project.  In regard to theory development, there 
is a rich tradition of organizational studies focusing on organizational texts as forms of 
discourse.  Alvesson (2000) highlights two major approaches to discourse in organizational 
studies.  The first is the study of social talk and text, which illuminates the ‘talked’ or textual 
nature of everyday interaction in organizations.  The second focuses on the determination of 
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social reality through historically situated discursive moves and is the study of social reality as 
discursively constructed and maintained (p. 1127).  Key to both these approaches is the 
positioning of texts at the center of the organization process (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000a).  
‘Texts’ in this context include documents such as reports, contracts, memos, signs and work 
orders.  These objects, as well as every day conversations, meetings, meeting notes and a 
range of interpersonal interactions perform the work of constituting the organization 
(Cooren, 2004; Fairclough, 2005; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004).  
 A discursive perspective conceives of institutions as “constructed primarily through 
the production of texts, rather than directly through actions” (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 
2004, p. 628).  Where actions may form the basis of institutional processes, in being 
“observed or interpreted, written, or talked about, or depicted in some way, actions generate 
texts” (p. 628).  Thus, the production, structure, and collection of texts produce social 
categories and norms that shape “understandings of behaviors of actors” into methods 
(Lawrence & Hardy, 2007, p. 628).  This project views texts as the structure via which 
organizational activities become stabilized and repeated over time (Ashcraft & Mumby, 
2004) and as intrinsically linked to their authors and the members who engage with them.  
Therefore, texts are placed at the center of the study of organizational identity moving 
forward.    
Pragmatic concerns also influence the methodology of this study.  The majority of 
studies exploring organizational identity involve some aspect of participant observation or 
emic experience with the organization in question.  Studying violent ideological extremism, 
however, offers significant barriers to achieving that form of access. As a graduate student, a 
woman and a United States citizen, it would be extremely dangerous, possibly deadly and 
decidedly career ending for me to attempt to join a violent Islamist group.  I also currently 
  74 
lack the interpersonal connections, security clearance, financial resources, and time to gain 
access to imprisoned members of al Qaeda being kept in federal detention centers.   
Ultimately, however, I did not deem such access necessary to satisfy the goals of this 
study.  The focus of this research is not the emic experience of organizational members 
themselves, but rather the ways in which the organization constructs its own public identity 
and that of its members.  One of the key objectives of this study is to explore the ways in 
which al Qaeda utilizes narrative to construct organizational and individual member 
identities for public consumption.  Al Qaeda operates on a global stage and publishes its 
discourse via media and internet distribution to a global audience.  Therefore, the group’s 
identity is produced for multiple publics.  Those publics include the global Sunni Islamic 
community – the ummah - potential sympathizers and ideological supporters of al Qaeda’s 
goals, regional governments, and the United States and its allies.  Much of the discourse 
relevant to answering questions of organizational and individual identity was produced by al 
Qaeda for non-organizational actors to consume.  These outgroup audiences include 
English-speaking western audiences.  I therefore suggest that research conducted from the 
position of a member of one of those publics still offers opportunities for rich analysis.  
Collection 
To collect appropriate texts, I utilized my access to a pre-existing database 
maintained by the Center for Strategic Communication (CSC) at Arizona State University.  
This database contains texts authored by different violent Islamist groups.  These groups 
include al Qaeda prime (AQP), franchise groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and other ideologically similar groups 
active throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia and Southern Europe.  
While the database contains texts from numerous Islamist groups and all al Qaeda 
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franchises, this project centers its examination on AQP and AQAP. AQP is the group 
directly responsible for the attacks of 9/11, and in the post 9/11 conflict, AQAP was the 
first franchise most closely ideologically aligned with AQP’s organizational goals (Blanchard, 
2007; Farrall, 2011).  AQAP is also credited by security experts as being pivotal in the 
strategic construction and publication of al Qaeda’s ideology (Farrall, 2011).   
Text types.  Since this study is concerned with the ways in which al Qaeda 
constructs its organizational identity, the data for this project is comprised of documents 
authored only by members of al Qaeda (AQP) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) as well as by their official media arms.  Following the events of 9/11, Al Qaeda and 
its franchises embraced new media technology, recognizing the utility of broadcasting their 
ideology via their own websites, twitter accounts, internet forums, YouTube videos and 
media releases to more mainstream news sites like al Jazeera (Burke, 2004; Farrall, 2011).   
Most groups developed official news and public relations groups or “media centers,” 
such as AQAP’s media foundation al-Malahim Media, that were prolific in producing and 
distributing official public relations material to numerous publics.  Videos and transcripts of 
speeches by key figures, official documents, notifications of martyrdom, the equivalent of 
PR memos, inspirational music videos and other texts describing organizational activities and 
ideological positions are common products distributed through a variety of sources for 
multiple stakeholder audiences.  These media entities and the sheer volume of output they 
created contributed to the perception in the western security community that extremists 
were winning the communication war.13  
 
                                                 
13 For a more detailed breakdown on the evolution of the extremist internet “fandom” and its relationship to 
official al Qaeda ideology, see Conway (2012) and Douglas (2007). 
  76 
Sources.  The data for this project includes multiple types of texts produced by 
AQP and AQAP, containing transcripts of videos, martyrdom notifications, ideological 
texts, documents concerned with organizational structure and operation, and transcripts of 
speeches by key organizational members.  The majority of the texts examined for this project 
were initially collected by the CSC from the Open Source Center (opensource.gov).  Created 
to provide intelligence analysis of open-source (non-classified) intelligence materials, the 
Open Source Center “aims to promote the acquisition, procurement, analysis and 
dissemination of open source information, products and services throughout the U.S. 
Government” (Aftergood, 2014, ¶ 1).  The Open Source Center is a product of the Central 
Intelligence Agency of the United States and succeeds the former Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service.  While maintaining a broad-spectrum focus, The Open Source Center 
collects, translates, collates and publishes a range of data produced by extremist groups of 
different types - from Islamist groups to Nationalist organizations - all over the world, 
including public news releases, texts, memos, website and forum discussions, videos, tweets, 
and books.  
 The Center for Strategic Communication (CSC) database also contains texts 
collected and translated by the Center for Combating Terrorism (CTC) at West Point as well 
as texts drawn from rich site summary (RSS) feeds of regional news sources in countries 
where Islamist extremist groups operate.  The bulk of the data, however, is filtered through 
The Open Source Center before being coded and organized into the CSC database for use in 
original independent and funded research projects by CSC members.  
Metadata.  All documents are published with as much meta data as possible 
detailing (when available) the date of release of the text, date of its collection, origin of the 
text – group or individual with group affiliation, original language, source that the data was 
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collected from – website, twitter, whether it was released by the group themselves or turned 
over to a regional news organization, published on YouTube etc, and finally, a summary and 
brief analysis of the data.  These metadata are crucial as there is significant variation in the 
methods of engagement extremist groups use to communicate with their audiences, either 
the broader Muslim community, potential recruits, or the U.S. and its allies.  For example, 
the metadata for document onr-nase0059 [text not included in study] reads: 
AQLIM Claims ‘Kidnapping an Italian and His Wife in Mauritania’ On 30 December 
2013, a forum participant posted a statement on a jihadist website from Al-Qa'ida in 
the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) claiming responsibility for the 
kidnapping of two Italian nationals identified as ‘Cicala, Sergio’ and ‘Kabore, 
Philomene Pawelgba.’ The statement calls on their families and the Italian people to 
pressure their ‘transgressor government to respond to the legitimate demands of the 
mujahidin.’ Images of the two hostages and their passports are included. The 
statement, dated 26 December, is signed by AQLIM and the Al-Andalus 
Establishment for Media Production, and was disseminated by the Al-Fajr Media 
Center. A translation of the statement follows. 
This information explains that the text in question is considered an official 
organizational document and is a public statement created by the media wing of al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb.  It should be noted, however, that the richness of the metadata varies. 
Some texts contain only brief descriptions of source and attribution to speaker. 
The CSC database contains just over 5,000 texts from multiple sources, originally 
published between the years 1994 and 2015 (at the time of data collection for this project). 
Once texts from groups other than AQP and AQAP were excluded, approximately 1,500 
relevant texts remained.  Limiting the data collection period to a time when both groups 
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were the most active in terms of kinetic operations and production of organizational texts, I 
confined the data set to the years between 1998 and 2012, reducing the number of relevant 
documents to just over 1100.  Employing a stratified random sampling technique, I chose 
every fifth text.  This resulted in 210 relevant documents that met the parameters, equaling 
1890 pages of text, single spaced.  This amount of data was deemed too extensive for the 
scope of an exploratory project, so another stratified random sample of every fourth text 
was taken.  The final sample resulted in 54 individual documents equaling 508 pages of 
single spaced text.  Thirty-three texts were produced and published by al Qaeda Prime, and 
21 were produced and published by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.  The most prolific 
named, individual authors found the final sample include Osama bin Laden, Ayman al 
Zawahiri, Abu Yaha al -Libi, Anwar al Alwaki, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, Seif Al-Din Al-Ansari, 
and Adam Gadhan.  All of these individuals are key figures in the organizational hierarchy 
and instrumental for constructing and publicizing al Qaeda’s ideology.   
Translation.  While the data analyzed for this project is strictly English language 
texts, some of the original sources were published in multiple languages such as Arabic, 
Urdu or Pashtun.  Therefore, some of the texts analyzed have been translated into English 
from another language.  Lacking fluency in Arabic, I could not translate the source texts 
myself and relied on the skill of the translators employed by The Open Source Center or the 
Center for Combating Terrorism.  Since the translators are employed by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and The Open Source Center and CTC are tasked with providing 
actionable intelligence to policy makers, I proceeded with the assumption that the 
translations are of an extremely high quality, while acknowledging that the lack of an emic 
perspective and translated data has implications for loss of richness and voice.  Many texts, 
however, were originally authored in English or translated into English for public 
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distribution by entities within AQP or AQAP.  One of al Qaeda’s key audiences has always 
been western, English speaking countries, both in terms of the adversarial relationship and 
also as a ground for recruiting sympathizers to their cause.  Therefore, many publications 
were created with the intent of addressing western, English speaking audiences and were 
produced in English or translated by their original authors or organizational authorities into 
English for the purposes of addressing English speaking publics.  
Analytical Procedures 
All data were uploaded into NVIVO qualitative analysis software for analysis.  To 
analyze the data, I employed a multi-step coding process based on the constant comparison 
method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which features open, focused and theoretical coding.  This 
process involves close reading, reflection, constant comparison, and elements of narrative 
analysis.  Although analysis did not begin until after data collection was finalized, at the time 
of collection I was a member of the research group that initially populated the database from 
which I drew data for this project.  Because of this, I had already read many of the texts in 
question.  I was a contributor to several CSC projects that employed the database - including 
some of the texts that were part of the sample for this study - to conduct original research 
for funded grants from several agencies including the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), NATO, and the Office of Naval Research (ONR).   
Once the sample was chosen and the data were sorted in NVIVO, the first step was 
to read through the data completely without taking notes.  The next step was to read the 
data again and perform “open coding” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  Open or initial coding 
(Charmaz, 2006) encourages the researcher to remain open to exploring “whatever 
theoretical possibilities we can discern in the data” (p. 47).  This involved multiple passes 
through the data, recording first impressions guided by the general question “what is 
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happening here?” (Cresswell, 2007, p. 153).  Initial passes (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011) 
concerned the focus of the text itself.  Did the text describe a single individual or several 
individual group members?  Was it focused on the organization as a whole?  Since this 
project centers the analysis on individual and organizational identity as distinct discursive 
constructions, these questions helped guide the creation of two, smaller subsets of data.   
The first subset consists of documents where the entirety or majority of the text 
focuses on one individual or several individual group members.  For example, text 00006, 
“Al-Libi Eulogizes Ibn-al-Shaykh Vows ‘Revenge’ Against Libyan Regime” was included in 
the first subset of data since the text directly addresses, “brother Ali Abd-al-Aziz al-Fakhiri, 
also known as Ibn-al-Shaykh al-Libi” (al Libi, 2009, ¶ 5) and contains stories and 
descriptions of the individual, his life, and experiences.   The second subset of documents 
consists of texts where the sole or majority focus of the text is organizational identity or 
ideological construction.  For example, text 00043, “Al-Zarqawi's Group ‘Creed and 
Methodology’ Reiterates Mandate of Jihad, Battling ‘Infidels, Apostates, Shia’” describes in 
detail aspects of the organizational ideology and approach to jihad.  
Narrative and Story 
The next step in coding was to look for the appearance of narratives within the data.  
Halverson et al., (2011) argue that narrative and story should not be conflated.  A narrative, 
“is not a single story, but a collection of stories, and a collection is systematic because the 
stories are components that relate to one another with coherent themes, forming a whole 
that is greater than the sum of its parts” (p. 2).   Stories are comprised of actors taking 
actions that result in some form of resolution.  “Susan went to the store” would not be 
considered a story as it is a single statement of action.  However, “Susan went to the store, 
bought milk and returned home,” contains elements of an actor (Susan) taking actions 
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(going to the store and buying milk) and offers a resolution (returned home with the milk).  
This example is a single story.  In order for there to be a “narrative” of shopping, many 
stories about Susan going to the store would have to exist.   
Many narrative analysts are careful to point out that narratives in organizational 
discourse often exist as fragments in ordinary discourse, (Czarniawska, 1988) rather than as 
whole cloth.  Therefore, the approach to narrative analysis in the data was two-fold.  First, 
instances of whole stories were coded.  For example:  
One of the stories that indicate his heroism was that the mujahidin were in one of the 
orchards in Ma'rib and set up a “12.7” [-mm] antiaircraft machinegun, Dushka.  
Then, two jetfighters, which were assigned with striking the ranch, appeared.  
Muwahhid, may God rest his soul, immediately fired at them heavily, which strongly 
confused them.  Thus, the jetfighters had to get rid of their rockets and did not hit 
the target, thanks to God.  Then, one of the pilots returned once again to look for 
the antiaircraft machinegun to bomb it.  Indeed, he bombed the place where the 
“Dushka” was set up but without causing any losses because the brothers had 
already moved it to another place and were safe. - [00023] 
And: 
One day, the tyrant staged a large campaign and mobilized his soldiers against a 
group of pro-mujahidin tribesmen.  The campaign was intended to make the mujahidin 
submit to the rule of infidelity.  However, the heroic mujahidin refused to submit.  
Instead, they were intent on making God’s word prevail over the word of infidelity.  
Thus, a fierce battle broke out and the tyrant launched raids on the soldiers of God 
using armed personnel, machinery, and helicopters.  As the fighting went feverish, 
the mujahidin realized that they fought an unequal battle, but they were eager to meet 
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death and asked God to host them in heaven among His beloved ones.  Truly, he 
who likes to meet God, God likes to meet him. Thus, God invited to His heaven the 
elite of His righteous people. - [00024] 
These passages offer instances of stories in complete form and were coded as 
“story.”   Subsequent coding passes were then made to explore the presence of narrative 
elements - settings, actors, actions, and resolutions – that were present in each text but did 
not necessarily appear as a complete sequence.  Text detailing these story elements were 
coded into categories labeled “actor,” “action,” or “resolution.”  Text coded “actor” refers 
directly to an individual entity, usually describing traits the individual displays or is known 
for.  The “action” code applies to text describing actions taken by individuals or group 
members, and the “resolution” code labels text that delineates the outcome of a situation.  
The table below offers examples of each code, highlighting the ways in which story elements 
could appear in texts, sometimes separated by data describing other individuals, other 
stories, exposition, author asides, Qur’anic verses, or other types of text.   
Actor Action Resolution 
Afghanistan knew Ibn-
al-Shaykh, may God 
have mercy on him, as a 
muhajir [foreign fighter], 
a persistent fighter and a 
teacher.  
They knew him for his 
good character, coyness, 
ample humbleness, rare 
courage, unequaled 
stances, devotion in 
worshiping and reading 
the book of God, and his 
care and love for his 
brothers. - [00006] 
 
 Ibn-al-Shaykh, may God have 
mercy on him, was among those 
who rolled up his sleeves.  
They stood all together in the 
face of this aggression.  
They endured and stood 
steadfast in fighting and 
confronting the aggressors.   
He stayed with his brothers in 
Tora Bora until the last moment. 
- [00006]  
 
That has ended, but its grief and 
sorrows have not. Avenging it is 
still to take place. The victory was 
for those heroes, although they 
were in shackles. They triumphed 
for their exalted faith, deep-
rooted ideology, and strong 
steadfastness. Our hope for them 
is to achieve greater victory and 
better dwellings in the midst of 
gardens and rivers [Paradise], in 
the presence of Omnipotent 
God. - [00006] 
 … he became a trained When a military campaign,   So, the campaign was defeated 
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fighter and was known 
for his audacity.  He was 
famous for his bravery in 
his tribe.  Since his early 
childhood, he was 
characterized by his 
intelligence, bravery, and 
eloquence. - [00023] 
 
belonging to the republican 
guards, tried to advance [to 
attack] the Yafi tribes, he, may 
God have mercy on him, came 
from Al-Bayda with his groups 
and blocked the advancement of 
the campaign.  They destroyed a 
tank and a number of vehicles, 
and the enemy fell in a tight 
ambush, thus they fled leaving 
everything behind. - [00023] 
and they retreated holding their 
white flags.  These [video] chunks 
were brought on media channels 
back then.  This help left an 
impact on the Yafi tribes and 
most of them realized that the 
mujahidin were the shield and the 
safety valve against any 
aggression. - [00023] 
 
He was gentle while 
talking to both the 
youngsters and elders.  
Whenever you met him, 
you would find him 
welcoming and smiling.  
You would feel closeness 
and amicability and then 
cordiality would start. - 
[00023] 
 
He, may God have mercy on his, 
and some of his brothers, 
became responsible for one of 
the operating hubs.  He never 
stopped working, preparing, and 
organizing as some of those who 
were with him reported.  He 
used to lead groups, coordinated 
among them, and make plans 
with his brothers.  - [00023] 
Brother Muhammad al-Ghazali 
told me: “As much as I saw 
exhaustion on Muwahhid, I 
realized that his martyrdom 
became near.” And it did happen; 
after a lot of good work and 
sacrifice, leader Muwahhid - may 
God have mercy on him - was 
killed in cold blood in a US raid.  
- [00023] 
 
 
Table 1:  Offers examples of text addressing actors, actions, and resolutions.  
Each code gives a brief description and includes short data samples.  Lindlof (1995) 
refers to this process as the “overt emergence of a theoretical sensibility” (p. 223), and 
Charmaz (2006) argues that qualitative coding is an “emergent process” (p. 59) where ideas 
surface continually throughout the coding and analysis.  As such, multiple passes through the 
data were used to refine codes.  In some cases, this led to expanding codes or creating sub 
codes for a richer description of what was happening in the text.  Focused coding was then 
conducted to highlight relationships and patterns in the data deemed salient based on 
repetition, intensity, or connection to theoretical concepts. 
Identity Construction  
Sensitizing concepts.   This project accepts Charmaz’ (2001) assertion that data do 
not form ready-made categories but are instead are a reflection of researchers’ interaction 
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with the data, influenced by their own position and the theoretical frameworks they draw on.  
Narrative components alone, however, did not fully articulate the ways in which individual 
member identity, and organizational identity was being constructed.  To better understand 
how al Qaeda constructs individual and organizational identity, Alvesson & Wilmott’s (2002) 
approach to organizational influence of identity was applied.  The authors’ sites of identity 
influence or “identity targets” were used as sensitizing concepts to assist in creating a clearer 
picture of what was occurring in the data. 
Typologies offer researchers with useful ways to explain how something is 
accomplished (Tracy, 2013) and can provide insight into complex environments.  Alvesson 
and Willmott’s (2002) targets offer a typology of the specific means and media of control 
through which the regulation of identity is accomplished in organizations and are thus salient 
to studies of IDOs where identity may have a significant impact on member retention and 
action.  Alvesson and Willmott propose nine sites of identity regulation.  These are:  1. 
defining the person directly, 2. defining a person by defining others, 3. providing a specific 
vocabulary of motives, 4. explicating morals and values, 5. detailing knowledge and skills, 6. 
explicating group categorization and affiliation, 7. clarifying hierarchical location, 8. 
establishing and clarifying a distinct set of rules of the game, and 9. defining context (p. 13). 
1. Defining entity directly.  Individual members may be defined directly by “explicit 
references made to characteristics that have validity across time and space and that 
distinguish a person from others” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 12).  The characteristics 
used to identity an individual “suggest expectations of those people who occupy the social 
space that is therefore defined for them” (p. 12) and the more explicit the characteristics, the 
less vague the implications.  For example, describing a “middle manager” offers few clues as 
to the specifics of the individual or how they perform that identity.  In contrast, a “50-year-
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old male middle manager who has plateaued” (p. 12) implies cues about how the individual 
is perceived within the organization. 
2. Defining entity by defining others.  “A person or group can be indirectly identified 
by reference to the characteristics of specific others” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 12).  
Organizations may work to influence or construct member identity indirectly through 
assigning negative characteristics to competing organizations and their members. This form 
of othering may also function at an individual level when roles are gendered - a manager 
arguing that he would never hire a woman for a specific position, thus implying that the 
position is constructed as inherently masculine.  By encouraging members to reject 
identification with other groups (and the traits associated with them), organizations invite 
their own members to accept conditions and identity traits “that might otherwise have been 
experienced as frustrating and negative” (p.12). 
3. Providing a specific vocabulary of motives.  In some organizations, management 
may promote “a particular framework through which employees are encouraged to 
understand their own work” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 12).  This “vocabulary of 
motives” is often constructed through archetypes and stories and creates a set of reference 
points that members use to understand what is “natural” or normal for their role within the 
organization.  For example, in a corporate organization, management could develop a 
“skills” versus “jobs” discourse, wherein employees are encouraged to understand their work 
as developing critical skills rather than simply doing a job (Alvesson, 1995).  By emphasizing 
workplace climate and corporate pride and downplaying competitive and materialistic (pay) 
motivations, for example, employees may be invited to construct themselves as “intrinsically 
motivated rather than pay oriented” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 13).  This is relevant to 
identity work in IDOs since the reasons members do what they do is a critical part of how 
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identity is constructed in organizational discourse and key to supporting an IDO’s goals, 
especially an IDO engaged in physical and political combat with an adversary.  
4. Explicating morals and values.  Espousing a particular morality or certain values 
can have a significant influence on orienting member identity (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). 
Some research (Jackall, 1988) suggests that morality may be contextual - for example, a 
strong sense of morality may not be advantageous in a corporate setting.  Creating a local 
system of values, however, has advantages for all organizations as it invites members to 
orient their identity in a specific direction.  Since a key function of ideology is to construct 
notions of what is ‘right’ and ‘normal,’ morals and values should play a significant role in 
discourses of identity in an IDO. 
5. Knowledge and skills.  Definition of knowledge and skills can be key resources 
“for regulating identity in a corporate context” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 13).  In 
organizations, knowledge often defines the knower, and education and professional status 
can be significant components of identity construction.  Within corporate organizations, 
emphasis on education and its relationship to member identity may take the form of 
employee or manager training seminars.  Watson (1994) describes how certain organizations 
encourage their managers to see themselves as “business managers” rather than skill-specific 
manager (p. 5).  Similarly, Sveningsson (2000) contends that “strategic management” as a 
field of “knowledge and practice” encourages the construction of managers as strategists (p. 
6).  As a result, the capacity to articulate a strategy discourse and appear to be “a strategist” 
becomes a key measure of a manager’s effectiveness.  Ideologically driven organizations are 
no less dependent on educated and skillful members than corporate members, even if the 
skills themselves are likely to differ.  
6. Group categorization and affiliation.  One of the most explicit and direct ways to 
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regulate identity is by developing social categories “to which the individual is ascribed” 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 13).  Creating an “us” and a “them” - implicitly or explicitly - 
creates social boundaries (Ashforth & Mael, 1983) and may engender feelings of belonging 
and membership (Alvesson, 1995).  Some organizational researchers suggest that 
corporations make an effort to provide “emotional gratification” in the form of a 
“workplace family” which may counter “the attractions of rampant individualism and 
consumption” (Casey, 1996, p. 331).  Being a team member (or organizational member) 
“may then become a significant source of one’s self-understanding, self-monitoring and 
presentation to others” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 14).  Although the authors suggest 
that group categorization can occur absent references to specific values or distinctive content 
(p. 14), differences between corporate organizations and IDOs suggest that group 
categorization and affiliation in IDOs may be connected more strongly to morals and values. 
7. Hierarchical location.  Social positioning and relative value of different groups in 
most corporate organizations is constructed and reified by repeated symbolism (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2002; Kunda, 1992).  While hierarchy in corporate organizations is often formal, 
delineated by title, pay scale, experience, or function, status distinctions between different 
groups (such as working groups) can also be central for identity regulation (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2002).  As organizational scholars have noted (Alvesson, 1995), even organizations 
that claim to avoid rigid hierarchies typically still exhibit social hierarchies even if they are 
expressed in subtle and sometimes contradictory ways.  Absent a formal bureaucratic 
structure and with hierarchies often kept secret for physical security reasons, social hierarchy 
in extremist organizations may be more likely to rely on other identity targets - knowledge 
and skills, or morals and values, for example - and be expressed in subtle ways, or even 
outright rejected.   
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8. Establishing and clarifying a distinct set of rules of the game.  “The naturalization of 
rules and standards for doing things calls for the adaptation of a particular self-
understanding” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 14).  Widespread ideas and norms about the 
“right” or “natural” way to do things in an organizational context have significant 
implications for identity construction.  One of the most common examples is the way in 
which organizational cultures establish unspoken codes about what it means to be a “team 
player” for that organization.  Alvesson & Willmott (2002) suggest that “rules of good 
corporate citizenship” (p. 15) are distinct from values and morals.  Rules of the game do not 
offer judgment guidelines but rather offer organizational members a road map for navigating 
ambiguous or potentially politically charged social settings.  “They offer guidance on what is 
natural or necessary for corporate work to function” (p. 15).  
9.      Defining context.  Finally, discourse that explicates the scene “and its 
preconditions for the people acting it” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 15) invokes a 
particular actor identity.  Alvesson & Willmott (2002) argue that “by describing a particular 
version of the conditions in which an organization operates (e.g. the market situation) or the 
zeitgeist (the age of information technology), identity is shaped or reinterpreted” (p. 15).  By 
setting the scene, so to speak, organizations may influence or regulate the creation and 
maintenance of the kinds of identity that “fit” the social, organizational or economic terrain 
that the organization operates in.  Below is a chart demonstrating examples of the sensitizing 
concepts as present in the data.  
Identity 
Target 
Example of text coded  Example of text coded 
Defining 
Entity 
Directly 
 At the top of this regiment of lions is 
the courageous imam and the active 
scholar, the martyr, the son of a 
martyred father, and a martyred 
He was recognized by Arhab and the 
Yemeni tribes as a person, who rejected 
the non-Islamic traditions and laws, 
sought to apply God’s rulings, and 
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mother too, as we consider them as 
such [but God is the final Judge], 
Abd-al-Rashid Ghazi, may God 
bestow His mercy upon them, who 
spoke the truth at a time of 
subordination, and exalted faith at a 
time of submissiveness, and despised 
he who was evil and proud, who 
depended on his own strength and 
relied on his own omnipotence. - 
[00008] 
endured scourges, abuse, and 
maliciousness. He was recognized for 
his da'wah [Islamic call to submit to 
God,] bravery, boldness, and 
generosity. They further recognized 
him as a man, who spoke out the truth, 
spread monotheism, and combated 
polytheism. - [00015] 
Define Entity 
by Defining 
Others 
The First Type: They are the 
hypocrite, the double dealer, and the 
evil persons, whose appearance you 
admire, but whose intentions you 
abhor. If these people are invited to 
piety and fear of God, they reject 
righteousness and never attempt to 
reform themselves. They are rather led 
by arrogance to more crimes. 
Moreover, they disdain the idea of 
being shown the path of righteousness 
and blessings. They continue on the 
path of demoralization by way of 
polytheism and sins, and they kill and 
destroy farmlands and offspring. This 
type brings about plague to the masses 
that will eventually lead them to 
immorality and destruction. - [00022] 
The so-called Hani. Prisoners used to 
call him “Juw'ah” [causer of hunger] 
because he used to reduce the 
quantities of food, even though food 
was already scant. He was nearly 184 
cm tall, strong, with brown eyes, and as 
active as a monkey. He was newly 
employed. His favorite hobby was to 
slap the brothers in the face and on the 
ears. This malicious jailer tried hard to 
expose [violations], cause brothers to 
be involved in violations, and inform 
his masters about them so that his 
superiors might be satisfied and pleased 
with him. - [00046] 
 
Providing a 
Vocabulary 
of Motives 
Oh people of jihad in Pakistan, oh 
lions of sacrifice, and oh you seekers 
of martyrdom and the virgins of 
paradise, man dies but once. You 
should then seek the meadows of 
martyrdom, which are now available 
in your country; rise in a way that God 
will see in you what pleases Him; 
mobilize to remove this apostate and 
corrupting tyrant; put an end to his 
secular tyrannical rule; and, attack the 
strongholds of his demeaned army, 
the dens of his filthy Intelligence, and 
the centers of his pre-Islamic-like 
regime. You should follow the 
example of your neighbors, the heroic 
people of Afghanistan, who, with their 
Life without principle amounts to 
nothing in the human history. Man was 
created for the great purpose of 
worshipping God as the only deity. By 
such principle, man leads a noble life, 
and without it, man becomes like cattle, 
nay, more misguided. - [00016] 
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steadfastness, strong will, persistence, 
and with their strong dependence on 
God have made their country a grave 
for arrogant and powerful empires 
and forced them out humiliated and 
defeated. Along with those empires, 
the people of Afghanistan crushed all 
the dishonored agents, and you should 
do likewise. - 00008 
Explicating 
Morals and 
Values 
He was raised according to principles 
of religion, bravery, and benevolence 
in a Bedouin environment that values 
high manners and disdains humility. - 
[00023] 
This incident highlights the fact that 
Abu-Ata was very keen not to shed 
Muslim blood under any conditions.  
He did this out of his fear of God and 
obedience to his amirs.  The 
instructions with regard to avoiding 
shedding Muslim blood were clear.  
The operations that were canceled for 
this reason are many. - [00024] 
Knowledge 
and Skills 
The Shaykh became known for his 
intelligence and wisdom in resolving 
issues. His solutions, verdicts, and 
settlements between disputing sides 
on issues related to land, blood, and 
tribal retaliation disputes demonstrate 
his intelligence and wisdom. He 
spread true peace with every issue he 
resolved. The people of Waqar have 
known him since he contributed to 
the spread of justice among them. - 
[00015] 
He, may God rest his soul, took several 
courses of various Shariah-related 
curricula, as well as military, security, 
and management curricula.  He was 
distinguished for his smartness and 
grasp.  He, may God rest his soul, was 
constantly developing his skills, 
reading, and experimenting until God 
Almighty granted him a good 
knowledge of military and 
management. - [00023] 
Group 
Affiliation 
My Muslim brother, these great 
stances show the greatness of the 
bearers of the message and that their 
ethics and goals were different from 
the ethics and goals of people. Even 
their patience was distinguished. 
These constants are not subjects to 
any changes by the conditions or 
temptations. My Muslim brother, you 
have to learn these values because 
knowledge comes by learning. You 
should not boast by these values but 
to cling to them to save you and the 
entire nation. My Muslim brother, Do 
not precipitate victory; be optimistic, 
and know that with every difficulty, 
 Ibn-al-Shaykh, may God have mercy 
on him, was among those who rolled 
up his sleeves. They stood all together 
in the face of this aggression. They 
endured and stood steadfast in fighting 
and confronting the aggressors.  He 
stayed with his brothers in Tora Bora 
until the last moment. When they 
started to run out of places and the 
winds of betrayal and apostasy began to 
blow in their direction from the US 
collaborationists, he and some of his 
brothers headed toward Pakistan, - 
[00018] 
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there is a relief and that victory comes 
with patience. My Muslim brother, 
“Beware of weakness and do not 
relinquish this religion because if you 
do so, you will be humiliated in this 
life before the hereafter, you will lose 
your respect among people, and God, 
Exalted and Sublime be He, will 
replace you with someone who is 
better than you. - [00018] 
Hierarchical 
Location 
We ask God to compensate the 
ummah for its loss, grant mercy to our 
shaykh, and raise him to the level of 
the pure martyrs along with the 
prophets, the righteous, and the 
martyrs. These are the best 
companions. - [00014]. 
  
leader Muwahhid, may God have mercy 
on him, moved to Abyan Governorate 
to champion his brothers in Lawdar 
after it had been attacked by an assault 
of the army and Central Security.  He 
was in charge of the artillery group, and 
specialized in mortar. - [00023] 
Establishing 
Rules of The 
Game 
 The honest believer is superior by his 
faith, firm on his doctrine, and 
steadfast on his path. His heart does 
not know any weakness and his 
determination is never hesitated or 
confused. On the contrary, when 
hardships and afflictions increase 
against him and sorrows surround 
him, he defeats them by his 
confidence in God, Exalted and 
Sublime be He. - [00007] 
Every jihadist that participated in 
clashes and fought in battlefields, 
whether as a soldier or as a leader, has 
already prepared himself for this day 
[martyrdom]. Not only that, but also he 
waits for this to happen at any hour 
and at any moment. - [00007] 
Defining 
Context 
The Islamic Ummah did not taste 
humiliation and become disgraced 
except when it abandoned the steeds 
of horses and followed the tails of the 
cows, and when it abandoned the 
shooting and got busy with 
amusement and trivial things … When 
the worshipers of the cross began 
their aggression against the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan, and 
descended their horses and men upon 
it, Ibn-al-Shaykh, may God have 
mercy on him, was among those who 
rolled up his sleeves. - [00006] 
 We have seen that our Ummah is 
living an existence of humiliation, 
ignominy, and enslavement by the 
Crusaders, Jews, and apostates. Its 
wealth is being pillaged through the 
collusion of the Crusaders and the 
collaborator rulers in history’s greatest 
theft of this and future generations’ 
wealth. - [00027] 
 
Table 2: Examples of data representing each of Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) nine 
  92 
sites of identity influence.  
Identity targets where then categorized by which component of narrative they 
addressed: setting, actors, actions, or resolutions.  This was done to best explore the ways in 
which sites of identity “were organized into narratives” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 8).  
With sensitizing concepts to help focus the investigation, data was coded again, focusing on 
the subset of codes concerned with identity construction and regulation.  Charmz’ (2006) 
“examined stance” regarding coding and categories was maintained throughout the 
proceeding analysis (p. 69).  This ensured codes were grounded in the data, rather than 
forming pre-made categories into which data were forced to “fit.”  The process of 
interpreting data and refining coding schemes ceased at the point of theoretical saturation, 
when new data added little fresh insight (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  
Summary 
The next chapters answer my research questions in detail and explore implications 
and further directions for research.  Chapter 6 explores the role narrative plays in the 
construction of individual identity of organizational members.  Chapter 7 illustrates the ways 
in which narrative is used to construct al Qaeda’s public organizational identity.  Chapter 8 
discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, acknowledges limitations 
of the study, and provides directions for further research.  Writ large, these chapters illustrate 
the complex and fragmentary ways that narrative is used to construct identity in al Qaeda’s 
discourse and offers suggestions for new directions in organizational scholarship and policy 
direction.  
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CHAPTER 6 
BRAVE MUJAHIDIN: AL QAEDA’S USE OF NARRATIVE IN CONSTRUCTING 
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER IDENTITY 
When the worshipers of the cross began their aggression against the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan, and descended their horses and men upon it, Ibn-al-Shaykh, may 
God have mercy on him, was among those who rolled up his sleeves. They stood all 
together in the face of this aggression. They endured and stood steadfast in fighting 
and confronting the aggressors.  He stayed with his brothers in Tora Bora until the 
last moment. When they started to run out of places and the winds of betrayal and 
apostasy began to blow in their direction from the US collaborationists, he and some 
of his brothers headed toward Pakistan, whose unwanted tyrant ruler had 
committed, like many others, to stand side by side with the global protector of the 
cross, the United States, in its war against Islam and Muslims.  His journey in the 
prisons of the Crusader started there.  He was captured with a number of his 
comrades and stayed some time in Kohat prison. Then he was delivered to the 
guardian of the cross and was transferred to Kandahar, and then to Kabul, where he 
stayed for a short time, where he was subjected to torture and punishment…the 
Americans threatened to send him back to the prison of darkness, but he said: 'Do as 
you please, but this is the truth.' They did send him to the torture prison in Kabul in 
October 2003. That was my last time with him in prison. He stayed in the torture 
prison, or the prison of darkness, for some months, but he remained patient, in high 
spirits, depending on his faith, and despising the tyrants, who could not affect his 
steadfastness or his faith. Later, he was sent to the prisons of the tyrant in Libya, to 
be buried into oblivion behind their walls, together with the other forgotten people 
there. [00006] 
 
Stories offer access to deeper organizational realities by centering member 
experience, infusing events and facts with meaning (Gabriel & Griffiths, 2004).  Stories are 
not, however, solely the purview of individual group members.  Organizational elites can 
also author, produce, and publicize stories that shape organizational narratives for multiple 
audiences.  These audiences include current organizational members, potential recruits, and 
ideological sympathizers.  Members from competing or antagonistic groups such as U.S. 
military or security community might also be considered potential audiences.   
In an ideologically driven organization (IDO) such as al Qaeda, leadership and designated 
media and publicity groups are the main producers and distributors of discourse containing 
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stories.  For example, the passage at the beginning of this chapter tells the story of a member 
of al Qaeda who was martyred.  In relating the story of the mujahid’s life, the eulogy has 
several functions.  First, it sets the “scene” where “the worshippers of the cross” (referring 
to U.S. and coalition forces) are carrying out “their aggression” against the Islamic state of 
Afghanistan.  The story address actors: U.S. forces, the individual mujahid being eulogized 
(Ibn al Shaykh), and his “brothers” - a reference to other members of al Qaeda or affiliated 
groups.  The story offers plot - Ibn Shaykh fought the aggressors, was captured, experienced 
torture, remained “in high spirits” despite this experience, and was eventually killed.  Finally, 
a resolution is presented: the martyrdom of the eulogized individual who - according to the 
author - “despised the tyrants” and remained steadfast in his faith no matter what he 
endured.  This story exemplifies components common to the construction of individuals in 
al Qaeda’s discourse and centers particular traits and actions that support an organizational 
narrative of an ideal “employee” or organizational member.  The following chapter unpacks 
the components of that narrative and explores the construction of an idealized individual 
identities - the brave mujahidin - in al Qaeda’s discourse.  The research question guiding this 
chapter asks: How is narrative used to construct individual member identity in al Qaeda’s 
public discourse? 
Organizations - either through sanctioned media outlets14 or approved elite 
organizational members - author stories for a variety of reasons.  Stories and narrative form 
the building materials for organizational ideology (Ashcraft & Mumby, 2004; Czarniawska-
Joerges, 1998; Mumby, 1987).  Ideology, as previously discussed, orders organizational life, 
                                                 
14 Most AQ franchises developed designated media arms early on to disseminate their ideology through a 
variety of platforms.  These included movies, televised speeches by key al Qaeda members, magazines such as 
AQAP’s English language ‘Inspire,’ music videos, and more. 
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constructing and legitimizing power structures in social settings (Giddens, 1979, Mumby, 
1987).   
Recent trends in organizational studies focus on the relationship between the 
ordering functions of ideology and organizational control of members.  Karremen and 
Alvesson (2004) argue that organizational or managerial control can be best understood as 
an activity “predominantly carried out by a powerful social group that exercises definitional 
and executive authority over other social groups within an organization” (p. 152).  Here 
definitional authority refers to organizational influence over and regulation of individual 
member identity (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  
 Understanding organizational construction of individual member identity is 
meaningful in ideologically driven organizations (IDOs) where identity construction serves 
as a form of normative control in the potential absence of more bureaucratic regulatory 
structures (Karreman & Alvesson, 2004; Mumby, 1987).  Alvesson and Willmott (2002) offer 
nine targets or sites of identity regulation through which organizations potentially influence 
member identity.  These sites are valuable as a lens to explore the ways in which al Qaeda as 
an IDO attempts to construct identity for its members.  To best explore how these identity 
targets comprise an identity narrative, they are examined in conjunction with the 
corresponding narrative component: setting, actors, actions, or resolutions (Halverson et al., 
2011).  
Setting 
Alvesson and Willmott do not explicitly apply the term “setting” in their work.  
However, they suggest that discourse which “defines a context” of organizational existence 
“explicates the scene” (p. 12) in which the organizational story is set.  For Alvesson and 
Willmott, the “context” describes the conditions in which the organization operates.  The 
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authors’ notion of “defining context” in organizational discourse is analogous to the setting 
of a story, and this project treats the “context” and “setting” as two labels for the same 
discursive action – creating a location and an environment in which the organization and its 
actors exist and take actions.  
Defining the Context  
The setting of a story creates expectations in a reader’s mind (Gabriel, 2000).  
Without the setting to contextualize the action of the plot, it is impossible “to understand 
human intentions” in the story (Czarniawska, 1998, p. 4).  Human actions occur “within 
cultural settings that maintain symbolic narrative forms for use in the articulation of action” 
(Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 143).  A person taking water from a store in the middle of a natural 
disaster, for instance, may be understood differently than a person taking water from a store 
on a balmy spring day.  Discourse that sets a scene “and its preconditions for the people 
acting it” invokes corresponding actor identities (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 15).  Setting 
a scene for organizational narratives offers an opportunity to influence the construction and 
regulation of member identities that “fit” the particular social, political or economic context 
in which the organization functions.  For example, an organization positioned in a health 
care field may encourage employees to focus on the service aspects of its environment and 
downplay competition with other health care organizations to promote employee focus on 
patient care as an end goal, rather than a competitive activity ‘to get ahead’.  Employees who 
see their primary organizational identity as that of a caregiver in a health organization may 
provide better care to their patients than employees who understand themselves as punching 
a clock to earn a paycheck.  
Two key themes emerged in data defining the organizational context for al Qaeda 
and its members.  The first is referred to as “Muslims under attack” and highlights ways in 
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which the Muslim community suffers or is oppressed by outside forces.  The second is 
labeled “jahiliyyah” after the historical master narrative (Halverson, 2011).  Jahiliyyah attributes 
the suffering of Muslim countries and the global Islamic community to a state of modern 
ignorance (jahiliyyah) and a failure to adhere to an arbitrary “True” Islam.  The operational 
context in which al Qaeda exists is one where the global Muslim community - the ummah - is 
under attack by malicious forces and this situation exists at least partially because Muslims 
themselves have entered into a state of moral and religious decay and impurity.  
Muslims under attack.  Al Qaeda discourse constructs a setting where the ummah is 
under attack from numerous external actors, including the United States, Israel, Shia 
Muslims, and local governments.  These actors are accused of threatening Muslim countries, 
people, and culture.  An al Qaeda spokesman writes:  
The forces of global non-belief seized upon the Muslims.  They allied in a global 
campaign against terror, with the protector of the Cross America at the fore.  It came 
after the Muslims with everything it had.  It planned, carried out, and continues to 
carry out what it can to wage war against Islam and Muslims.  This matter does not 
need to be proven, for it is seen and felt by people in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
the Arabian Peninsula, and elsewhere through the lands of Islam. [America] was 
aided it this dirty war by the collaborator regimes loyal to it, especially the 
government of Pakistan, the government of Yemen, the Saudi regime, and the 
Egyptian regime, who opened up their countries to the Crusaders so they could use 
them for military bases in order to strike and kill Muslims. [00027]  
The forces of “global non-belief” refers to all non-Islamic countries, although al Qaeda elites 
generally use it to refer specifically to Western state actors.  The passage produces a story 
world where Muslims are the victims of a premeditated campaign organized by the United 
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States.  Labeled the “protector of the Cross” - another term for Crusader - the U.S. in al 
Qaeda’s discourse is engaged in a war of aggression against Islam as a religion and the 
Muslim people.  America is waging a war not just against al Qaeda, but Muslims everywhere, 
and they are being aided by their political allies who include the governments of Pakistan, 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, whose actions, particularly allowing U.S. military bases on 
what al Qaeda claims as Muslim territory, is all part of a global plot to destroy Islam.15 
U.S. media and political discourse frame the events of 9/11 as the beginning of a conflict 
which began with unprovoked violence by a previously unknown entity (Dimitrova & 
Stromback, 2005).  Unsurprisingly, al Qaeda’s public statements situate the events of 9/11 
much differently.   Spokesperson for al Qaeda Sulayman Abu Ghayth writes:  
According to the figures I mentioned in the last part about the number of Muslims 
killed at the hands of the Americans, either directly or through their support, help, 
and backing, we are still at the beginning of the road and the Americans have not yet 
tasted what we have tasted at their hands. The ones killed in the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon are just in return for those killed in Al-Amiriyah shelter in Iraq 
[during the 1991 Gulf War]. They are just a very small number against the number of 
those killed in Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, Bosnia, Kashmir, 
Chechnya, and Afghanistan…We have not broken even with them, otherwise we 
would have the right to kill 4 million Americans, including 1 million children, 
displace double this figure, and wound and maim hundreds of thousands. [00031] 
                                                 
15 The “Zionist-Crusader alliance,” is a term that is shorthand for the United States and its allies as well as the 
country of Israel.  It should be noted that the ummah in al Qaeda discourse refers solely to Sunni Muslims.  
Sunnis comprise a majority of the global Muslim population - roughly 90%.  The second largest sect are the 
Shia - often labeled in al Qaeda texts as “the rejectionists” – a derogatory term Salafi Sunnis often use to refer 
to the Shia due to the Shia tradition rejecting the legitimacy of Abu Bakr, Umar al-Kattab, and Uthman ibn 
Affan as Caliphs following Muhammad.  Shia doctrine states that after Muhammad only his cousin, Ali, was the 
rightful Caliph and that leadership of the ummah should go to relatives of Muhammad. 
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For al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates, the events of 9/11 represent a defensive response 
to a preexisting state of violent oppression inflicted on the global Muslim community, but in 
particular on Arab-Muslim countries like Afghanistan and Saudi-Arabia.  By constructing a 
setting where there is a global-scale, ongoing war against Muslims being waged by the U.S. 
and allied actors, al Qaeda leadership produces a context where the events of 9/11 are a 
rational counter-response.  
 For al Qaeda leadership, the U.S., Israel, and many local regimes are conducting a 
deliberate, large-scale effort intended to subjugate and destroy Muslim countries and Islam 
across the globe.  Continued operations by al Qaeda and its affiliates are interpreted in terms 
of countering U.S. and allied aggression that they believe will not end until the goal of the 
destruction of Islam has been reached.  An excerpt from a text authored by Usama bin 
Laden claims:  
Here I remind you O Muslims of the blessed 11 September strikes, after which there 
emerged facts that had been unknown to many.  These include the continuation of 
the Crusader campaign, which had been targeted against a small group of Muslims in 
Afghanistan.  I swear by God that these campaigns will not stop as long as Islam 
exists.  Look at our brothers in Palestine, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, Afghanistan, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. And now they are in captive Iraq. [00040] 
The use of “Crusaders” as a label for U.S. forces is a significant word choice deliberately 
drawing on macro narratives of the Crusades that exists in many Muslim cultures in the 
Middle East (Halverson 2011).  Historically, the Crusades refers to an extended time period 
in which multiple groups from Europe, motivated by religious, political and economic 
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concerns, vied with various Muslim leaders for control of territory in the Middle East.16  The 
Crusades extremist discourse refers to are remembered for the extreme barbarism displayed 
by invading forces acting (ostensibly) under the auspices of the Church and the conquering 
of territory by foreign armies.   
Relevant to the construction of individual identity is the First Crusade (1096-1099 
CE).  At the time, Jerusalem was under control of the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt 
(Halverson et al, 2011) who had recently recovered Palestine from the Sunni Seljuk Turks.  
Under the leadership of Godfrey of Bouillon (d. 1100 CE), European crusaders breached the 
city’s walls on July 15th, after a protracted siege.  The ensuing slaughter of men, women and 
children became legendary.  Following the initial massacre, the crusaders established 
Jerusalem as a Christian city, converting or destroying Muslim and Jewish holy sites in the 
area.  The conflicts known as the crusades would continue for centuries, although crusades 
in the Muslim Middle East are generally considered to have ended in the late thirteenth 
century (Halverson, 2011; Madden 2013). 
Narratives of the history of the Crusades gained new relevance in Muslim countries 
with the onset of European colonialism in the late 1700s, particularly with Napoleon’s arrival 
in Egypt.  Colonization of approximately 90% of Muslim controlled territories by the British 
and the French, including Palestine and Jerusalem (Halverson et al, 2011), reinforced the 
modern crusader narrative.   Thus, calling the U.S. and allied forces “Crusaders” evokes a 
significant period in Muslim history, one in which Islamic territories were under attack by an 
adversary that carried out its actions in the name of an opposing religious force, intending 
publicly and explicitly to subjugate or eradicate Islam and Muslim cultures.  The Crusader 
                                                 
16 For a more extensive history of the Crusades, see Madden (2013) A Concise History of the Crusades. 
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label also invokes a history of foreign colonialism that impacted the sociopolitical, religious, 
and economic landscape of numerous Muslim countries in detrimental ways. 
Of the key influences in al Qaeda’s ideology, Qutb (d. 1966) is largely responsible for 
the inclusion of the Crusades and defining the U.S. and western allies as Crusaders.  As 
Halverson et al, (2011) writes, for Sayyad Qutb, “… the Crusades were an expression of 
unbridled hatred, motivated not by penance, pilgrimage, or the promise of earthly or 
otherworldly rewards, but by an insatiable hatred of Islam and a thirst for its destruction” (p. 
114) Qutb viewed the Crusades as a genocidal force and “before and above all else, cultural 
enmity.”17  Qutb, however, did not view the Crusaders’ hate for Islam as the result of 
Christianity itself, but born instead out of “the crusading spirit,” motivated as much by 
secular concerns as religious.  He further argued that Europe – and by extension the 
Crusaders – was not truly Christian at all (Qutb, 2000).  For Qutb, the Crusades might have 
been intended to wipe out Islam and all Muslims, but the motivations driving the Europeans 
were intrinsically material and economic in nature, independent of true religious values 
(Halverson, 2011). 
The production of a setting in which Muslims are oppressed by an adversary defined 
through historical connotations creates an expectation of violent conflict.  In al Qaeda’s 
version of 9/11, the war began a long time ago, started by Western powers, and violence is 
the only way to stop these modern Crusaders.  The Muslim community is under attack, ergo, 
it must fight back.  Also contributing to the construction of this setting is the theme of 
jahiliyyah.  
                                                 
17 Sayyad Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, trans. Hamid Algar (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 
2000), 271 
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Jahiliyyah.  Roughly translated, jahiliyyah means ‘ignorance of the divine state’ and is 
a term in Islamic jurisprudence that historically referred to the time period before Islam was 
revealed to the Prophet.  The original concept of jahiliyyah is not limited to extremist 
discourse (Halverson, 2011).  The claim that today’s modern Muslim societies as a whole 
have regressed to a state of modern jahiliyyah has no orthodox precedent, however, and 
appears almost exclusively in the ideological underpinnings of Islamist extremism.   
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the origins of the modern usage can be traced 
back to the writings of Sayyid Qutb.  Qutb saw Muslim societies as abandoning the divine 
guidance of the Qur’an “in favor of foreign atheistic (or self-deifying) systems created by 
mere men, such as nationalism, socialism, or communism” (Halverson, 2011, p.110).  By 
turning away from the “true” Islam, or from God’s teachings, the ummah has allowed itself to 
fall into moral decay.  The state of oppression and attacks on Muslim countries and 
individuals is considered a result of this state.  In al Qaeda’s organizational discourse, 
jahiliyyah is rarely if ever explicitly named, but the concept is clearly described and plays a 
significant role in producing identity.  From a martyr text eulogizing an organizational 
member:  
If we were ruled by God’s Shariah, our rights would not have been lost, our riches 
taken away, or our sons killed -- unless lawfully like how it was at the time of God’s 
Messenger, God’s prayer and peace be upon him, and the time of the Orthodox 
Caliphs…When we saw our rights had been lost; Muslims’ property despoiled; prices 
soared; blood spilled with the approval of the oppressive government; Muslims’ 
honor violated and their sanctities desecrated; our Prophet, God’s prayer and peace 
be upon him, slandered; and Muslims’ creed profaned; we realized then that the only 
exit from our situation was when we would return to God’s Book; the Sunnah of His 
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Prophet, God’s prayer and peace be upon him; and to the call to apply the Islamic 
Shariah. [00023] 
The author claims that by failing to live by shariah, the ummah brought about their own 
humiliation and persecution.   
 Qutb, writing at the height of Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s regime in Egypt, revived and 
articulated the heretical doctrine of takfir, “excommunication” (Halverson, 2011).  Orthodox 
Sunni Islam holds that anyone who professes to be a Muslim should be accepted as a 
Muslim.  Crucial to the notion of takfir, however, is that proponents claim the right to decide 
who is or is not a Muslim.  The radical ideologue Ahmed ibn Taymiyya, from whom Qutb 
draws much of his thinking, argued that any ruler who does not rule according to shariahh is 
an unbeliever and therefore must be overthrown.  Although Taymiyya wrote in reference to 
the converted Mongols of the time (Halverson, 2011), Qutb brought this concept into 
modernity, and it remains a central theme in al Qaeda’s rhetoric.  From a text eulogizing 
AQAP member Muwahhid Al-Ma'ribi: 
The disobedience to God is what drove us to fall under the injustice of this gang that 
controls the wealth of the Muslims and their rights and enables those rascals to 
disperse you and drive wedges among you until your conditions became the way they 
are now.  They will never stop.  Their fight against you will continue.  Currently, they 
are sucking ground water from your land, building dams to deprive your wells from 
water and leave your valley to face desertification, and then they will sneak from 
under your houses to rob your wealth…The reason for all this is not implementing 
the commands of God on earth. [00023] 
The author explicitly attributes Muslims falling under “the injustice” of the gang that 
controls their wealth to their “disobedience to God.”  The quote also reinforces the theme 
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of “Muslims under attack.”  The actors oppressing Muslims are also “sucking ground water” 
from their land and attempting to rob Muslim’s wealth.  It was not uncommon for text to 
simultaneously co-construct these themes and indeed, the theme of jahiliyyah itself supports 
the construction of a setting where Muslims are being threatened.   
Collectively, discourse producing a setting where Muslims are threated and 
oppressed by antagonistic actors because of a lack of adherence to God’s will normalizes the 
perception of large scale kinetic conflict (as opposed to U.S. framing which positions the 
conflict between the U.S. and isolated terror groups) and naturalizes the existence of a group 
of actors acting in defense of Islam and Muslims.  To protect Islam and the ummah requires 
organizational members who are not only willing to act on the organization’s behalf but who 
demonstrate certain desirable identity traits.  The next section explores the construction of 
these desire traits, explicating the ways in which al Qaeda discursively constructs actors - 
particularly organizational members.  
Actors 
Narrative, Polkinghorne (1988) states, is the primary method by which human 
experience is ordered into “temporally meaningful episodes” (p. 1).  The subjects of that 
experience are actors.  In organizational stories, actors can be members of the organization 
or members of other (often competing) organizations.  Traditional organizational studies 
have focused on stories constructed by employees and management.  This project, however, 
is concerned with the ways in which narrative is used to discursively address social actors as 
subjects (Therborn, 1980) for both internal audiences (al Qaeda and affiliated groups) and 
external audiences (the broader Muslim community, regional state actors and Western 
audiences).  The following section explicates those identity targets proposed by Alvesson & 
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Willmott (2002) that address actors.  They are: defining the entity directly, defining the entity 
by defining others, explicating morals and values, and detailing knowledge and skills.  
Defining Actor Directly  
Organizations may define members discursively through “explicit references made to 
characteristics” that distinguish an individual member from all others (Alvesson & Willmott, 
2002, p. 12).  Predicated on typical corporate organizational culture, however, Alvesson and 
Willmott rely on demographic information - age, gender, position within the organization.  
Descriptors like, “a 50-year-old male middle manager” may be insufficient to address 
individuals in an atypical organizational structure like al Qaeda.  Take this excerpt from a 
martyr text eulogizing an individual fighter: 
Our martyr was born in the town of Tripoli, Lebanon, in 1981. He was a resident of 
Al-Mankubin, and was raised in a well-known conservative family.  He loved Islam 
and its people, and was an observant Muslim. He was thus keen to attend prayers in 
mosques.  He was kind and of good moral character. - [00025] 
 Gender, age, or information regarding the hierarchical position of the individual within the 
organization are absent.  Instead, the individual is addressed through information about his 
birth, the town where he was raised, his family, and his character.18  No explicit association 
with al Qaeda is present either.  Instead, the description privileges the type of individual “our 
martyr” was.  The discursive address of social actors in al Qaeda’s discourse is significantly 
richer, more detailed, emphasizes homogeneity, rather than individuality, and explicitly 
subverts notions of hierarchical rank.  In place of demographic data, ingroup members are 
directly addressed via ideal traits.  
                                                 
18 The lack of gender is unsurprising given the exclusion of women from the ranks of many extremist groups. 
For a more detailed examination of the relationship between gender and Islamist extremism, see Bloom, (2007); 
Brown, (2008); Othman, (2006). 
  106 
Traits.  Ingroup members - mujahidin - are primarily addressed through text 
describing innate traits of an individual.  This discourse highlights inherent qualities 
possessed and displayed by an individual actor - generally through the medium of a “martyr 
text” or eulogy for the individual after they have died.  Martyr texts relate stories of an 
actor’s life and the way they died.  For example, this excerpt from a martyr text: 
Afghanistan knew Ibn-al-Shaykh, may God have mercy on him, as a muhajir [foreign 
fighter], a persistent fighter and a teacher. They knew him for his good character, 
coyness, ample humbleness, rare courage, unequaled stances, devotion in worshiping 
and reading the book of God, and his care and love for his brothers.  [00023] 
An employee or member’s devotion to particular ideals, organizational practices, and good 
character might be present in stories of corporate organizational members.  It is less likely, 
however, that personal traits like “coyness,” “humbleness” or “rare courage” would be 
included in discourse about ideal employees in a for-profit company such as Amazon.  
Martyr texts are also remarkably homogeneous, presenting a consistent list of celebrated 
traits exhibited by eulogized individuals.  These traits include bravery, patience, steadfastness, 
good humor, putting the needs of others before their own, remaining committed to 
organizational ideals in the face of hardship, making sacrifices, eloquence, and 
telling/prioritizing the truth. 
Bravery.   Mujahidin are brave and courageous, and they do not fear death.  Indeed, 
bravery in the face of injury or death, or even eagerness to die, plays a key role in addressing 
ideal individuals.  Bravery - like other ideal traits - is described as an innate attribute 
evidenced throughout a mujahid’s life.  Texts often describe martyred individuals displaying 
bravery at an early age, such as in this martyr text: 
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Abu-Ata’s days passed quickly in the city of Sa'dah, but his limitless courage and 
audacity of character were noticeably prominent…He grew very dangerous in the 
eyes of the enemies of God, and thus they were extremely concerned of his 
increasing danger.  He never worried about them, as he was quite courageous and 
bold.  Among the customs of the tribes of Yemen is that children are taught how to 
carry a gun from an early age. [00024] 
Organizational member Abu-Ata is described as having “limitless courage” which made him 
appear dangerous to the “enemies of God” - another way to reference U.S. and allied forces.  
The eulogized individual, however, is attributed bravery that his adversaries lack and he 
“never worried about them.”  This courage, it is implied, is not surprising given his 
background coming from a tribe where children are allegedly trained to conflict from an 
early age.   Another text describing a different martyr contains similar descriptions: 
In that environment that hurries to arms whenever anything happens, he became a 
trained fighter and was known for his audacity.  He was famous for his bravery in his 
tribe.  Since his early childhood, he was characterized by his intelligence, bravery, and 
eloquence. [00023].  
Even at a young age, the author claims, the deceased displayed ideal traits including bravery 
and intelligence.  The importance of bravery extends beyond individual attributes.  It is also 
celebrated as a trait that inspires similarity in other group members.  In the same text, the 
author describes the mujahid as: 
 … he lived through fierce wars and fought with a courageous and steady 
heart…Moreover, he used to inspire the enthusiasm of the mujahidin, remind them to 
remain steadfast, bring them the good heralds of victory, and preach them before 
battles. [00023] 
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Bravery and courage are innate traits that mujahidin are born with or display at a very early 
age.  This makes them exceptional.  Members who display these traits serve as a source of 
inspiration for others.  Attributions of bravery often appear in conjunction with stories 
about battles against overwhelming odds.  Given al Qaeda’s membership numbers – even at 
the organization’s peak of operation – in comparison to U.S. and allied armed forces and 
scarcity of resources, it seems logical bravery would be a valued member trait.  According to 
al Qaeda’s own discourse, the adversaries the ummah face are formidable.  The scale of the 
conflict between ‘true’ Islam and the Crusader-Zionist alliance and its allies is global.  Ergo, 
mujahidin face numerous disadvantages, especially with regard to weaponry and logistical 
support.  Encouraging bravery as an ideal member trait allows al Qaeda to acknowledge 
these disadvantages without framing them as an impossible obstacle.  Indeed, the hardships 
faced by organizational members are used to highlight the extraordinary nature of the 
individual actors in the data. 
Good humor.  Membership in a violent IDO like al Qaeda carries extreme risk.  
Mujahidin face physical hardship, poverty, injury, imprisonment, torture, and obviously, 
death.  Attrition rate for members is high.  Despite this risk, or perhaps in direct response to 
it, members are often described as being known for their good humor, friendliness and 
strong bonds with fellow organizational members who are often referred to as their 
“brothers.”  A text eulogizing a mujahid who was killed in a firefight with enemy troops 
describes his interactions with other organizational members:  
I would like also to highlight Abu-Ata’s love of his brothers as well as his hospitality.  
Whenever he met the people, even for a short time, he used to smile warmly at 
everybody and ask them one by one about their conditions and general affairs in a 
way that makes everyone feel honored.  He loved his immigrant brothers very much.  
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He did not like that any of his brothers be badly talked about.  Instead, he used to 
commend his brothers’ efforts and highlight their good qualities.  [00024] 
Multiple explicit references to emotional connection reinforce a sense of closeness and 
mutual support between the mujahidin.  Among the positive traits highlighted in the eulogy is 
the martyr’s encouragement of the “good qualities” of other members, suggesting ideal 
members not only display favorable traits but encourage and publicly celebrate the display of 
those traits in others.  Continued emphasis on displaying similar traits also implies that 
individuality is less relevant to organizational goals.  In another text containing a series of 
eulogies for multiple fighters who died in a single battle, the author focuses on how one 
eulogized individual was viewed by other members:  
I noticed and saw myself how the mujahidin loved him so much.  That is because 
God caused people to love him.  He, may God rest his soul, used to joke a lot.  He 
would entertain you with his gentle talk and his simple “Bedouin” accent.  We 
believe, as we consider him and God is the best Judge, that Almighty God’s saying 
applies to him: “Humble towards the believers, proud towards all who deny the 
truth…” [partial Quranic verse, Al-Ma'idah, 5:54].  He was gentle while talking to 
both the youngsters and elders.  Whenever you met him, you would find him 
welcoming and smiling.  You would feel closeness and amicability and then cordiality 
would start. [00023] 
The role of “humor” and friendship and the emphasis placed on similar qualities in 
organizational texts may serve multiple functions.  Without formal bureaucratic control 
measures or profit-based incentives, organizational culture and identification takes on greater 
significance in the role of member retention and recruitment (Brown, 2006).  Extremist 
groups cannot offer 401ks or resume-building experience.  Nor are there industry-wide 
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quantitative standards for measuring the “success” of an ideologically driven organization.  
Where a corporate organization such as Amazon can point to quarterly profits or share 
dividends, IDOs generally need to construct their own metrics of success.  Where the 
primary goal of the organization is support and spread of an ideology, members themselves 
may be part of the “product.”  Rising membership, or an increase in sympathetic stakeholder 
audiences can both facilitate the spread of the organization’s ideology.  Resulting support 
may also include resources, intelligence, or political leverage.  
 An ideal member identity that prioritizes cooperation, humility, and bonding with 
other members as if they are family may encourage ingroup members to take actions that 
increase group cohesiveness and promote willingness of new members to identify with the 
organization’s goals.  A member identity that privileges and celebrates qualities like good 
humor and humbleness sits in contrast to organizations (generally corporate) where 
individuality and competition might encourage competition to prove higher performance.  
This suggests that member retention is a priority for al Qaeda.  Closely tied to the notion of 
good humor and ingroup cohesion is the notion of selflessness. 
Selfless.  Mujahidin put the needs of others - either fellow mujahidin or Muslims - 
before their own.  Numerous martyr texts contain stories about mujahidin taking actions to 
benefit their “brothers” at their own expense.  For example, one eulogy reads:  
In one of his stories of support and sacrifice, he once sold his weapon to bear the 
expenses of some mujahidin whom he hosted, but he did not tell the amir about it.  
He remained in this condition without a weapon for some time and he used to move 
with some bombs.  May God have mercy upon him. - [00023] 
In an environment where resources are often scarce, encouraging members to exhibit 
selflessness may benefit the organization.  Ideal members help distribute goods evenly, 
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ensuring as many as possible receive money, food, or weapons – whatever is needed to 
continue working toward organizational goals.  A culture of sharing may also strengthen 
social ties between members, aiding member retention.  From a eulogy for a fighter whose 
family had a history of supporting Islamist groups:  
He was generous as he used to serve his brothers’ needs from his own money.  
Sometimes he had to borrow money to provide his brothers the equipment or 
weapons they needed … On his way Abu-Ata met, by chance, a group of the 
mujahidin among whom was his elder brother Salih al-Tays, may God protect him.  
Thus, he paid all the money he had to the mujahidin and provided supplies and a 
house for a group of them.  Having checked on them, he returned to the city of 
Sa'dah where he runs his business and stays with his wife and family.  He used to 
visit his mujahidin brothers regularly to supply them with their needs, buy arms for 
them, and provide them with ammunition. [00024] 
The excerpt relates a story from before the eulogized joined al Qaeda, but his actions are 
clearly consistent with encouraged norms of member behavior.  The text describes Abu Ata 
as an ideal mujahid who displays desired traits even prior to joining the organization.  This 
and other martyr texts do not suggest that membership confers or enhances these traits.  
Instead, mujahidin are constructed as inherently brave, or selfless, prior to membership in al 
Qaeda.  Addressing these traits as innate to group members may incentivize the process of 
identification in members.   
Patient and steadfast.  Mujahidin are patient and steadfast.  Patience and the ability 
to remain steadfast conveys advantages on members of a violent IDO since many fighters 
who join extremist organizations like al Qaeda have been imprisoned, either before their 
recruitment or as a result of it.  Indeed, prison remains a significant recruiting ground for 
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extremist organizations.  Imprisoned members of al Qaeda or affiliated groups endure 
physical hardship, injury, deprivation, and torture.  A passage from a eulogy of an 
imprisoned mujahid describes the condition of a fellow detainee, using the opportunity to 
stress the individual’s qualities, particularly patience. 
It was there that I had my first encounter with him, where I found him to be a thin 
and weak man.  Being originally thin, his back was arched. But I swear to God that 
he was a true example of patience, steadfastness, and had good faith in God. [00006] 
 The excerpt below describes experiences of multiple al Qaeda fighters in Syrian prisons, 
relating harsh internment conditions: 
There was also a young Afghan man. He was 19 years old. They arrested him while 
he was on his way to Iraq to support his brothers.  He had been in a solitary cell 
since 2005. Glory be to God, the steadfastness of this brother was weird and rare. 
He did not know Arabic, but for a few words: “Relief will come soon.” Every time 
we tried to communicate with him, he knew only one answer: “Relief will come 
soon.”  How patient and tolerant he was!  [00046] 
Another text eulogizing organizational member and cleric Abu-Abd-al-Rahman Jamal al-
Misrati details a long list of traits displayed by the deceased, again highlighting the 
importance of patience not just as an ideal trait for individuals but in providing an example 
for other “successive generations.”  
The jihadist Shaykh and diligent cleric Abu-Abd-al-Rahman Jamal al-Misrati, known 
as Atiyatallah…made a brilliant and honorable example for successive generations in 
showing patience, good performance, jihad, knowledge, diligence, ethics, good 
manners, sacrifice, and endurance in the separation from the loved ones. [00028]. 
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When the chances of imprisonment and subsequent torture are high, patience becomes a 
valuable member trait, and al Qaeda’s discourse repeatedly celebrates patience, framing it as 
a potential survival tool not just physically but spiritually.  The importance of remaining 
steadfast and determined is not limited to the context of imprisonment, however.  An ideal 
organizational member, one worthy of being eulogized in al Qaeda’s public discourse, is 
“determined” to pursue action and related, ideal behaviors such as sacrifice.  Ideal members 
are also determined to pursue jihad in the face of adversity, refusing to let external events – 
such as being attacked by a superior force – deter them.  See this excerpt from a martyr text 
describing Muwahhid Al-Ma'ribi. 
When the enemies of God failed to arrest him, they bombed his house with rockets 
and artillery.  Nevertheless, he was not affected and did not retreat from his path.  
On the contrary, he was determined to continue with the path of jihad. [00023] 
Relevant to constructing ideal members is the way the quote centers the mujahid’s 
determination.  Ideal organizational members are not deterred from acting, even in the face 
of significant personal danger.  Bravery as an ideal trait is also implicitly reinforced - the 
mujahid was “not affected” when the adversary bombed his house.  Rather, the attack merely 
highlights the mujahid’s determination and devotion to organizational action - jihad.   Martyr 
texts contained numerous references to the determination of the eulogized in acting toward 
a desired goal.  
Day by day, he was proven a tireless jihadist and fervent struggler who never 
wavered.  Being countless, his heroic actions cannot be compiled in a single record, 
but it is said that the matter which cannot be wholly acquired should not be left out 
altogether.  [00024]. 
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This example, attributed to an AQAP spokesman, refers to martyred fighter as “tireless” and 
unwavering, “fervent” in the struggle to carry out jihad.  The speaker then goes on to 
highlight the heroism of the deceased, positioning the mujahid as an ideal organizational 
member who - because this is a martyr text - the audience understands died in support of the 
organization.  Self-sacrifice is key to performing the role of ideal mujahid, and the discursive 
relationship between sacrifice and martyrdom, and organizational ideas of success is 
explored in greater detail below.  Relevant here is that this connection is reinforced at 
multiple sites of identity influence, thus strengthening the overall construction of narratives 
of the ideal mujahid.  
 Al Qaeda’s discourse contains numerous examples of what Alvesson and Willmott 
(2002) call “defining the entity directly” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 3).  As subjects, al 
Qaeda members are addressed in extremely explicit and homogeneous ways.  Mujahidin are 
brave, kind, and selfless, putting the needs of others before their own.  They show good 
humor and patience in the face of adversity and willingly make many sacrifices.  They pursue 
organizational goals - violent conflict - without faltering, even in the face of extreme 
adversity.  
Martyr texts and similar media are regularly publicized by al Qaeda media apparatus. 
The consistency and homogeneity with which ingroup members are addressed directly 
suggests strategic aims.  Martyr texts construct idealized member identities presumably for 
other current members to emulate, but they may also serve as ‘advertising’ for potential 
recruits or sympathizers.  Sageman (2004) notes a trend in early al Qaeda recruitment: many 
individuals came from educated, middle-class backgrounds.  These individuals were not 
commonly denied social or economic opportunities, yet many felt deprived of meaning or 
purpose in their lives.   
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Discursively producing al Qaeda members who are brave, steadfast, selfless, in good 
spirits and having a strong sense of self and purpose may appeal to similarly disaffected 
individuals.  In regard to the impact of this discourse on antagonistic audiences such as 
Western counterintelligence, media, military or policy makers, the uniformity and celebratory 
aspects of these texts presents a highly strategic image of an organization and its members 
resistant to coalition efforts to defeat them.  
Describing and defining individual organizational members accounts for only a small 
part of the ways in which organizations can influence identity construction, however.  
Individuals (and organizations) also define themselves by constructing an ‘other’ embodying 
traits that contradict the ideal ingroup identity.  The next section of this chapter utilizes 
Alvesson & Willmott’s (2002) ‘defining others’ identity target to examine the ways in which 
al Qaeda defines outgroup members to influence ingroup member identity.  
Defining Others  
Organizations can influence member identity by constructing an oppositional 
identity for outgroup members in contrast to their own identity.  Alvesson & Willmott write, 
“a group can be identified indirectly by reference to the characteristics of specific others” (p. 
12).  In a sense, defining an ‘other’ who embodies the antithesis of the values an organization 
wants to promote increases adherence in its own members.  “Don’t be like them,” is the 
implicit moral of organizational stories that focus on defining others.  Analysis revealed, two 
distinct types of outgroup identity construction.  The first - labeled “negative comparison” - 
described typically antagonistic actors who were ascribed traits that were the antithesis of the 
mujahidin.  The second type, however, was an aspirational identity - the Companions and first 
Muslims - who were positioned as ideal examples of traits and behaviors that current group 
members should model their own identities on.  
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Negative comparison: Antagonistic outgroup identities.  Corporate 
organizational literature contains comparisons between ingroup and outgroup members that 
are largely implicit, and any competition is generally hypothetical, or commerce based 
(Alvesson & Empson, 2008).  Such inference is largely lacking in al Qaeda’s discourse.  
Outgroup members are not just in conflict ideologically with ingroup members, but often are 
depicted committing acts of physical violence against organizational members or those they 
represent (the broader Muslim community).  Attribution of negative traits is explicit.  
Adversarial actors who appear in al Qaeda discourse are violent, hateful, untrustworthy, 
impious, and often sadistic.  A text relating the suffering experienced by mujahidin in a Syrian 
prison explicitly compares individual guards to animals and relates their violent behavior in 
detail, stating, 
Prisoners used to call him “Juw'ah” [causer of hunger] because he used to reduce the 
quantities of food, even though food was already scant.  He was nearly 184 cm tall, 
strong, with brown eyes, and as active as a monkey.  He was newly employed. His 
favorite hobby was to slap the brothers in the face and on the ears.  This malicious 
jailer…One of the stories about him was that an imprisoned brother was suffering 
from some illnesses such as diabetes, heart disease, and others, and so would have to 
take many and various medicines.  When that oppressive man glimpsed the packets 
of medicine, he sarcastically said to the brother: “You have a pharmacy.”  Then, he 
started to ask the brother about each kind of medicine and what it was for.  This 
brother was injecting himself with insulin. This brutal guy saw how the brother 
injected himself with insulin.  He said: “This method is so slow and it takes much 
time, you donkey.  Who taught you this method?” The brother replied: “The 
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physician.” He said: “He is a donkey like you.” The following day, he stole half the 
quantity of the medicine. - [00046] 
The story relates the experiences of the mujahidin, but primarily it focuses on the actions and 
cruel nature of the guard, explicitly labeling him “malicious” and then supporting the claim 
via description of the guard’s actions.  Another text, authored by senior al Qaeda member 
Ahu Yaha al Libi, positions former president of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf as the antagonist.  
Actions and traits ascribed to Musharraf are used to emphasize the danger he presents and 
highlights what the mujahidin are contesting.  By resisting a “despotic, secular tyrant” who has 
caused the “land and people” to abandon “Islam and morality,” the implication is that 
mujahidin are champions protecting the people, Islam, and good values.  
Isn’t it true that they stood up to a despotic, secular, and despicable tyrant after they 
saw him dragging the land and the people to the abyss of abandoning Islam and 
morality and turning them into blind followers and an exact copy of his masters in 
the East and West in culture, values, creed, and customs?  They stood up to him 
[Pervez Musharraf] and to his agent and dishonorable army and his Intelligence 
apparatus, that targets only the weak, in order to say stop this train of corruption that 
destroyed the country, and crushed the values and obliterated virtue.  They stood up 
to them to say that Pakistan will not achieve independence from the worshippers of 
cows [India] only to be enslaved by the worshippers of [material] pleasures and the 
people of sin. [0008] 
As displayed in the quote above, there is very little subtlety in discourse addressing outgroup 
members.  Outgroup members are enemies of al Qaeda and the ummah.  These enemies 
represent a clear and immediate danger to the organization and the people al Qaeda claims 
to act on behalf of.  The “others” in al Qaeda discourse, whether individual guards, political 
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leaders, or groups, lack morality, enjoy killing, are enemies of Islam, and perpetuate many 
different forms of violence on the ummah.  This observation is supported by intersection 
between texts containing the “Muslims under attack” theme and the “defining other” theme.  
This passage provides an example:  
They [the “US and NATO Crusaders”] attacked the Muslim people of Afghanistan 
and Iraq and supported the Jews in the occupation of Palestine.  They also killed the 
Muslim people, made children orphans, made women and scholars homeless, and 
stole the wealth of Muslims.  Who did so are the Americans and their allies. [00026] 
Texts such as this reinforce the perception that the U.S. deliberately targets Muslims, 
particularly women and children, constructing the U.S. and allies as supporters of an 
occupation and killer of noncombatants.   
Not all descriptions of outgroup members referred to existing groups or individuals, 
however.  Outgroup members were also constructed via indirect attribution, or descriptions 
of hypothetical actors.  For example, this passage from an article entitled, Virtues of jihad, 
Martyrdom-Seeking Operations: 
Thus, God is referring to two types of people: The First Type: They are the 
hypocrite, the double dealer, and the evil persons, whose appearance you admire, but 
whose intentions you abhor.  If these people are invited to piety and fear of God, 
they reject righteousness and never attempt to reform themselves. They are rather 
led by arrogance to more crimes. Moreover, they disdain the idea of being shown the 
path of righteousness and blessings. They continue on the path of demoralization by 
way of polytheism and sins, and they kill and destroy farmlands and offspring.  This 
type brings about plague to the masses that will eventually lead them to immorality 
and destruction.  That will also be the case if they ever rule the people. [00022] 
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The language still attributes undesirable traits to a group, but it does not connect these 
attributes to specific individuals.  Presumably, the audience is encouraged to draw 
conclusions for themselves who belongs to this “First type.  This rhetorical strategy is 
exceptionally effective in delineating between ingroup and outgroup members.  
The extreme division between ingroup and outgroup identities is likely due to the 
position of al Qaeda as an IDO.  The distinction between “us” and “them” in a corporate 
organization may rest on traits such as creativity or effectiveness.  In the context of an IDO, 
the main form of competition between organizations centers ways of ordering social 
systems, and the method for bringing about that order may include kinetic violence.  
Outgroup members – representing the antithesis of organizational values – are constructed 
in this way to support violent action taken against them.  By rejecting identification with the 
outgroup, organizations invite their own members to accept or even privilege conditions and 
identity traits that might otherwise been viewed as negative (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  
Contrasting ingroup and outgroup members based on traits such as efficiency or being a 
‘team player’ is unlikely to elicit the strength of identification necessary in order for 
organizational members to accept violent conflict as a rational plan of action to achieve their 
goals.  Put bluntly, if you want organizational members to commit suicide, engage in fights 
with better armed adversaries, and give up most of their material possessions, the “other” 
needs to be constructed not just as “competition” but a direct threat to organizational 
members’ core values.  
Positive comparison: The companions and first Muslims.  Analysis revealed 
that negative comparison was not the only purpose for outgroup identities.  Discourse also 
constructed a positive idealized identity for ingroup members to emulate.  The subjects of 
the positive comparison were primarily individuals or groups positioned in an historical 
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context.  Two different subjects were commonly addressed as examples for positive 
comparison.  These were the Prophet and his companions and the first generation of 
Muslims who lived at the same time as the Prophet.  Aspects of identity emphasized in text 
addressing the companions and first Muslims are consistent with traits considered ideal for 
current al Qaeda members: bravery, patience, good humor, selflessness, and perseverance. 
 Events from the life of the Prophet are common.  The Prophet represents a significant 
point of comparison for modern Muslims, not just al Qaeda members.  In contrast to 
Christianity, where the central figure of religious narratives - Jesus - is considered divine, the 
Prophet was a mortal man, and orthodox Sunni practices explicitly forbid considering him a 
saint or divine figure.  The Prophet is considered the best of Muslims, as he was chosen by 
God for the revelation of the Qur'an.19    
The Prophet confronted the enemies himself and fought them by his sword until his 
head was injured, his hip bones were fractured, and his pure blood ran over his 
cheeks and was wept by his pure hands. May God’s peace and prayers be upon the 
Prophet … By his act, the Prophet wanted to tell every commander, who wants to 
establish the pillar of religion and follow the path of the guided people, that this is 
the right path and you should adhere to it … Copy the good example of the Prophet, 
prayers and peace be upon him, when he stabbed Ubay Bin-Khalaf with his spear 
killing him, on the day of Uhud, and making him moan like the bull when it dies. - 
[00007].  
                                                 
19 Not all Islamic traditions equally eschew the practices of sainthood.  Comparing the rich and complex history 
of Islamic jurisprudence, however, is beyond the scope of this project.  For the sake of pragmatism, the focus 
remains on the majority Sunni interpretation.  This interpretation views the Prophet Muhammad as a mortal 
individual, last in the line of Prophets of God, rather than an aspect of the divine 
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Bravery and perseverance in spite of physical injury, willingness to engage in physical conflict 
and taking the lives of adversaries to establish to follow the path of the guided are traits 
highlighted for al Qaeda members to emulate.  Besides the Prophet himself, the data 
contained references to “the first generation.”  The first generation or first Muslims who 
answered the call to Islam and lived at the time of the Prophet are held up in al Qaeda 
discourse as the “best” generation, or the people who were truest to the form of Islam al 
Qaeda ideology considers the most ‘pure.’20  
 The first generation wrote a glorious and honorable chapter in the history of our 
nation, by upholding the great tenets of Islam which they practiced in reality. They 
set the best of examples by holding on to such tenets.  They were brought up in the 
school of the greatest imam, Muhammad, prayers and peace be upon him, who 
instilled in them the seeds of steadfastness and sacrifice in the cause of their religion 
and principles. He who follows these great seeds which our Prophet Muhammad, 
prayers and peace be upon him, instilled in the hearts of his companions, can find 
them in the following four matters…[00016] 
The first generation is also used to highlight the importance of patience, particularly in the 
face of suffering, and its value to organizational members.  An article in a magazine 
produced by AQAP discusses “the importance of patience” and the first Muslims up as 
examples of ideal behavior.  
Therefore, when the early generation beautified their call with patience, they were 
victorious over the most powerful nations in their time. The whole world was 
                                                 
20 Sayings attributed to Muhammad and stories about his life form a key part of Islamic exegesis.  These 
recountings and historical narratives were collected in the centuries following the Prophet’s death and are called 
the Hadith.  Along with the Qur'an, they are the primary texts in Sunni Islam.   For a broader discussion and 
overview of the authenticity of Hadith, their contents and purpose, see Brown, (2009) 
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opened before them and their memory was immortalized … The companions did 
not show patience toward difficulties and hardships only, but they showed more 
patience toward the temptations of the world to the extent that some of them used 
to cry when life offered them something good, fearing that their rewards were sent 
before time.  [00018] 
The author emphasizes patience should be displayed in the face of hardships and also 
“toward the temptations of the world,” emphasizing the importance of giving up worldly 
possessions in favor of pursuing relevant actions.  “Temptations” are something to be 
resisted, and ideal organizational members should actively denounce them - just as the 
Companions did.  What “temptations” are, however, is not addressed.  Context clues and 
general familiarity with similar texts suggest that temptations can refer to many things, from 
wealth, to ease of living, to anything that might lure a Muslim to turn away from Shariah 
teachings.  In other words, temptations challenge norms of what it means to be sufficiently 
Muslim as dictated by the speaker.  This excerpt from another text describes the experience 
of one of the first four, “rightly guided” or Rashidun Caliphs, so known because they were 
chosen in accordance with the example set down by the Prophet.  In the text, the author 
emphasizes the hardships, including physical torture, experienced by the early Muslims. 
I wish to start with a statement by Umar Bin-al-Khattab [one of the rightly-guided 
caliphs], in which he said: ‘We realized the best living through patience.’ Caliph 
Umar, may God be pleased with him, did not say this unless he remembered --in his 
comfort and glory-- the hardships of the Prophetic call in its early days. He saw the 
companions, may God be pleased with them, being tortured and mutilated. He saw 
some of them being thrown in the burning heat with rocks on their chests; yet, the 
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polytheists were surprised to hear them shouting ‘God is One’ and showing more 
firmness and steadfastness. - [00016] 
The theme of “patience as strength” and its connection to suffering as a source of strength 
and delayed reward plays a key role in the construction of individual member identity.  As 
previously discussed, membership in an extremist organization is hazardous.   Victories are 
rare and generally achieved on a small scale - like individual skirmishes.  Death is a very 
probable outcome of membership.  These conditions result in “patience” being a tool 
necessary for member survival and continuous membership in the organization.  
The features of the hardships and difficulties that the Messenger, God’s prayers and 
peace be upon him, and his companions, may God be pleased with them, suffered 
are numerous and painful that may destroy those who do not have patience. [00018] 
Presenting patience as a tool for victory may enable members to better endure difficult 
experiences and may also implicate members in conflict outcomes.  In an AQAP published 
text, the author exhorts the audience to emulate early Muslims, claiming: 
Patience which leads to victory.  Not many people are ingrained with patience which 
is, along with piety, the key factor that leads to steadfastness, and upholding this 
great principle.   Addressing His jihadist believing worshippers, God said: ' O ye who 
believe! Persevere in patience and constancy; vie in such perseverance; strengthen 
each other; and fear Allah. that ye may prosper' [Koranic verse, Al-Imran, 3:200]. 
[0016] 
 If patience is a tool of victory then blame for loss can be placed on ingroup members, rather 
than pragmatic factors like relative troop strength or access to resources.  Unlike 
ammunition or money, patience is an internal trait that can be addressed as the responsibility 
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of the individual rather than supplied from an external agent.  In short, if an individual lacks 
patience itis a failure on the individual’s part, not the organization’s.   
Referencing the Prophet Muhammad and the first generation of Muslims also results 
in reification of the setting, where the ongoing conflict between the U.S. and al Qaeda is 
framed as a war to protect Islam.  Temporal boundaries are also bypassed by this strategy, 
suggesting that the trials faced by the first generation of Muslims are connected to the trials 
faced by modern mujahidin.  And where the first Muslims triumphed, current organizational 
members will also, as long as they embody desired traits.  More significance is placed on the 
construction of this conflict as a battle between Islam and “disbelief” or “falsehood” in texts 
concerned with organizational identity, however.  Chapter 7 will explore the role of religious 
language and imagery more thoroughly as it directly relates to organizational identity.  
In summary, al Qaeda’s discourse supports Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) assertion 
that individuals and groups can be indirectly identified by reference “to the characteristics of 
specific others” (p. 12).  However, al Qaeda takes two distinct approaches to the 
construction of an “other” or outroup identity.  The first bolsters Alvesson and Willmott’s 
(2002) assertion that organizations may influence member identity by assigning negative 
characteristics to competing organizations and their members, which encourages ingroup 
members to reject those identity traits.  The second approach is the construction of an 
aspirational or positive “other” that embodies extreme examples of identity traits al Qaeda 
elites find valuable in organizational members.  The positive construction of an “other” or 
outgroup identity in al Qaeda’s discourse is not held up as something from which an ingroup 
member can differentiate himself but as an ideal to strive for.   The Prophet and the first 
generation of Muslims are the primary examples of this aspirational identity; they embody 
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traits considered ideal for modern mujahidin: bravery, selflessness, good humor, patience and 
willingness to fight for the goals of the organization.   
Explicating Morals and Values  
Actors are not addressed solely through direct or indirect definition.  Organizations 
may attempt to influence member identification by espousing a particular morality or certain 
values (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  By creating and promoting a system of values, 
organizations invite members to construct their identity to align with values that presumably 
support the organization’s ideological position.  As one of the main functions of ideology is 
to create notions of what is ‘right’ and ‘normal’ morals and values should play a significant 
role in identity construction of IDOs.  
Complications arise, however, when trying to unpack the ways al Qaeda constructs 
morality and values in public discourse.  First, “morality” is treated as a priori, rarely 
explicated by authors.  Authors assume their audience understands what they mean when 
they refer to morality, and presumably agree.  For example, “In Ma'rib, Abu-Ata was widely 
loved by the people.  He was admired for his noble morality.” [00024].  And “He is brave, 
generous, and of good moral character.  He is patient, venerable, and his merits are 
innumerable” [00025].  Both examples come from martyr texts describing individuals as 
“moral” or displaying morality without expanding on what “morality” entails.  Instead, 
morality is approached as an end unto itself, a finite characteristic possessed by ideal 
organizational members rather than a system of rules that need to be explained.  Morals and 
morality is something a mujahid possesses innately, rather than something that needs to be 
earned to comply with organizational norms.   
Second, the majority of data addressing morals and values supported the direct 
address of individual actors rather than a distinct site of identity influence.  For example, a 
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martyr text descries a mujahid, “He was raised according to principles of religion, bravery, 
and benevolence in a Bedouin environment that values high manners and disdains humility’ 
[00023].  Although the passage clearly celebrates the values displayed by the individual, the 
outcome of the passage is addressing the martyr directly.  In another text eulogizing two 
fighters, the author writes: “They were raised on the values of honor, perseverance, bravery, 
and heroism.” [0007] 
The speaker references specific traits ascribed to members that have already been 
discussed as important to the construction of an idealized individual member identity: love 
of and support of jihad, perseverance, bravery, etc.  The reflexive construction of self-identity 
“is assembled out of cultural raw material: language, symbols, sets of meanings, values, etc.,” 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 8).  Where research on identity construction in corporate 
contexts suggests that strong feelings of morality may be considered misplaced in the 
corporate world (Jackall, 1988), they form the bedrock of identity construction in al Qaeda’s 
discourse and act simultaneously with other “identity targets” – most commonly by defining 
an entity directly. 
Knowledge and Skills   
In organizational contexts, “knowledge often defines the knower” (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2002, p. 13).  Skills, education, or professional status can be significant 
components of identity construction for organizational members.  In corporate 
organizational research, emphasis is typically placed on completion of training seminars or 
the construction of particular kinds of managerial identities.  Lacking publicized bureaucratic 
hierarchy that encourages internal promotion, however, the significance of knowledge and 
skills appears relative to intersections with other sites of identity, not a major site of distinct 
identity regulation.  
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Despite the significance of kinetic conflict to identity narratives, little data focused 
on individual al Qaeda members’ combat skills.  Some examples included, “He had a great 
love of arms and fighting, and he became a skillful sniper.” [00023].  And “Meanwhile, he 
was training some brothers to use artillery, and they practiced and mastered it” [00023].  
Both instances, however, appear in the same text, written by a single author.  Mujahidin were 
much more likely to be celebrated for bravery than systemic learning or displaying 
experience with weaponry.  Indeed, skill at arms was not necessarily heralded as an 
accomplishment.  One martyr text explicitly notes the deceased was not highly educated in 
warfare.  “It is noteworthy that Abu-Ata’s combative experience was not very large” [00024] 
relates the author.  
Two general areas of skills emphasis not related to combat did emerge from the data.  
The first concerned religious knowledge: memorizing the Qur'an and understanding of 
Shariah, or practicing daw’ah.  Daw’ah is generally translated as “issuing a summons” and 
refers to the practice of inviting others to Islam.  
After the second Gulf War, he began to study Shari'ah. He was mentored by a 
number of Muslim Ulema [a recognized scholar or authority on Islamic 
jurisprudence] … He continued his daw’ah mission by giving lessons and lectures in 
English, publishing them on the internet, which had a great effect in promoting 
Islamic daw’ah in the USA and the West, in general. [00019]. 
The text describes the experiences of al Qaeda leader Anwar Awlaki, highlighting his efforts 
to invite others to Islam.  Mujahidin noted for being diligent or talented in spreading the 
word of Islam or inviting others to Islam were routinely praised, and daw’ah was presented as 
a valued skill.    Another text eulogizing an individual fighter describes his commitment to 
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daw’ah.  In this text, the author also praises the mujahid’s style and his intense study to 
improve his daw’ah efforts.  
His style in daw’ah was nice and his method sublime.  His style in daw’ah used to 
include all the classes of the society.  I remember that he asked me to write daw’ah-
related message to elders and notable people of tribes.  He was very keen on 
benefiting from scholars.  He asked some scholars to write some messages in daw’ah, 
explaining the righteous ideology, and talking about the perfect path to change these 
apostate governments. [00023] 
Practicing daw’ah was considered a desirable endeavor for organizational members, although 
calling outgroup members to Islam was not immediately relevant to organizational goals.  
Daw’ah is not significant to organizational goals because the kinetic conflict is framed as a 
defensive war rather than an offensive one.  From a speech on the importance of jihad, al-
Awlaki states  
Obviously, we're talking about here the jihad of expansion, the jihad which is the 
offensive jihad, which is different in its objectives than jihad al-daf' [jihad of defense].  
In the jihad of defense, your purpose is not da'wa. You're fighting an enemy because 
he came and took over your land, so this is an important difference. It is in the 
offensive jihad, that is when your objective is daw’ah, not in the defensive jihad.  
Because some people say, well, why are you treating the occupiers so brutally, 
shouldn't we give them da'wa? No, he came to our land, he should be treated 
brutally. [00003] 
Daw’ah is not necessary, Awlaki argues, when fighting an occupier who has already acted 
aggressively.  The primary goal of jihad is defending Muslims and Muslim territories; thus it is 
acceptable to “treat the occupiers brutally” because, bluntly, they started it.  Since the kinetic 
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conflict between the U.S. and al Qaeda is framed as one of defense on al Qaeda’s part, 
celebrating the practice of daw’ah in individual narratives may do more to construct an ideal 
member who fits the setting by reinforcing the presentation of mujahidin as moral, virtuous 
individuals dedicated to Islam, rather than contributing to organizational goals.   
The second area of skills emphasis in organizational discourse concerned leadership 
and dispute resolution. For example, a martyr text states:  
The Shaykh became known for his intelligence and wisdom in resolving issues.  His 
solutions, verdicts, and settlements between disputing sides on issues related to land, 
blood, and tribal retaliation disputes demonstrate his intelligence and wisdom.  He 
spread true peace with every issue he resolved.  The people of Waqar have known 
him since he contributed to the spread of justice among them … The Shaykh spent 
most of his time in Waqar working on resolving issues, going to villages to make 
reconciliation among tribes, preaching in mosques, giving sermons, teaching, 
receiving prominent figures, and encamping on the frontlines as a preacher, an 
adviser, and a fighter, as active and energetic as young people. [00015] 
Judiciary skill is the emphasis of the eulogy - the mujahid was not remembered as a fighter, 
but as someone who displayed wisdom in resolving disputes, not just internally to the 
organization, but for local tribes.  The author claims that the deceased “contributed to the 
spread of justice” among local tribes and filled multiple roles beyond just “a fighter.”  
Similar to discourse defining individuals directly, language addressing knowledge and skills 
was fairly homogeneous.  Intersections between discourse supporting the construction of 
different identity targets further suggests that al Qaeda senior leadership attempts to 
influence multiple aspects of identity simultaneously.   
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Texts like these, while highlighting and celebrating certain traits or actions, ascribe 
mujahidin as total individuals, rather than solely organizational members.  Greater need for 
identification may result in a higher number of identity targets addressed in organizational 
discourse.  To better understand how organizations’ influence member identity construction 
and the process of identification, a broader perspective examining how these targets work 
together is useful.  
In summary, as an IDO, al Qaeda seeks to influence member identification by 
constructing a homogeneous, highly idealized member identity. This is accomplished by 
addressing actors directly and through the construction of both negative and positive 
“other” identities as points of comparison.  The next sections move away from ‘actors’ to 
explore the ways in which ideal ‘actions’ are addressed and how that influences member 
identity.  
Actions 
Narrative offers a fundamental scheme for linking actions and events “into 
interrelated aspects of an understandable composite” (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 13), providing 
a framework that allows audiences to see connections among events in ways that confer 
meaning on those events.  Polkinghorne (1988) argues that narrative “adds to simple action 
sequences the structure of a plot” (p. 144).  A man shooting a gun is taking an action, but a 
mujahid firing a stolen rocket launcher at a U.S. convoy and escaping to return to base camp 
unharmed is a story that carries significance for the individual actor, the audience, and the 
organization he belongs to.  The following section explores the “action sequences” in al 
Qaeda’s discourse and examines the ways in which actions are used to construct individual 
member identity.  Two of Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) identity targets are relevant to 
exploring actions: rules of the game, and vocabulary of motives.  Discourse addressing these 
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sites of identity influence, however, did not ascribe actions in isolation.  Rather, they 
encouraged an understanding of rules and norms of behavior supporting another action: 
conducting jihad.   
 
Figure 1: relationship between identity targets ascribing actions and jihad.  
Discourse establishing “rules of the game” naturalized ways to most effectively carry 
out jihad while the explication of a “vocabulary of motives” encouraged mujahidin to 
understand the meaning of jihad.  Ultimately, the reason to become a mujahid is to carry out 
jihad.  In order to explicate the relationship between identity construction and action, this 
section discusses jihad first, followed by rules of the game, and vocabulary of motives, 
highlighting the intersection of actions and identity targets.  
Jihad 
The primacy of jihad as an action cannot be overstated.  Jihad, as an act and a 
concept, however, is not native to extremist discourse.  The translation of jihad generally 
means “struggle” with no explicitly violent connotations (Kepel, 2006) and “mujahid” refers 
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to one who is engaged in a struggle (Esposito, 2004).21  The rich historical and contemporary 
traditions existing within Islamic exegesis and jurisprudence exploring, and contesting, what 
it means to conduct jihad can generally be categorized into two broad approaches: The first 
proposes that jihad should be understood as an inner struggle against our worst impulses, or 
an inner struggle to better surrender to God’s will.  Jihad in this perspective is a personal 
undertaking that involves only the individual and their relationship God.  The second 
approach is the view that jihad is an outward struggle against unbelief, including “non-
believers.”  Historical accounts of the early Muslim community associate this outward 
struggle with kinetic conflict (Esposito, 2004).  The fledgling Muslim community faced 
extreme hardship and persecution from various actors who viewed Islam as a threat to the 
political landscape.  The Prophet and his early followers struggled to repel attacks from 
many local actors, particularly the Banu Quresh, a pre-Islamic Arabic tribe generally thought 
to have controlled Mecca and the city’s significant commerce infrastructure at the time 
(Lapidus, 2002).  
Depending on the context and the tradition, “non-believers” may refer to Christians, 
Jews, Shia Muslims, and various secular governments.  However, many schools of Islamic 
thought view the “People of the Book” – Jews and Christians – as believing in the Islamic 
God and therefore cannot be referred to as non-believers.  Since this project is solely 
concerned with the ways in which Jihad is constructed by al Qaeda’s discourse and how it 
contributes to narratives of individual identity, relevant to this analysis is that al Qaeda and 
its ideological affiliates view everyone other than Sunni Muslims as “non-believers.”  
                                                 
21 Grappling with a deep understanding of jihad as it pertains to the lives of ordinary Muslims is beyond the 
scope of this project.  This project is not intended contribute to Islamic discourse regarding the role of jihad in 
contemporary Muslim society.  Discussion of jihad in this project is explicitly limited to the ways in which al 
Qaeda - as an example of a violent IDO - employs the concept of jihad in its public discourse.  
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Although construction of jihad does contain themes of self-improvement and emotional or 
spiritual reward, they appear rarely.  Jihad as an inner struggle is largely absent from al 
Qaeda’s rhetoric while the kinetic aspects of jihad are highlighted.  
In al Qaeda’s discourse, jihad is a kinetic action placed at the center of all identity 
narratives, through which desired organizational resolutions will be achieved. An article 
extolling the virtues of “jihad martyrdom seeking” published by AQAP states:  
God salutes every honorable jihadist … With them, God will lift the heartache, 
remove the darkness, make the sun of Islam, establish justice, and restore 
righteousness to illuminate the world after the eras of darkness of polytheism, 
injustice, and corruption. [00022] 
The function of jihad is to address and resolve the conditions explicated by the setting in 
which al Qaeda operates. Jihad is the tool by which God will end the “eras of darkness of 
polytheism”22 that currently threaten and oppress Muslims and Islam, and thus end the state 
of jahiliyyah.  A spokesman for AQAP states, “This bitter reality [jahiliyyah] can only be solved 
by a return to the religion of God and jihad for His cause” [00027] 
 Note that desired results - “lift(ing) the heartache, remove the darkness” - are implicitly 
positioned as the goal of God rather than the organization, supporting the conception that 
mujahidin exist and act for God, rather than for their own ends.  Jihad, and organizational 
members who engage in it, are the tools God will use to achieve the ideological goals the 
organization supports.  This construction of jihad creates an intrinsic link between member 
action and God’s will.  The definition of success is predicated on God acting through an 
organizational member, rather than on his individual achievement.  Subsuming individual 
                                                 
22 Polytheism is generally a reference to democracy.  The positioning of democracy as religion competing with 
Islam is explored in greater detail in chapter seven 
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agency in this manner also appears in the construction of martyrdom and notions of 
hierarchical position within the organization which will be explored below.   
Desired resolutions are not just metaphorical, however.  Jihad is also the method by 
which invading forces - primarily U.S. and coalition troops - will be removed from Islamic 
territories.   An AQAP magazine states:  
A person who is capable of jihad has no excuse for not undertaking this path for fear 
of being imprisoned; this should make it [jihad] more of a duty.  Shaykh of Islam Ibn 
Taymiyyah, may God have mercy on his soul, says:  'Nothing is more obligatory, 
after faith, than repelling the enemy who corrupts religion and society.  Repelling the 
enemy is agreed by all to be a duty.’ [00026] 
Ibn Taymiyyah, the 14th Century Islamic scholar who Qutb draws so heavily on in his 
writings (Henzel, 2005), argued that overthrowing non-Islamic governance was a duty all 
Muslims should be required to undertake.  The recurring theme of jihad as something 
required of “true” Muslims and being carried out by al Qaeda on behalf of the greater 
Muslim community references the setting where the Muslim community is under attack.  
Whether in reference to local “apostate” governments, the U.S. or Israel, al Qaeda discourse 
encourages members (and non-members) to view jihad as violent conflict that is not only the 
best way to defend the ummah from many different threats but as a way to achieve 
submission to God.  
Data also addressed criticisms of jihad by outgroup members.  The excerpt below, 
from a magazine produced by AQAP, cites ibn Taymiyyah to counter the accusations that 
jihad as a violent conflict had been wrongfully co-opted by al Qaeda.  
He [Ibn-Taymiyah] goes on to give this verse and other verses as proof of his 
argument that martyrdom operations are permissible, and that they constitute a form 
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of jihad in the cause of God if the person carrying out the operation is doing it full-
heartedly. These operations are the most successful methods of jihad, and they are 
effective against the enemies of this religion because of the frustration, wounds, 
killings, and terror that they inflict upon the enemy. They also make Muslims' hearts 
stronger and more daring, while breaking and wounding those of the enemies. … 
God salutes every honorable jihadist, who gives himself away in His cause wishing to 
earn paradise, every scholar who voices the opinion of righteousness without fear of 
blame, and everyone who propagates virtue and prevents vice in times of 
estrangement [from religion]…[00022] 
After 9/11, numerous Muslim scholars and leaders attempted to uncouple the link between 
al Qaeda and the concept of jihad and to de-legitimize extremist tactics.  Al Qaeda leadership 
responded to those attempts, justifying the organization’s ideology and tactics.  The detailed 
nature of the response suggests that the criticism impacted al Qaeda’s public image enough 
to warrant public rebuttal.  Justifying the continuation of suicide tactics, the author argues 
that these behaviors constitute a form of jihad and serve God if done “full-heartedly” i.e. for 
God, rather than material gains since God will praise the “honorable jihadist” who acts in 
service of God’s cause.   
The ways jihad is described in al Qaeda’s discourse parallel the ways that a non-IDO 
might describe the main product or service offered by their organization.  Jihad is, after all, 
the primary ‘output’ produced by al Qaeda and its affiliates.  Media production addresses 
jihad and mujahidin operations, and organizational members who appear in martyr texts are 
constructed in the context of carrying out jihad.  When jihad is understood this way - as both 
an organizational action and a product - the construction of identity targets rules of the 
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game, and vocabulary of motives, remain congruent with Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) 
work.  
Rules of the Game  
Not all actions taken by organizational members are equally valued.  Naturalizing 
rules for ideal ways of acting in an organization encourages “the adaptation of a particular 
self-understanding” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 14), thus influencing construction of 
member identity.  Different types of organizations are motivated to encourage different 
types of member self-understanding based on the goals of the organization.  In a corporate 
organization where that goal is market share or quarterly profit, notions of what makes a 
“team player” might be a set of guidelines that offer members a kind of road map for 
navigating the expectations of the organization.  For al Qaeda, “rules of the game” offer 
guidance on what it means to be an ideal mujahid and to most effectively conduct jihad.  
These rules are: be patient and be willing to sacrifice themselves.  
Be patient.  The importance of patience as an innate trait for organizational 
members has already been described. Patience is also framed as an agentic action. Enough 
data positioned “being patient” as an agentic act to warrant exploring it in connection with 
actions.  Both patience as a trait and patience as an action, however, contribute directly to 
notions of success by allowing members to function or achieve gains in a violent and 
unequal operating environment.  Indeed, multiple texts reinforced the construction of 
patience as both an inherent trait and an agentic action simultaneously.  An article published 
by an AQAP media outlet states:  
Fourth: Patience which leads to victory.  Not many people are ingrained with 
patience which, along with piety, is the key factor that leads to steadfastness, and 
upholding this great principle.  Addressing His jihadist believing worshippers, God 
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said: ' O ye who believe! Persevere in patience and constancy; vie in such 
perseverance; strengthen each other; and fear Allah. that ye may prosper' [Koranic 
verse, Al-Imran, 3:200]. [00016]  
The passage illustrates the way in which patience is addressed as an innate trait - “Not may 
people are ingrained with patience” - and an action by asking the audience to, “Persevere in 
patience.”  Quoting from the Qur’an, the author reinforces the association between patience 
and achievement, in this instance “victory,” presumably in battle.  Patience is the key that 
allows mujahidin to “uphold his great principle” or act in support of God.  Further 
association of patience as a “rule” for achieving success appears in a text authored by al Libi:  
Oh heroes of Iraq, have patience. Oh lions of Islam, have patience.  Oh soldiers of 
Abu-Umar and Abu-Hamzah, have patience.  The falsehood has one round but the 
truth have many rounds, and soon they will regret for everything.  Continue on your 
way, be steadfast on your approach, and adhere to the religion of God.  [00007]  
A Libi addressees all mujahidin - “lions of Islam” - and instructs them to have patience in 
order to outlast “falsehood.”  Falsehood, al Libi claims, has one “one round” while the truth 
has many.  Whether “rounds” refers to iterations of a fight or ammunition is unclear in al 
Libi’s speech, but largely irrelevant.   
The takeaway is the correlation between patience and notions of success - 
representatives of “the truth” can outlast “the falsehood” if they will it.   
Finally, in the service of God, survival and endurance are often conflated with notions of 
success and victory.   Addressing all mujahidin, AQP spokesman Abu Ghayth explicitly details 
the difficulties often associated with conducting jihad and describes the importance of 
patience as a tool for members.  
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My beloved ones, the path of principles and missions [jihad] is fraught with 
misfortunes, obstacles, dangers, and disasters. It is prisons, death, deportation, and 
exile. Whoever wants to uphold a principle or convey a message must take these 
matters into consideration.  He must be prepared for them and expect to be affected 
by them.  As to the one who is after a smooth ride, a nice picnic, a big festival, a 
rhetorical speech, and great hospitality, he should read the life history of the apostles 
and their followers since the rise of this religion. In fact, he should read it since God 
sent His messengers to mankind to this day…A true Muslim and a sincere mujahid do 
not worship God lightly, succumb to the first shock, and give in to the first test and 
tribulation.  This is the will of God in this world.  One day it is for you and on 
another day it is against you.  Read the life history of the Prophet, may the peace and 
blessings of God be upon you, and what also happened to [the tortured] Bilal, 
Salman, Suhayb, Ammar, Ibn-Mas'ud and other followers, may God be pleased with 
them.  To the faithful, everything is welcome.  If he meets with goodness, he thanks 
God and it would be for his wellbeing.  And, and if he meets with evil, he would 
remain patient and it would be for his wellbeing. [00032]  
Abu Ghayth addresses the “sincere mujahid” in the abstract, rather than referring to a 
specific actor.  In doing so he frames remaining patient as an act necessary for the faithful if 
they are to “meet with evil.”  Ghayth also connects the need to be patient to service to God.  
Remaining patient does not serve organizational goals but “is the will of God in this world” 
that sincere mujahidin do not “succumb lightly to the first shock.”  It is God’s will that an 
ideal mujahid endures hardships without, presumably, losing the discipline to continue acting 
on behalf of God’s cause, i.e., carrying out jihad.  The author does not shy away from the 
potential hardships faced by organizational members; indeed, they are highlighted 
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throughout the data, even celebrated as something to embrace and look forward to, since “to 
the faithful, everything is welcome.”  He tells audience members to “read the life history of 
the prophet” and what happened to many famous followers who were tortured.  God, the 
author suggests, is pleased with those - like the historical figures named in the passage - who 
remain patient and faithful even in the face of torture.  
Make sacrifices.  Member commitment to organizational action in the context of al 
Qaeda often engenders sacrifice.  Successful members of al Qaeda must be prepared to 
sacrifice, whether that sacrifice is possessions, one’s life, or one’s soul.  “On the path of jihad, 
he offered his money, self, and children as sacrifices to God.” - [00014], states an AQAP 
member, eulogizing another mujahid.  Sacrifice is presented as vital for individual (and by 
extension organizational) success.  From a text encouraging mujahidin to emulate early 
Muslims, the author states:  
Third: Sacrifice.  The greater the principle, the greater the sacrifice will be for this 
principle. The principle of monotheism and establishing the rule of God on earth 
entails a great sacrifice.  Man sacrifices his soul, which is his dearest possession.  
Thus, once this becomes the yardstick by which the worshipper gives more 
importance to his principles than his soul, then it will become easy for him to 
sacrifice anything else. [00016] 
 Individual members are encouraged to view their “soul” as their most important possession 
that can be sacrificed.  While there are no explicit descriptions of what constitutes an 
individual’s “soul,” context suggests members understand the soul as the essence or 
embodiment of individual existence.  Thus, sacrificing their “soul” would be the ultimate 
method of support for al Qaeda’s mission as it entails subsuming notions of individual self 
for the goals of the organization.  In making this ultimate sacrifice, the author suggests that 
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other forms of sacrifice - such as material possessions - become easier to accomplish.  The 
language is suggestive of a promotion analogy; although no explicit hierarchical roles are 
dictated, there is clearly a hierarchy of forms of sacrifice, with “life” and “soul” being 
privileged.   
Presumably, the implicit hierarchy of forms of sacrifice encourages individuals to 
make increasingly extreme commitments to the organization.  Sacrifice constitutes a “rule” 
for individual member precisely because it engenders organizational actions.  A text authored 
by a spokesperson for AQAP states:  
 In order to reach the tyrants, you need two [sic] matters and you will achieve your 
goal, God willing, and avenge your religion and ummah.  These matters are: to 
sacrifice your lives and blood in the cause of your God, to have resolution and 
determination to reach your goal, and to be able to prepare your explosive belt by 
yourself and in your house with the least resources and the easiest ways available. 
[00026] 
The author informs the audience that the two most important “matters” and individual 
needs are a willingness to sacrifice one’s self, and the ability to prepare an explosive belt (for 
suicide attacks) alone.  One of the most significant differences between rules of the game in 
a corporate organization or non-violent IDO and an organization like al Qaeda is the 
assumption of member existence.  Corporate employees might leave the organization, but 
they do not die for company goals.   Success in the organization is predicated on the 
individual remaining a member, continuing to work to further organizational goals.  Notions 
of achievement and what constitutes necessary action for organizational work to continue in 
al Qaeda, however, rest on the assumption that members might (and should) die to further 
the organization’s goals.  In the excerpt above, the author draws an explicit connection 
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between sacrifice of individual life and achieving a desired goal.  In this example, “avenging” 
Islam and “the ummah” occurs presumably by attacking U.S. and allied forces. 
Providing a Vocabulary of Motives  
Discussing how organizations may seek to influence member identity construction, 
Alvesson and Willmott (2002) suggest that why members do what they do is a critical part of 
the identity construction process.  This issue is relevant to IDOs where tangible rewards are 
not be immediate, if they exist at all.  Therefore, organizations like al Qaeda may promote a 
particular framework through which “employees are encouraged to understand their own 
work” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 12).  Alvesson and Willmott refer to this framework 
as a “vocabulary of motives.”  Rewards do not automatically constitute motives, although in 
al Qaeda’s discourse, intersection between motivation and reward is present.  Generally, 
however, creation of a vocabulary of motives is intended to help members understand the 
meaning of their work.  The primary motives encouraged by organizational elites included 
achieving freedom of the ummah from oppressive forces, serving as an example of ideal 
behavior for other ingroup and outgroup members, and “attaining paradise and winning the 
acceptance of God” [00027].  
Freeing the ummah.  Organizational members are strongly encouraged to 
understand their work as helping to “free” the Arabian Peninsula from the oppressive forces 
currently threatening Islam and the Muslim people.  These oppressive forces are sometimes 
explicitly labeled by referring to the U.S. and allied forces and the state of Israel, but often 
they are described in general terms.  For example, AQP spokesman al-Libi writes:  
They [the mujahidin] confronted them to tell them that Pakistan is a Muslim nation 
and its people are Muslims, and it [Pakistan] should be ruled by Islam, enjoy [life] 
under the umbrella of its just Shariah, to have the banner of monotheism fluttering in 
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its skies, and the banners of secularism and the cross rolling in its mud; and if it is 
not, then below the ground is better than above it. Because of that, they rose, 
resisted and were killed, and they have become truly martyrs as we count them and 
God is the final Judge.  [0008] 
The goal of confrontation is to ensure the victory of “monotheism” over “secularism.”  One 
of the major components of al Qaeda’s organizational discourse is the framing of Western 
Christianity and democracy as “polytheism.”  This rhetorical strategy is described in greater 
detail in chapter seven.  Relevant to the discussion here is that the audience for this text 
would understand the author is discussing what is necessary to defend the primacy of Islam 
in certain territories.  In a text publicized by AQAP highlighting the mujahidin of the Arabian 
Peninsula, the author addresses fellow Muslims and potential recruits. 
To the Muslim brother: These are some of the things you can [do] to participate in 
jihad, which is the real solution to the problems of the Ummah.  With jihad, the glory 
of the Ummah will return.  This battle, which we must fight in order to defend our 
creed, the Islamic ummah, its sanctities, honor, values, wealth, and resources, is the 
battle of every Muslim (small or big, young or old).  Do not ask where to start from.  
You are the beginning.  You are the good seed. [00023] 
The quote emphasizes the importance of armed conflict as a way to achieve “the solution to 
the problems of the ummah.”  The conflict the organization is encouraging is carried out to 
defend Muslims and “return their glory.”  Recall the “setting” in which al Qaeda operates.  
The notion that Muslims are under attack, both physically and ideologically, is key to the way 
al Qaeda constructs its operational context.   
As seen with other identity targets, the above passage is an example of the ways in 
which organizational discourse acts to influence different aspects of member identity 
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simultaneously.  In this instance, a set of motivations for action - to defend [Muslims] creed, 
the Islamic people, and their “honor, values, wealth, and resources” - exists and is reinforced 
by the construction of a context where Muslims are under constant attack by malicious 
forces.  Any audience familiar with al Qaeda’s discourse should be able to infer from the text 
that Muslims need protection because the audience would presumably have been exposed to 
those texts constructing that ‘setting.’  By implying the connection, the construction of a 
“vocabulary of motives” is potentially strengthened while simultaneously reinforcing the 
theme that the ummah exists in a state of oppression and violent attacks.  
Setting an example for other Muslims and mujahidin.  The second theme found 
in text constructing a vocabulary of motives for organizational members emphasizes setting 
an example for other members to follow and attempt to live up to.  In the same text 
discussed above, al Libi eulogizes an individual, describing him as:  
 … an example for those who fought under him, and became a school for those that 
will follow his path, God permitting, so that their heads remain high and so that the 
goal they would compete for is the attainment of the highest rank of martyrdom and 
its most noble status. ‘If you take risk for the sake of an honorable objective, do not 
be content with anything less than the stars.  Meeting an honorable death is not more 
painful than a mundane death’ [poem].  [0008] 
The paragraph focuses on the legacy left by the deceased: providing a “school” or example 
for others to follow and encouraging future organizational members to compete for the rank 
of martyrdom.  The notion that death in the service of organizational goals is preferable to a 
“mundane” life is also emphasized here and inspiring others is addressed in poetic terms. 
We are fully confident that God will give life to men with your pure blood.  Your 
brave stances will guide others who follow the path you have taken or who have 
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graduated from your school.  The Musaylamah [false Prophet] of the age shall witness, 
very soon, God willing, how your remains, which were buried in the sands of 
Ajdabiya, will generate brave men and brave knights who rush to the battlefields and 
death sites, like heavy, sweet, pure and life-giving rain. [0006] 
This quote, from a martyr text attributed to al Libi, remembers several martyrs who al Libi 
calls of “pure blood” - meaning they were ideal Muslims.  The deceased were so exemplary 
that individuals who follow in their footsteps will be said to have graduated from their 
“school” and their remains will “generate” new martyrs.  Given that martyr texts are 
ubiquitously authored after a mujahid has died, the tactic of addressing the deceased likely has 
strategic value.   
 Martyr texts as a ‘genre’ construct ideal individuals as examples for current mujahidin 
to model their own identities on.  Eulogies exist and are publicized after an martyr’s death, 
giving them notoriety and increasing their standing within the organization, but only after 
they are gone.  Authors may address the deceased, but the implicit audience is living 
organizational members who consume these texts.  A function of the martyr texts may be to 
frame martyrs as “famous,” thus increasingly the likelihood that existing members will seek 
to emulate them.  
The blood of the two shaykhs, by God's will…will turn into a fuel that charges the 
enthusiasm in the hearts of the heroes to burn and detonate the worshipped idols of 
the era and their louts, who spread corruption in the lands.  [0007] 
The language positions the deceased as not just an exemplary organizational member, but as 
a hero whose “blood will turn into a fuel that charges the enthusiasm in the hearts of the 
heroes…” Martyrs, in short, become local celebrities.  They are not just docile members 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002) but shining examples for the future.  This veneration presents 
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an interesting dichotomy.  Living organizational members are encouraged to be selfless and 
homogeneity of members is encouraged.  Dead organizational members, however, are 
described in inflammatory and hyperbolic terms and positioned as singular examples who 
stand out for all future ingroup members to emulate.   
Rewards.  The final theme in texts constructing a vocabulary of motives centers 
notions of reward, explicitly connecting conducting jihad and happiness or emotional and 
spiritual reward for the individual carrying out jihad.  For example, in the eulogy of Abdallah 
Bin-Hadi al-Tays al-Wa'ili, the narrator relates an incident where he met with the deceased 
and discussed his participation in jihad.  
He said to me one day after his emigration: "By God, oh Abu-Muhammad, I never 
felt the taste of happiness which I feel now as a jihadist who immigrated in the cause 
of God."  He went on telling him how God blessed him with wealth and how his life 
was decent and abundant with worldly pleasures.  He said: "Nevertheless, I never felt 
happy as I did when I performed jihad." [00024] 
The author relates a story where the deceased claims that he was at his happiest when 
performing jihad, despite having a “decent” life abundant with “worldly pleasures.”  The 
celebration of jihad over worldly pleasures reinforces the construction of an ideal 
organizational actor who is selfless and steadfast - focused on organizational actions rather 
than gaining material rewards.  While the intersection between notions of reward and 
conducting jihad is notable, these themes when presented together are overwhelmingly 
associated with martyrdom.  Given the position of death and martyrdom as the primary 
desired resolution or ending for individual identity narratives, it was deemed thematically 
more appropriate to discuss reward in conjunction with the construction of resolutions 
rather than actions.  
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Resolutions 
Stories can be differentiated from chronicles or lists by “the organizing theme that 
organizes the significance and the role of the individual events” (Polkinhorne, 1988, p.18).  
This organizing theme is the plot of the story, and it serves to transform what would 
otherwise be a list or collection of events into a “schematic whole.”  By recognizing and 
highlighting the relative contribution of events included in the story to the development and 
outcome of the story, the plot provides meaning (Polkinghorne, 1988).  For Polkinghorne, 
narrative guides individuals in making sense of events “by clarifying the significance of 
events that have occurred on the basis of the outcome that has followed” (p. 21).  It is the 
“outcome that has followed,” or the resolution, that provides the key to distinguishing 
stories from other forms of ordering.   
The following section explores the resolution of narratives of identity in al Qaeda’s 
discourse.  Three major themes are present in discourse constructing resolutions.  The first 
centers notions of victory, the second produces martyrdom as a form of hierarchical position 
within the organization, and the third concerns notions of paradise and reward.  These 
themes, though distinct, were highly interconnected and often presented simultaneously in 
the same text, even the same paragraph.  For al Qaeda, ideal choices made by an individual 
often revolve around “victory or martyrdom” [00025], while martyrdom itself is regularly 
presented as a form of victory.  Becoming a martyr is explicitly associated with hierarchical 
location - indeed, the only hierarchical position addressed in discourse that otherwise actively 
subverts notions of rank by focusing on framing intraorganizational relationships in familial 
terms i.e. - calling each other brothers.  Martyrdom was also linked inextricably to the theme 
of paradise and reward as the method by which mujahidin achieved paradise.   
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Victory or Martyrdom  
A corporate or non-violent IDO might utilize conflict metaphors in their discourse 
to increase the perceived urgency and importance of organizational goals.  For a violent IDO 
like al Qaeda, notions of conflict and battle are literal.  The kinetic nature of the conflict, 
however, does not negate the presence of ideological aspects or metaphorical language.  
Notions of victory or success in al Qaeda’s discourse were both literal and metaphorical in 
nature.  In the literal sense, victory is achieved when the organization makes gains in 
recruitment, resources, territory, press coverage etc.  Adversaries experiencing losses, either 
of property, munitions, finances, moral, or life (or some combination thereof) is also 
considered victory.  From an AQAP produced series eulogizing the “martyrs of the 
peninsula,” the author relates a story about Muwahhid Al-Ma'ribi: 
When a military campaign, belonging to the republican guards, tried to advance [to 
attack] the Yafi tribes, he, [Muwahhid] may God have mercy on him, came from Al-
Bayda with his groups and blocked the advancement of the campaign.  They 
destroyed a tank and a number of vehicles, and the enemy fell in a tight ambush, thus 
they fled leaving everything behind.  So, the campaign was defeated and they 
retreated holding their white flags. [00023] 
Although focused on one individual, the data constitutes what the Center for Strategic 
Communication (CSC) terms “victorious battle stories” – homogeneous accountings of 
mujahidin operations related in storied form that result in a positive outcome.  Relevant to 
individual identity construction in this excerpt is the success of Muwahhid and “his group” 
in defeating “the campaign” (referring to Iraqi troops).  The mujahidin engaged in combat 
with an adversary, inflicted property damage – “destroyed a tank and a number of vehicles” 
– and returned presumably unharmed, leaving the Iraqi forces to “retreat with white flags.”   
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Another example, from the text of a speech by al Qaeda spokesman al Libi, reflects the same 
theme, albeit in a more generalized way.  “Under the leadership of Shaykh Abu-Mus'ab al-
Zarqawi, may God grant him His mercy, the heroes were stoking the war flames and 
inflicting great losses on US soldiers.” [00006].  There is no piece of a market share in this 
account.  Victory is a zero-sum state and individual members are valued for their 
contributions to actions or operations that result in victories for al Qaeda, victories which 
generally involve inflicting some kind of loss - physical or in terms of morale - on an 
adversary.    
Most victorious battle stories, however, detail small, individual skirmishes, perhaps 
due to the dearth of significant quantitative military success against coalition forces.  The 
lack of major battlefield victories results in greater emphasis on the connection between 
construction of norms of victory and individual identity.  In a text celebrating the “Saudi 
martyrs” Usama bin Laden states:  
In no circumstances, would a Muslim wonder what benefit did they get.  No Muslim 
would say that they wasted their lives.  The ignorance of a Muslim who would argue 
in this manner is compounded, for these men have won the satisfaction of the 
Almighty God and the immortal heavens they were promised by Almighty God.  For 
victory is not only material gain, but rather adherence to firm principles. [00040] 
Victory, in Bin Laden’s words, is not considered solely in terms of quantifiable gain, but 
should also be understood as an “adherence to firm principles.”  An example of strategically 
re-defining success, bin Laden’s statement prioritizes internal identity labor, positioning 
adherence to principles - presumably principles in line with organizational goals - as equal to 
concrete material gains.  Support for organizational-mandated “principles” as a way to 
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achieve an unspecified “victory” is implied.  Ideological success, victory, and martyrdom are 
also closely linked.  Death in service to organizational goals constitutes victory.  
We incited the nation to expel this usurper and occupier enemy from the land of the 
two holy mosques.  Some of the youths responded favorably to this. Among these 
youths were Khalid al-Sa'id, Abd-al-Aziz al-Mi'thim, Riyadh al-Hajiri, and Muslih al-
Shamrani.  We pray to God, Glory be to Him, to accept them as martyrs.  They 
enabled the nation to hold its head high and removed a large part of the disgrace that 
has enveloped us as a result of the Saudi Government’s betrayal and collision with 
the US Government in allowing the desecration of the land of God, the land of the 
two holy mosques.  We regard these youths as great heroes and mujahidin who walked 
in the footsteps of our messenger, may God’s peace and blessings be upon him.  
[00040] 
The individuals named in the eulogy are praised for “enabling the nation to hold its 
head high” for taking some action that resulted in losses for U.S. and allies.  The relationship 
between “victory” and death is mutually reinforcing.  Ideal mujahidin are encouraged to view 
the outcome of their efforts in stark terms of “victory or death” - with the implication that 
death is victory - with both options presented as equally desirable.  From a eulogy for al 
Qaeda ideologue Jamal Ibrahim Al-Misrati, the author writes:  
Congratulations to an ummah to which these youth, leaders, and sons belong to.  
Congratulations to an ummah whose slogan is: Either to obtain victory or martyrdom.  
Congratulations to an ummah whose banner is: We are never defeated; we are either 
victorious or dead.  I feel as if I am hearing the soul of the martyr repeating:  Let me 
fight until I die as a dignified man.  Death in the cause of dignity is better than my 
  150 
disgraceful life.  Congratulations to the martyrs, their families, and their orphans.  We 
consider our dead in paradise, and theirs in hell, God willing! [00028] 
The except illustrates the explicit celebration of martyrdom, congratulating the families and 
associates of the deceased individuals.  Indeed, the author states there is no such thing as 
defeat, strategic wording reinforcing the notion that organizational members simply cannot 
lose.  Either mujahidin achieve their objective, or they die in the attempt to do so.  Since 
death in the service of organizational goals is perceived as success, there is no way for 
members - and by extension the organization itself - to be defeated.  This linguistic strategy 
places the measurement of “success” on al Qaeda’s terms - a sophisticated example of 
claiming victory and then changing the rules to support that claim so that all probable 
resolutions to individual identity narratives equate success.  For an organization engaged in 
kinetic combat with a much larger, better supplied and supported adversary, defining victory 
in such a way as to mitigate adversaries’ success is advantageous.  As stated by al Qaeda 
spokesperson Anwar al Awlaki:  
Paradise for those who are killed fighting those who refuse, and victory for those 
who survive.  He said jannah [paradise] for those who are killed and victory for the 
ones who are alive. This is the promise of Allah, ihda al-husnayayn [one of the two 
good things], so you can never lose. If you are killed, then you’re a shahid; [martyr] if 
you live then you are victorious. [0003] 
In sum, al Qaeda’s rhetorical strategy is to redefine success and then claim that they 
are achieving it, avoiding any engagement with the perception that they might lose.  Another 
component of this strategy is the construction of hierarchical position and rank within the 
organization and its connection to notions of reward.  The next section explores the ways in 
which al Qaeda creates an organizational hierarchy in discourse. 
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Hierarchical location  
IDOs may have formal, bureaucratic positions such as executive, spokespeople, 
press agents, etc.  Most organizations, especially those that carry out activities across large 
geographic territories, require some type of formal hierarchy to organize the flow of work in 
operations.  While presumably al Qaeda has some formal structure, references to hierarchical 
positions in public discourse are extremely rare.  
The absence of hierarchical data to identify individuals within al Qaeda contrasts 
Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) centering of rank as a key aspect of organizational member 
identity.  Instead of “employees” “leaders” or “managers” (or the equivalent for an IDO), al 
Qaeda discourse repeatedly emphasizes familial bonds.  The mujahidin are “brothers” - 
implying all members are equally valuable to the organization.  Instances of referring to 
fellow organizational members as “brothers” occurred in 17 of the 23 texts included in the 
dataset for this research question.  The most common use was to refer to a specific 
“brother” or individual; for example, “Brother Muwahhid is very sad about what happened 
to some brothers who were wounded in clashes in Abyan” [00023], and “the apostate and 
collaborationist regime in Libya killed the heroic mujahid, the steadfast muhajir [foreign 
fighter] and patient captive, brother Ali Abd-al-Aziz al-Fakhiri.”  [0006] 
Brothers was also used to refer to the mujahidin as a group, however.  Examples 
include this passage from a martyr text, “…he and some of his brothers headed toward 
Pakistan, whose unwanted tyrant ruler had committed, like many others, to stand side by 
side with the global protector of the Cross…” [00006] and this excerpt from another eulogy:  
When the Sanaa government forces later tried to launch a military campaign against 
martyr Ali Dawhah’s house and farm, Muwahhid and his heroic brothers, who 
volunteered to fight with the mujahidin, and some of his relatives used to spend nights 
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in guarding and protecting their jihadist brothers, after many other people had let 
them down.  [00023] 
The use of familial language and the absence of an explicit hierarchy for (living) members 
presents a significant departure from identity literature focusing on corporate organizations.  
The scarcity of references to bureaucratic positions within the organization suggests this is a 
deliberate, strategic effort on the part of organizational elites to reduce the importance of 
hierarchical position in the context of individual identity construction.  There is, however, 
one major exception to the lack of concern for hierarchical position.  That exception is 
martyrdom. 
Martyrdom.  Martyrdom as an act comprises a significant theme in al Qaeda’s 
discourse writ large.  The importance of martyrdom in al Qaeda’s organizational discourse 
and the way it functions in the construction of individual member identity goes beyond the 
act of dying itself.  First, the label of martyr is generally only conferred when an individual 
sacrifices his life during activities that support organizational goals.  Choice and willingness 
(even eagerness) to be martyred are important aspects of the construction of martyrdom as it 
influences individual identity.  Martyrdom is described as an agentic act, something 
organizational members seek out and desire. For example, this except from an AQAP 
produced series “Biography of Prominent Martyrs in the Levant” describes an individual 
mujahid: 
Abu-Abdallah was seeking one of the two virtues - victory or martyrdom - and 
received the latter when God chose him to be a martyr in His cause, as we believe 
him to be, and God suffices for him. [00025] 
And from another issue of the same series eulogizing AQAP member Abu-Ata Al-Wa'ili, the 
author describes the small cell Abu Ata was part of:  
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As the fighting went feverish, the mujahidin realized that they fought an unequal 
battle, but they were eager to meet death and asked God to host them in heaven 
among His beloved ones.  Truly, he who likes to meet God, God likes to meet him. 
[000024] 
Both of these excerpts portray ingroup members as actively desiring and seeking death.  In 
the first, martyrdom is explicitly depicted as a “virtue” equal to victory, and in the second, 
the mujahidin are described as being “eager” to meet death and by implication become 
martyrs, since they would have died while working to implement organizational goals.  One 
passage from the same text relates a story about the individual member who (allegedly) died 
literally with a smile on his face:  
Abu-Ata, may God rest his soul, was directly shot in the chest and fell down.  His 
brothers carried him while he uttered the testimony of the Islamic faith and repeated 
it 15 times before his soul ascended to heaven.  A cheerful smile was drawn on his 
face. [00024] 
One of the most significant functions of martyrdom is the way in which it fulfills the role of 
ordering an organizational hierarchy.  As discussed above, there is very little explicit 
construction of or even reference to an organizational hierarchy in extremist discourse.  
Martyrs are the exception.  From Abu Ghayth’s letter to mujahidin everywhere:  
Martyrdom is the highest rank that can be attained by God’s subjects. Martyrs are the 
closest of His subject. There is no rank above the righteous other than that of the 
martyr.  God takes some of his subjects martyrs, who sacrifice their blood for his 
love and pleasure.  They prefer his pleasure and love to life.  The attainment of this 
rank depends on the causes that lead to martyrdom, such as the tyranny of an enemy. 
[00032].  
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This quote by an al Qaeda spokesperson lays out in explicit terms the way in which 
martyrdom is connected to hierarchical rank.  To be a martyr is to achieve the highest form 
of success possible, not just within the organization itself, but as a Muslim.  By saying 
“God’s subjects” instead of limiting the reference to mujahidin, Abu Ghayth opens the 
statement to include audiences beyond current al Qaeda members, implicitly inviting 
outgroup members to act in support of al Qaeda’s goals.  It also reinforces the assertion that 
the mujahidin are acting on behalf of all Muslims.  Martyrdom is also referenced in numerous 
occasions in association with rank and social position.  From the eulogy of “Mujahid 
Preacher” Abu-Umar Muhammad al-Hanaq of Abyan by an AQAP spokesperson:  
We ask God to compensate the ummah for its loss, grant mercy to our shaykh, and 
raise him to the level of the pure martyrs along with the prophets, the righteous, and 
the martyrs. These are the best companions. [00014] 
In sum, the highest rank an organizational member can strive for is death in the 
service of organizational goals.  ‘Promotion’ in al Qaeda is achieved only in death.  
Promotion itself, however, is not the sole impetus for organizational members to seek 
martyrdom.  There is also a significant theme of ‘reward’ - often associated with “paradise” 
that appears in discourse describing martyrdom. 
Paradise/reward.  The theme of reward serves as a resolution to individual 
narratives while simultaneously reinforcing a vocabulary of motives for organizational 
members.  Where a corporate organization might promote a particular framework focusing 
on, for example, “building skills” as opposed to “doing a job” that encourages employees to 
understand their work in particular ways, al Qaeda encourage members to understand their 
“work” as a way to achieve paradise.  In stating “May he rest in peace and may God reward 
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him with a high rank in Paradise” [0006], an AQP spokesman illustrates the relationship 
between martyrdom, rank, and reward.   
Martyrdom is the act by which hierarchical achievement is granted, and reward is 
conferred.  In Abu Ghayth’s address to mujahidin, he claims:  
The mujahid for the sake of God looks at the people from above, since he strongly 
believes that life is transient and that if he lost a battle with falsehood in one round, 
he knows very well that Islam will have its round and that right will have its round. 
All people die, but he is martyred. He leaves the earth to go to paradise, while the 
infidel leaves it to go to hell. [00032] 
The ideal mujahidin is one that understands life is “transient” i.e., short and not to be valued 
over serving organizational goals.  The passage encourages the audience (either current or 
prospective organizational members) to view dying not just as a significant possibility but 
something that should be sought after (through the act of martyrdom) in order to achieve 
paradise.  “Paradise” in extremist discourse is generally understood to mean the Islamic 
conceptualization of heaven.  Paradise is often presented as the desired end state and 
ultimate achievement; however, some texts also frame reward and paradise as a means to the 
end of suffering, or the end to tribulations experienced by ingroup members in life.  As 
explored above, imprisonment, suffering, and various forms of hardships are to be expected, 
even embraced, by organizational members and non-group Muslims.  Recall that al Qaeda 
constructs a setting for its discourse where the default state of all Muslims is existing under 
attack from malicious oppressive forces.  As a result of the socio-political landscape that al 
Qaeda members operate in, chances of enduring numerous hardships are extremely high.  
Thus, death in extremist discourse is strongly associated with victory, reward and an end to 
suffering.  This excerpt from a transcript of a eulogy in which Al-Libi encourages mujahidin 
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to work together encourages the audience to perceive victory and triumph as resulting from 
being steadfast, and, at the same time, reinforcing the theme of reward after death for 
martyrs.  
The victory was for those heroes, although they were in shackles.  They triumphed 
for their exalted faith, deep-rooted ideology, and strong steadfastness.  Our hope for 
them is to achieve greater victory and better dwellings in the midst of gardens and 
rivers [Paradise], in the presence of Omnipotent God…One of the greatest things 
that eases the calamities of the believer and lessens his afflictions is his knowledge of 
all the great rewards and benefits that God has prepared for him in the hereafter.  
These rewards are so great that no eye has ever seen them, no ear has ever heard 
them, and no human has ever imagined them. [0007] 
In summary, martyrdom is constructed as a complex, multi-layered resolution that intersects 
with multiple points of identity construction for individual members.  Martyrdom constitutes 
the highest ‘rank’ a member of al Qaeda can be granted and serves as the key to gaining the 
reward of “paradise” and simultaneously being granted the end of suffering and hardship.  
The best resolution to a mujahid’s story is that he dies in service to organizational goals.  
Summary 
This research question explored the ways in which narrative is used to construct 
individual member identity in al Qaeda’s public discourse.  The narrative of the ideal 
organizational member - the brave, steadfast mujahidin - is constructed through numerous 
identity targets (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002) in al Qaeda’s discourse.  This idealized identity 
is extremely homogeneous.  Eulogies or “martyr texts” - which contained the most data 
concerning individual member identities - constructed an individual who was brave, patient, 
good humored, sought to put the needs of others before his own, endured in the face of 
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hardship and was patient in suffering, and eagerly sought death through jihad, thus ensuring a 
place in paradise after his demise.  Identity construction in al Qaeda’s discourse is extremely 
explicit.  Stories that reinforce the construction of the idealized mujahidin narrative list and 
reinforce desired member traits in explicit (and possibly hyperbolic) terms. 
The results of this research question suggest that narrative plays a significant role in 
the construction of individual member identity in an IDO.  It also makes a case for 
considering the interplay between narrative forms of knowing, and individual “identity 
targets” and how organizations influence these targets through discourse constructed in 
storied ways.  The next chapter explores the ways in which narrative is used to construct an 
organizational identity, using the same sites of identity regulation as points of comparison.    
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CHAPTER 7 
THE BELIEVERS:  
CONSTRUCTION OF AN ATYPICAL ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY  
God commanded his believing subjects to disavow His infidel enemies…The words 
"the enemies of Allah and your enemies" indicate that the infidels should be fought 
and terrorized because they are God's enemies in addition to being the enemies of 
the believers…The quest to terrorize the infidels is required initially because of their 
disbelief and their original enmity to the believers. This is what sets the believers 
apart from the infidels.  God said: "Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, 
and those who reject faith fight in the cause of Evil: So fight ye against the friends of 
Satan: feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan."  Because the believers fight in the 
cause of God and the infidels fight in the cause of an evil tyrant, the subjects of the 
merciful God were commanded to fight the loyalists of Satan. [00034] 
 
The previous chapter examined the discursive construction of individual member 
identity.  This chapter offers an understanding of the function of narrative in constructing 
organizational identity.  To accomplish this, answers to the following research question are 
provided: How is narrative used to construct an organizational identity in ideologically 
driven organizations? 
 Organizational identity - defined as what is “central, enduring, and distinctive” 
(CED) about an organization - is the primary locus by which an organization differentiates 
the group and its members from relevant outgroups (Whetten, 2006, p. 2006).  Strength of 
organizational identity - the answer to the question “who are we?” - has been shown to 
impact organizational performance in engaging multiple stakeholders, (Scott & Lane, 2000) 
legitimacy, (Golant & Sillince, 2007) and member identification (Foreman & Whetten, 2002).  
In corporate organizations, organizational identity can influence company structure, culture, 
communication strategy, even human resources policies (Moingeon & Soenen, 2002).  
For ideologically driven organizations (IDOs) that lack traditional bureaucratic 
means of control, identity becomes even more salient.  Identity construction serves to edify 
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ingroup members and provides the foundation for member commitment to the group, 
ideally resulting in action on behalf of the group (Ashforth et al., 2011; Alvesson & Willmott, 
2002).  In the context of an IDO such as al Qaeda (AQ), identity may contribute to member 
performance, organizational actions, even continued existence.  Results of this research 
question, however, revealed an atypical approach to organizational identity construction that 
significantly complicates typical understandings of organizational identity in the context of 
IDOs.  
Strategic Absence of Typical Organizational Identity 
As explored in chapter six, narratives of individual identity were cohesive to the 
point of homogeneity.  Discursive construction of ingroup members - the mujahidin - 
described brave, selfless, patient individuals who placed the needs of others before their 
own, faced tribulations with a good attitude, and were eager to sacrifice themselves in 
support of al Qaeda’s goals.  At the organizational level, similar coherence was not present.  
A distinctive organizational identity that defines, elaborates, and connects the central, 
enduring, and distinctive (CED) traits (Albert & Whetton, 1985) of al Qaeda as a social actor 
did not emerge from the data.  Only two instances of text addressing al Qaeda as an 
organizational actor, both attributed to Ayman al Zawahiri, were located in the data.   
With God's grace, I bring the good tidings to all Muslims and mujahidin that, praised 
be God, Al-Qaeda is spreading, expanding, and getting stronger.  It has turned, with 
God's grace, into a vanguard popular organization confronting the new Crusader-
Zionist campaign in defense of all usurped Muslim lands. [00048] 
Al Zawahiri calls al Qaeda a “vanguard,” meaning forerunner, and claims the organization is 
“spreading” and “getting stronger.”  No specific traits are ascribed to al Qaeda as an 
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organization, however.  No discussion occurs entailing what it means to be a vanguard 
beyond the denotative context.   
Other instances of explicitly addressing al Qaeda were similarly bereft of 
information.  Thus, data did not support the construction of a typical organizational identity 
as traditionally defined by Albert and Whetten (1985).  Where discourse did address al 
Qaeda, it was not approached as a social actor.  Instead, the mujahidin as a group of 
individual actors were foregrounded.  For example:  
I should like to remind you of the defeats suffered by a number of the great powers 
at the hands of the mujahidin.  I want to remind you of the defeat of the former 
Soviet Union, of which nothing remained after ten years of hard fighting by the 
Afghans and those Muslims who came to their aid, by the grace of Allah.  Similarly, 
the Russian defeat in Chechnya, where the mujahidin displayed the finest examples of 
self-sacrifice.  The Chechen mujahidin, together with their Muslim brethren, deflated 
the Russians' pride and caused them loss after loss.  [00037] 
Bin Laden attributes actions and victories explicitly to the mujahidin, foregrounding them as 
actors, instead of referring to al Qaeda as an organization.  Neither the mujahidin nor al 
Qaeda were prominent in organizational level discourse however.  As will be discussed in the 
following sections, the majority of identity work at the organizational level was concerned 
with the constitution of a kind of proxy identity – the Believers.  
The Believers 
Organizational level identity work in al Qaeda’s public discourse was primarily 
constitutive of an identity classified as “the Believers.”  The Believers is an idealized, largely 
abstract identity constructing Sunni Muslims in ways that are advantageous to al Qaeda.  
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Discursively, the mujahidin and the Believers are often addressed separately, but they are not 
mutually exclusive identity labels.  Usama bin Laden writes:  
Allah's messenger said in Muslim's reliable book: 'Whosoever fights them [the 
enemies of Islam] with his arm is a believer, whosoever fights them with his tongue 
is a believer and whosoever fights them in his heart is a believer, but there is not 
even the slightest measure of belief without this [that is, without at least one of the 
three].'  This sublime Prophetic tradition [hadith] embraces all Believers.  Since we 
are Believers, we are [necessarily] mujahidin for the sake of Allah on behalf of Islam… 
[00037] 
Bin Laden claims that being a Believer is - at least in part - contingent on fighting the 
enemies of Islam, and since “we” - presumably al Qaeda members - are Believers, they are 
also mujahidin.  However, not all Believers are members of al Qaeda or mujahidin.   The 
relationship between the Believers and mujahidin is best illustrated by figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Demonstration of the relationship between the Believers and the mujahidin.  
All mujahidin as Believers, but not all Believers are mujahidin 
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Both the construction of the Believers, and rhetorically positioning al Qaeda 
members as encompassed by the Believers supports the conflation of al Qaeda members 
with the global Sunni Muslim population, rhetorically resisting attempts to distinguish 
between the mujahidin and non-combatant Muslim populations.  The rest of this chapter 
explores the narrative construction of the Believers using Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) 
sites of identity regulation as sensitizing concepts.  
Setting  
 When organizational elites define the context and conditions in which an 
organization operates, it sets the scene for organizational narratives.  Emphasizing aspects of 
the setting an organization operates in - such as the market situation, or security 
environment - can influence the construction of an actor identity that fits that perceived 
setting (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  Explicating the setting creates preconditions for the 
actors acting in it.  For example, a hospital in a rural area and a tech startup in San Francisco 
would presumably define significantly different settings – composed not only of geographic 
location, but also potential competition, and stakeholder audiences. 
The setting addressed in al Qaeda’s discourse is one of extreme threat and danger to 
the Believers, Islam as a religion, and Muslim territories.  The major source of this threat is 
the United States, assisted by their agents - Shia Muslims and regional governments.  Two 
sub themes assisted the construction of the setting.  The first emphasized threats to the 
Believers and is labeled “Muslims under attack.”  The second theme is labeled “Conflict 
framing” and highlights aspects of the kinetic conflict between the mujahidin and various 
actors, the most prominent of which is the United States.  Appearing simultaneously in 
multiple texts, these themes emphasize aspects of the political, ideological, and kinetic 
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conflict to support the organization’s ideological position and justify continuing operation 
and tactics.  The following section explores “Muslims under attack.”  
Muslims under attack.  The discursive construction of the setting depicts a reality 
where the Believers are oppressed, threatened, and violently attacked by various external 
actors and ideological forces.  These forces threaten individual Muslims, Muslim territory, 
and (Sunni) Islam as a religion - through methods such as the attempted “Christianization of 
the Arabian Peninsula” [00007].  “I want to speak to you today about the Crusade-Zionist 
war against the Islamic world and its penetration into all aspects our lives” [00049] begins 
one of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s speeches.  Threats are directed toward three general targets: 
Muslim culture and Islam as a religion, Muslim territories and governance, and individual 
Muslims - The Believers. 
Threats to Islam and Muslim culture.  In al Qaeda’s discourse, the ongoing 
conflict between U.S. troops and the mujahidin is a war that exits because of U.S. aggression, 
where the end goal for the U.S. is to suppress or destroy Islam and Muslim culture.  In a 
sermon broadcast by al Jazeera, bin Laden claims:  
The Bush-Blair agreement pretends that it wants to put an end to terrorism.  
However, it is no longer a secret even from the masses that it wants to put an end to 
Islam…Nonetheless, the rulers of the region [the Middle East] emphasize in their 
notes and speeches their support for Bush in his war against terrorism, which is [in 
fact] a war on Islam and Muslims, in flagrant betrayal of both faith and Nation.  
[00037] 
What the U.S. and western officials and media refer to as the war on terrorism is framed as 
an attack on Islam by al Qaeda elites.  These claims reinforce allegations made by al Qaeda 
senior leadership that U.S. policy-makers are lying and that the U.S. cannot be trusted.  
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Rhetorical framing of the kinetic conflict as an attack on Islam and Muslims serves several 
functions: it positions the U.S. as aggressors, it conflates the mujahidin with non-combatant 
Muslim populations, and it alters the scale of the conflict.  Where U.S. and Western media 
(generally) approach the Long War as an asymmetric conflict between human forces, al 
Qaeda’s rhetoric - as will be discussed further below - situates the conflict within a macro-
level war between the forces of good (Islam) and evil (the West/Democracy).  This strategy 
is supported by discourse like this quote from al-Zawahiri: 
I know that many benevolent people and Islamic charity organizations have been 
harmed by America's crusader war on Islam.  America has been watching Islamic 
charity work, harassing it, and limiting its activities.  [00044] 
Al-Zawahiri’s accusation has significant implications for a Muslims audience.  Charity plays a 
prominent role in Islamic belief systems.  One of the five main tenets or pillars of Islam is 
“zagat” or alms-giving.  Zagat places notions of charity and support for the less fortunate at 
the center of Islam, along with prayer, fasting, belief in God and Muhammad as his 
messenger, and pilgrimage.  The U.S. attacking Islamic charity work has different 
connotations for Muslim audiences than if a foreign actor attacked a U.S. non-profit.  
Claiming that the U.S. intentionally harms Islamic charities implies that the U.S. is hostile to 
the central pillars of the Islamic religion and reinforces claims by al Qaeda elites that the U.S. 
is waging a war against Islam itself.   
The perception that the U.S. is deliberately antagonistic toward Islam is further 
reinforced by repeatedly connecting U.S. actions and support for the state of Israel.  This 
connection is accomplished in part by the label “Zionist-Crusader alliance” and by explicit 
accusations such as bin Laden’s address:  
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You [The United States] have supported the Jews in their idea that Jerusalem is their 
eternal capital, and agreed to move your embassy there. With your help and under 
your protection, the Israelis are planning to destroy the Al-Aqsa mosque. Under the 
protection of your weapons, Sharon entered the Al-Aqsa mosque, to pollute it as a 
preparation to capture and destroy it.  [00030] 
One of the worst crimes the U.S. is accused of is being complicit of, or actively supporting, 
the Israeli state, which al Qaeda elites claim is a direct threat to Islam and Islamic 
territories23.  Relevant to this project is the discursive positioning of Israel and “the Jews” as 
a monolithic adversarial identity and a direct threat to the Islamic religion.  In the passage 
above, bin Laden accuses the U.S. of supporting Israel’s goal to destroy Al-Aqsa mosque.  
Al-Aqsa is generally considered the third holiest site in Sunni Islam, located in the Old City 
of Jerusalem.  Further, conceptions of threat to Islam and Muslim culture often appear in 
conjunction with threats to Muslim territory, reinforcing the perception that the Believers 
exist in a state of clear danger. 
Threats to Muslim territories.  Threats to the Believers also include the loss of, or 
threat to, historically Muslim territory.  These threats stem primarily from U.S., Israel, or the 
relationship between the two, framed as a single actor - “Zionist-Crusader alliance.”  Israel 
and the U.S. are not the only antagonists named, however.  Shia Muslims are also positioned 
as threatening territory belonging to the Believers.  Indeed, after the U.S., al Qaeda’s senior 
management refers to Shia Muslims as the biggest danger to Sunnis.  
Second to them [The U.S. and NATO] is the upcoming danger, which had the 
biggest role and longest attempt in helping the Americans enter Afghanistan and 
                                                 
23 For a more comprehensive view of the history of the state of Israel, and its relationship with Arab Palestine 
see (Bright, 2000). 
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Iraq.  They still follow the same path, driven by their greed to seize the Muslim lands 
and by grudge to destroy the Sunnis.  Those are the rejectionists, [pejorative term for 
Shia] descendants of Bin-Saba and Bin-al-Alqami. [00026] 
This quote from a magazine published by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
explicitly refers to the Shia as the second greatest threat to the Believers.  This and similar 
data exemplify the intersection of different sites of identity.  The above quote addresses Shia 
Muslims as an outgroup identity, claiming that Shia are “driven by their greed” and actively 
seek to destroy Sunnis.  Simultaneously, the passage reinforces construction of a setting 
where Sunni Muslims are in danger of losing their lands to antagonistic actors.  Shia Muslims 
are frequently depicted as either complicit in helping the U.S. achieve its goals or actively 
working with the U.S. and Israel to undermine Sunni Islam and annex Sunni territories.   
Nonetheless, the most prominent danger to the Believers in terms of territorial 
sovereignty remains the west, specifically, The U.S.  From a statement by bin Laden: 
Bush and Blair --the Successors of Sykes-Picot: Muslim blood is being spilt unheeded 
in Palestine, Chechnya, the Philippines, Kashmir and Sudan; our children are dying 
in Iraq because of the American siege; we still suffer from the injuries inflicted by the 
Crusaders' wars on the Islamic world in the last century and by the Sykes-Picot 
agreement between Britain and France which divided the Muslim world into 
fragments and truncated limbs where Crusaders' agents still rule.  [00037] 
“Sykes-Picot” refers to the agreement between French and British ambassadors made in the 
waning days of the Ottoman Empire (Black, 2015).  Essentially defining “spheres of 
influence” for the major powers if the Ottomans were defeated, the Sykes-Picot agreement - 
named for Sir Mark Sykes (Great Britain) and François Georges-Picot (France) - divided 
Ottoman lands into British and French spheres.  The agreement ultimately paved the way for 
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the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, a political act the repercussions of which still exist 
today24 (Black, 2015; Fromkin, 2001).  
The Sykes-Picot agreement appears often in al Qaeda discourse as a disastrous, even 
“evil” event.  Generally viewed as a turning point in Western and Arab relations (Hawes, 
2003), the agreement negated promises made by Great Britain for a national Arab homeland 
in greater Syria in exchange for Arab aid against the Ottoman Empire.  Instead, what 
followed were decades of European colonial rule in the region.  Recall that one of the major 
ideological influences of al Qaeda’s ideology - Hasan al Bannah - developed his Islamist 
ideology in response to the British presence in Egypt.  Much modern Islamist theory and 
organizing originated in resistance to European colonial power in Middle Eastern states.   
Sykes-Picot remains - like the invocation of the Crusades - a linguistic marker 
invoking a significant period in Islamic history, one that connotates experiences of 
oppression by Western governments.  Continually referencing the Sykes-Picot agreement 
signifies and reinforces perceptions that the presence of Western troops and agencies in the 
region is nefarious.  Reference to the Sykes-Picot agreement may also support claims that the 
U.S. and allies are inherently untrustworthy, since it was famously secret until publicized by 
Russian press at the time.   
Lastly, al Qaeda elites view the presence of American troops as an invasion of holy 
lands.  From a statement attributed to bin Laden:  
They [references the Saudi government] lied when they claimed they needed 
assistance from the Americans for three months and here we are going to our 
thirteenth year of allowing the infidels on the holy land.  This initiative is clearly an 
attempt to firmly implant the land extorting Jewish state while the American forces 
                                                 
24 For more on the history of the state of Israel, see Fromkin (2001) 
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are establishing military bases on the holy land to threaten the region and attack Iraq 
and its Muslim people. [00039] 
The holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina are located in Saudi Arabia.  Because of this, 
the ongoing U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia constitutes an invasion of Muslim holy 
territory for al Qaeda and their ideological allies.  The continued presence of U.S. bases and 
troops with the permission of the Saudi Royal family is one of the major sources of 
animosity between Sunni Islamist groups like AQ and the ultra-conservative Salafist Saudi 
ruling family25.  Claiming the U.S. intends to support the expansion of a Jewish state into the 
region further reinforces the perception of antagonism on the part of the U.S. and threats to 
land considered sacred by all Muslims.  The above quote also exhorts that it is not just Islam 
and Muslim territories which are endangered, but the Muslim people themselves.  The final 
category of threats to the Believers focuses on the ways in which individual Muslims are 
suffering or experiencing hardship at the hands of various actors. 
Threats to individual Muslims.  In the setting constructed by al Qaeda discourse, 
Muslims exist in a state of significant danger.  Adversarial actors responsible for waging war 
against Islam are also responsible for numerous crimes against Muslim people.  Sunni 
Muslims face loss of life, the murder of women and children, torture, destruction of civilian 
property, and destruction of infrastructure in Islamic countries.  Once again, the U.S. is 
viewed as the primary source of these threats.  Gadahn exhorts the U.S., claiming U.S. 
subcontractors are responsible for the death of schoolchildren:  
And today your [addressing U.S.] government and military subcontracts its dirty 
work to international and local mercenaries who are subject to no law and observe 
                                                 
25 For a more indepth look at Salafism, and Wahabism, named after 18th Century ideologue Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab, see Halverson (2010) 
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no moral code and have taken hundreds, if not thousands of innocent Iraqi and 
Afghan lives, most recently slaughtering in their trigger-happiness over 60 elementary 
school students at a sugar factory in Pavland in Afghanistan, according to 
eyewitnesses and United Nations' reports. [00001] 
Gadahn addresses the U.S., and “local mercenaries” as actors who have no moral code, and 
who “have taken thousands of innocent Iraqi and Afghan lives” even “slaughtering” 
elementary school children, which highlights the threats to Muslims - even children.  This 
quote also exemplifies the way texts simultaneously address actors and setting.  Gadahn’s 
quote, while highlighting the loss of the students, also centers the actors - in this case, U.S. 
military - doing harm to Sunni Muslims.  The passage reinforces the setting where the 
Believers are facing constant danger and persecution and highlights characteristics of various 
actors committing aggressive or harmful actions.  Thus, both setting and actors are co-
constructed.   
What is happening to our people in Palestinian is merely a model which the Zion-
American alliance wishes to impose upon the rest of the region: the killing of men, 
women and children, prisons, terrorism, the demolition of homes, the razing of 
farms, the destruction of factories.  People live in perpetual fear and paralyzing 
terror, awaiting death at any moment from a missile or shell which will destroy their 
homes, kill their sisters and bury their babies alive.  [00037] 
Another explicit passage focuses on the experiences of Palestinian Arabs, claiming 
that the suffering experienced by “our people in Palestine” represents a desired goal for the 
U.S./Israeli alliance.  Again, the harm done to Muslims is not described in isolation.  
Relating the suffering of Muslims – particularly “women and children” – is a tactic used to 
reinforce claims that the U.S. and Israel are waging an intentional war against Muslims.   
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To summarize, the first theme constitutive of the setting in al Qaeda’s discourse 
centers threats to Sunni Muslims - the Believers.  These threats include attacks on Islam as a 
religion, on Muslim territories, and on Muslim people - particularly women and children.  
The United States is the primary aggressor, but Shia Muslims and local governments acting 
on behalf of the United States are also implicated.  The result of this discourse is a setting 
where the Believers exist in a state of incredible social, cultural, economic, and physical 
hardship, primarily caused by the actions of the United States, its alliance with Israel, and 
Shia Muslims.  Existing concurrently and often supporting the “Muslims under attack” 
theme is a second theme, labeled “Conflict framing,” which describes discourse addressing 
the kinetic conflict itself.  
Conflict framing.  Addressing the kinetic conflict between al Qaeda and various 
adversaries plays a substantial role in constitution of the setting.  Within the macro theme of 
conflict framing, analysis revealed two mezzo level rhetorical strategies use to emphasize 
aspects of the kinetic conflict.  The first is referred to as “relative tactical success.”  This sub-
theme focuses on the strategic and tactical elements of the conflict, highlighting the ways in 
which al Qaeda’s adversaries were being defeated.  The second theme depicts the conflict 
between the mujahidin and the U.S. as a microcosm of a larger war between Islam and the 
forces of “unbelief” or “falsehood.”  Referred to as “conflict between Truth and falsehood,” 
this theme draws on religious language and imagery, essentially framing the conflict between 
al Qaeda’s fighters and the U.S. as exemplifying the greater conflict between Good and Evil.   
Relative tactical success.  Czarniawska (1997) posits that where biographies of 
individual identity may include failure, mistakes, and miseries, organizational identities “must 
follow a straighter path.  Continuous success is a constant ingredient in the autobiographies 
of organizations” she argues (p. 52).  Treatment of the conflict in al Qaeda’s discourse bears 
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out Czarniawska’s assertion.  U.S. policy makers and intelligence agencies lament the 
protracted nature of the Long War (Case & Pawlak, 2010).  Al Qaeda elites, however, offer 
this same outcome as symbolic of the organization’s success.  In sum, according to AQ 
leadership, the mujahidin are winning, and the U.S. and their allies are losing this conflict.  
Mujahidin victory.  In the text of a sermon delivered on the “Feast of Sacrifice” 
(Islamic Holiday), Usama bin Laden claims, “The Fighting in Afghanistan, I am happy to tell 
you that the Jihad in Afghanistan is going well, thank God, and that things are improving in 
favor of the Mujahidin…” [00037].  The use of mujahidin here instead of al Qaeda is relevant 
to the broader construction (or lack thereof) of al Qaeda’s organizational identity.  Even 
when claiming victory over adversaries, only rarely does organizational discourse refer to the 
organization.  Instead, most discourse attributes success and achievement to the mujahidin as 
a group of individual fighters, not al Qaeda the organization.  In another example, Adam 
Gadahn claims: 
In the Islamic Maghreb, the western half of the crusaders' African disaster zone, the 
mujahidin of Qa'ida al-Jihad Organization continue to pound the apostate government 
in Algiers and its foreign backers, and martyrdom-seekers strike with ease at the 
symbol of the regime's unbelief: [00001] 
While membership is explicitly referenced, Gadahn gives organizational members credit for 
“pounding the apostate government.”  Thus, al Qaeda elites clearly frame member actions as 
a win for organizational goals while not addressing the organization as a social actor.  This 
strategy repeats through the data.  For example, in a statement attributed to bin Laden, the 
speaker argues: “The enemy rejected the warning and the mujahidin managed, through the 
grace of Allah, to deliver two tremendous blows in east Africa” [00037].  Similarly, from a 
speech attributed to al Zawahiri on the anniversary of the battle of Tora Bora:  
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Dear brothers, these days four years ago, the glorious Tora Bora battle was waged.  
That battle, like the other battles of resisting the new Zionist-Crusader campaign, 
revealed the extent of cowardice and frailty characterizing the Crusaders and their 
renegade supporters.  In Tora Bora, with its rough terrain and biting weather, about 
300 mujahidin stood their ground during the savage US bombardment for 12 days.  
They resisted the US legions of the Cross and herds of the renegades, who 
surrounded and besieged them, and shelled them with all types of bombs, including 
seven-ton bombs.  However, they did not dare break into their positions, where they 
would face bitter and sure death. [00044] 
And another from a speech by al-Zawahiri: 
The fact which our enemies realize before our friends is that the thing which 
trimmed America's claws, broke its back, and aborted its plans was neither the 
elections, nor trading in religion, nor beggary, but rather, was the Mujahidin love of 
martyrdom and their sacrifices in Iraq and Afghanistan, in a Jihadi resistance which 
the people of whims and prejudice have for so long criticized. [00042] 
These excerpts exemplify several rhetorical strategies employed by al Qaeda elites.   
Note that the authors attribute victory to the mujahidin as fighters, rather than presenting the 
organization as an actor.  The mujahidin are foregrounded, while references to al Qaeda as an 
organizational actor are extremely rare.  The significance of this tactic will be addressed in 
greater detail in the discussion of this project.  Here, both passages frame continuation of 
conflict, and continued resistance to a larger adversary, as success.  Explicit or tangible 
measures of tactical victory are absent.  Instead, the mujahidin are praised for withstanding an 
intense bombardment without fleeing.  The second excerpt uses metaphorical language to 
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construct notions of victory.  America’s “claws” have been trimmed and its “back broken,” 
but no corresponding data explains what that entails in terms of concrete strategic gains.   
Since al Qaeda’s adversaries have greater force superiority, are better equipped, and 
better funded, it is strategically advantageous to propose “continuation of operations” as a 
measure of success.  This strategy sets the organization up for perceived victory regardless of 
the objective situation.  As Czarniawska (1997) argues, there is little room for notions of 
failure in organizational identities.  While the data address the mujahidin rather than al Qaeda, 
Czarniawska’s assertion is still applicable.  Claiming that existence is victory mitigates 
possible perception of setbacks or defeat that could weaken organizational claims about the 
mujahidin’s success.   
In a speech dated from 2006, al-Zawahiri states, “Brother Muslims. I thank God for 
allowing us to stand fast in the face of the most brutal Crusader campaign that was launched 
against Islam throughout history.” [00044]. Claiming that U.S. and allied forces constitute the 
“most brutal Crusader campaign” against Islam supports multiple aspects of al Qaeda’s 
communication strategies.  First it reinforces the connection between the current conflict 
and historical clashes.  Second, emphasizing the threat presented by U.S. troops serves to 
make any victories by the mujahidin appear consequently more impressive.  If the audience 
accepts al Zawahiri’s assertion - that the U.S. and allied actions constitute the greatest threat 
Islam has ever faced - then it can also be inferred that the mujahidin are acting on behalf of all 
Islam, and they have achieved something significant in resisting the U.S. for this long.   
U.S. and allies losing.  Articulating the mujahidin’s continued success emphasizes the 
numerous ways in which the U.S. and its allies have suffered setbacks or been defeated, 
whether in terms of territory, morale, or the economy.  Doing so constitutes the other facet 
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of al Qaeda’s framing of the kinetic conflict.  For example, this excerpt from a speech by 
Adam Gadahn from early 2008:  
Has American really been defeated? The answer is yes, and in all fronts American 
and coalition officials have stated repeatedly that they are unable and unwilling to 
face the mujahidin in Iraq and Afghanistan militarily…In Afghanistan, bruised and 
battered NATO forces, at first willing partners in a coalition they assumed was 
victorious, are now unwilling to commit more than they already have, and instead are 
preparing to pull out, despite America's urgent pleas for them to stay on to the bitter 
end to cover its own retreat, and despite Gates' master document and numerous 
cross-Atlantic salvage missions and visits to Kabul. [00001] 
Gadahn uses extremely direct language, claiming outright that the United States military 
efforts in the region are unsuccessful.  Other speakers further highlight U.S. losses in 
extremely graphic ways, focusing on individual troop losses and the rise of PTSD among 
returning veterans (Jakupcak et al., 2007).   
Bush led everyone that followed in his footsteps into harm…However, he remains 
persistent and patient, saying: We have achieved accomplishments in Iraq…Perhaps 
these accomplishments are the psychiatric patients that have packed hospitals in the 
US. Perhaps they are the endless caskets for which they have not found graves. 
Perhaps [the accomplishments] are those who have returned deformed and 
handicapped to their parents and spouses, which is the case even if they return alive.  
[00009] 
Using rhetoric authored by U.S. policy makers - whether direct quotes or strategic 
paraphrases - is a common tactic al Qaeda elites use to make and support counter-claims 
(Brachman, 2010).  This tactic reinforces the perception that U.S. policy makers are 
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untrustworthy, deluded, or actively trying to mislead their audiences while bolstering ingroup 
members as reliable and credible sources.  Any suggestion that the ongoing conflict is not 
proceeding in favor of the mujahidin is dismissed by the expediency of claiming that the U.S. 
is merely silent, refusing to acknowledge its losses, as al-Zawahiri claims:  
The situation in Afghanistan is pushing the United States to the same abyss, in which 
the Soviet Union has fallen, but at even greater pace.  The United States is keeping 
silent on most of its losses in Afghanistan, although its lies are refuted and its losses 
are reported in the simple mujahidin media.  [00048] 
In al Qaeda discourse, U.S. and allied losses are not limited to territory or personnel.  The 
theme of economic loss is also prevalent. Speaking in 2009, al Libi implies that the collapse 
of the U.S. housing market which led to the Great Recession (Vos, Agabekian, & Dardari, 
2011) is due in part to the failure of allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Al Zawahiri 
writes:  
The new Crusader campaign has been a failure as its previous ones. The United 
States, backed by its Crusader allies, has not achieved anything other than plunging 
its army in the battlefield to receive blows daily and for its soldiers to be killed and its 
economy to be exhausted. [00048] 
Al Qaeda leadership takes a multifaceted approach to detailing the ways the U.S. is 
losing.  Emphasis is placed not just on territorial gains or losses, but on morale and 
economic losses.  In another speech, bin Laden elaborates on notions of the economic 
troubles faced by the U.S., taking credit for forcing President Bush to “resort to emergency 
funds to continue the fight.” 
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And even more dangerous and bitter for America is that the Mujahidin recently 
forced Bush to resort to emergency funds to continue the fight in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, which is evidence of the success of the bleed-until-bankruptcy plan. [00038] 
The emphasis on multiple type of U.S. losses may be a strategic move to compensate 
for the lack of territorial gain or quantitative success achieved by the mujahidin and their 
ideological allies.  Focusing on issues such as economy and morale allows al Qaeda’s senior 
leadership to strategically redefine notions of winning and losing.  In the data for the first 
research question, individual identity discourse connected notions of “success” to 
martyrdom - i.e., death.  At the organizational level, the failure of the U.S. to achieve a 
decisive victory is a success for al Qaeda.  Meanwhile, despite significant tactical and 
resource disadvantages, the mujahidin continue to operate.  Organizational discourse re-
frames this as a metric of success.  These strategies combine in such a way as to support 
claims like Abu Yaha al Libi’s, where he assures his audience that, “Neither Bush nor any of 
his followers have been able to extinguish this flame that truly expresses Islam.  Rejoice 
brothers, and be assured that victory is yours” [00009].  Al Libi’s wording hints at the second 
discursive strategy framing the ongoing conflict.  This second sub-theme positions the 
conflict between U.S. forces and al Qaeda and allied fighters as a microcosm of a larger war 
between the forces of Good and Evil - between Islam and “unbelief.”   
Microcosm of the war between good and evil.  Stories in organizations serve as 
sites where meaning can be variously shared, negotiated, and contested (Humphreys & 
Brown, 2002).  They offer participants “tools or programs for making sense of events” (p. 
422).  The ability to offer a map of reality makes stories formidable tools for organizations’ 
influence over ingroup member identity construction and organizational identity.  By 
highlighting and emphasizing certain facets of organizational experience, organizational elites 
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encourage audiences to align their views with organizational goals.  Al Qaeda’s discourse 
positions itself, and its members, within a broader conflict between Islam and the forces of 
“unbelief.”  An article in AQAP’s official magazine describes the “Struggle Between Truth, 
Falsehood,” claiming:  
The real and potential enemies of the religion are meeting and allying in conferences, 
to concoct plots and to hammer out plans to fight Islam, uproot its guardians, and 
suppress its faithful advocates.… As the infidels of Quraysh met [in the beginning of 
Muhammad's prophecy] in the Dar al-Nadwah to plot against the Messenger of God, 
prayers and peace be upon him, and against his message.  After deliberations, they 
agreed on the opinion of God's enemy Abu-Jahl [Amr Bin-Hisham], who said: 'I 
suggest that we select strong and vigorous youth of noble lineage, one from each of 
the Quraysh clans, and arm each of them with a sharp sword.  They should fall upon 
him [Muhammad] as one man.  Thus, no particular clan would be held accountable 
for his murder.  The Bani-Abd-Manaf clan would therefore have to content 
themselves with blood-money instead of vengeance.'  Today, they assembled in their 
conferences or conspiracy meetings, as I see them, in the name of development and 
reform. They are liars in their allegations, as how can they build up the countries 
while they are demolishing it and looting its wealth all through their terms in power?  
On the contrary, their real target is to get rid of the mujahidin and to silence the 
sincere advocates of the religion. [00021] 
 The language of “truth” and “falsehood” creates an extreme dichotomy, richly grounded in 
Islamic cultural and religious history that would likely be instantly familiar to potential 
Muslim audiences.  Similar to the way in which “Crusader” is used to invoke a significant 
historical narrative, “truth” and “falsehood” draw on historical events and cultural histories 
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to reinforce a simplistic, antagonistic dichotomy with Sunni Islam and the Believers on one 
side, and the U.S. and their allies (and Western ideologies) on the other.   
The passage above describes a modern setting where the “enemies of the religion” 
plot to turn the people away from Islam by referencing a historical event from the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad.  The author draws an explicit connection between the historical 
tribe - Quraysh - and modern actors “demolishing and looting” Muslim countries today.  
Since “infidels” is routinely used to refer to the U.S. and Western forces acting in the Middle 
East, this passage and others like it make an explicit comparison between the Quraysh and 
the U.S. for knowledgeable audiences.    
“Falsehood” historically refers to illegitimate Muslim rulers who collaborated with 
Christian powers.  In AQ rhetoric, it is applied more broadly, used to ascribe individual 
actors or abstract ideological concepts.  Islam, al Libi argues in one of his sermons, is the 
only way to the “truth.”  
Hence, the leading way to the truth is one, clear, fixed, and decisive; namely, Islam, 
except which God does not accept any other religions for His servants.  There are 
many leading paths to falsehood and whims that come up, increase, spread, and 
become various one day after the other in different ways and various names. [00005] 
The paths leading to “falsehood” in contrast, are many, and varied, implying that the way to 
Islam is often surrounded by falsehood, echoing the position of the Believers in the setting - 
surrounded by adversaries.  There can be only way to “truth” al Libi argues, and that is 
through Islam.  Specifically, truth is achieved only through a particular, idealized Sunni 
variation of Islam sympathetic to al Qaeda’s ideological goals.  Construction of “truth” 
found in AQ’s discourse relies heavily on notions of supplication and surrender to the 
authority of God – but as interpreted through al Qaeda’s ideologues.   
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Incorporation of religious texts and language to justify their ideological position, 
however, does not automatically infer religious justifications for the organization.  Indeed, 
there is little evidence that al Qaeda sees themselves as a primarily spiritual organization.  
Their discursive strategies emphasize defense of Islam and the Believers, but the resolutions 
observed contain as many references to secular outcomes as religious ones.  The significance 
of the use of Qur’anic quotes or Hadiths lies in their contribution to sites of identity 
regulation.  Addressing the ongoing kinetic conflict as part of a larger battle between 
ideological forces situates the mujahidin and adversaries as actors within the organization’s 
identity narratives and draws on entrenched macro narratives deeply embedded in Islamic 
history and regional culture (Halverson et al., 2011).  Concurrent with this strategy is a 
supporting theme that frames democracy as an “evil religion” competing directly with Islam.  
Democracy as competing religion.  Western democracy is positioned as a competing 
religion, antithetical to the values and belief systems of Islam.  Addressing democracy - and 
by extension Western, particularly U.S. values - as antithetical to Sunni Islamic principles 
further situates the kinetic conflict within a larger ideological struggle between the forces of 
Islam and unbelief or non-Islam.  In a lengthy document devoted to decrying democracy as 
“corrupt religion” Abu Yaha al Libi, argues, 
Understanding the reality of democracy and realizing its complete contradictions 
with the religion of Islam…the religion of democracy is such a system that makes the people 
a sole ruler and a master with no power above them…Anyone, who is minimally enlightened 
by the faith, will be certain that this religion [democracy] can never get together with Islam, 
not for a second, neither in the hearts and souls, nor in the reality and life [00005] 
Islam and democracy are incompatible.  This claim rests on the view that democracy 
privileges the rules and judgment of humans over the rules and judgment of God.  
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The word, [democracy] as they say, is a compound word of two parts.  It means in 
our language 'the rule of the people,' 'the sovereignty of the people,' or 'the authority 
of the people.'  This is the core of democracy and its meaning.  There will be no 
existence for democracy without it, that is the authority of the people and the 
sovereignty of the people…Therefore, the religion of democracy is such a system 
that makes the people a sole ruler and a master with no power above them. [00005] 
Such arguments make clear that sovereignty of human law stands in contrast to the tenets of 
Suni Islam that AQ and their ideological allies ascribe to, which privileges complete 
submission to God. 
The strong origins and the rigid foundation that the Islamic religion is found on are 
total surrender, complete compliance, and full submission to all the Islamic 
rulings…Islam was called so because it means surrendering to God's orders and 
accepting His rulings. These rulings should not be violated by a habit, opinion, norm, 
or experience, no matter where it originated from, whether it originated by an 
individual, a party, a parliament, a people, a tribe, or an organization. [00005] 
Al Libi’s view conflates accepting democratic rule with committing blasphemy.  Suggesting 
that democracy presents a threat to Islam, AQ further positions the U.S. and allies as 
aggressors.  This claim also undermines Western rhetoric regarding the creation of 
democratic institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan as positive outcomes.  For those audiences 
who accept al Qaeda’s perspective, or for potential sympathizers, the foundation of 
democratic rule constitutes a commitment to dismantling Islamic institutions and beliefs.  
One of disasters of this era, the greatest trials of this religion, and its gravest 
catastrophes is the infiltration of some of these systems, which were introduced as 
infidel Western ones, raised as blatant Western ones, and thrived as dissolute 
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Western ones; namely, the so-called democracy. This democracy crept into the 
ummah of Islam when its people were inattentive and weak, its governments were 
apostates, its sons were ignorant, and many of its ulema [scholars] were negligent, 
except those whom God saves.  It [democracy] raised its flags in their countries, 
squirted out its poisons into their limbs, spread its creeds among them, and cast its 
shadow and falsehood over their countries.  [00005] 
Democracy is seen not just a threat to Muslims, but as a poison.  While the notion of Islam 
as surrender to god is not unique to al Qaeda’s conception of Sunni Islam and despite 
significant effort put into claiming that democracy and Sunni Islam are antithetical, many 
Islamic scholars (ulema) disagree.  Indonesia, a predominantly Islamic nation, has long had a 
non-theocratic government, and since 2004 has been a (relatively) functional democracy26 
(Bush, 2009).  In the texts analyzed for this study, the construction of democracy as a threat 
to Islam is strategic, reinforcing al Qaeda’s claim that the mujahidin act in defense of Sunni 
Muslims and justifying the kinetic conflict with the U.S., as the symbol of western 
democracy.  This strategy may also constitute a direct response to U.S. policy rhetoric that 
worked to deny claims that U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq were religiously motivated.  
In the transcript of a video entitled “Obstacles to Jihad” Ayman al-Zawahiri writes: 
There are many other examples for the hypocrisy of Britain and the western 
Crusaders, but we do not have the time to mention them all.  They all explain the 
contradiction of these Crusaders in their claim about protecting freedom and human rights.  
The explanation for this contradiction is the Crusaders' hostility to Islam. [00048] 
Disputing U.S. policy and media rhetoric is a key component of al Qaeda’s public 
discourse, which will be explored in greater detail in following sections.  Relevant to the 
                                                 
26 For more on the complexities of Indonesian politics and Islam, see Bush (2009).  
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discursive construction of the setting is al-Zawahiri’s repeated emphasis that the “Crusaders” 
have ill intentions toward Islam as a religion, no matter what U.S. and allied policy states.  
Framing democracy as a religion, al Qaeda reinforces its claim that the U.S. and their allies 
present a threat not just to Muslim communities, but to Islamic beliefs.  The last line of the 
excerpt above also previews one of the ways in which al Qaeda’s discourse ascribes group 
membership and constructs an idealized “True” Sunni Muslim identity, which will be 
discussed in greater detail below.  In regard to the setting, the relevant take away is the 
rhetorical device framing the kinetic conflict between the mujahidin and U.S. and allied forces 
as emblematic of a significantly larger war between the forces of “unbelief” and Islam.   
Actors 
Narratives, Brown (2006) argues, structure “systems of presence and absence in 
organizations” (p. 10).  They emphasize sets of meanings while excluding alternate 
conceptions (Hall, 1985).  In the context of organizational identity narratives, this results in 
emphasizing certain actors or relationships in organizational discourse.  Identity work in 
organizations draws distinctions between “us” and “them” - ingroup and outgroup 
members.  These distinctions are usually accompanied by connotations of ideal and inferior.  
For an IDO like al Qaeda, the ingroup/outgroup distinction may be associated with more 
extreme moral or ideological judgments, where outgroup identities and actors are considered 
not just undesirable, but “bad” or “evil.”  The following section explores the construction of 
organizational level actors in al Qaeda’s discourse, guided by Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) 
relevant identity targets: “defining an actor directly,” “defining an actor by defining others,” 
“group affiliation,” “knowledge and skills,” and “morals and values.”  
Defining actor directly: Or not.  Individual actors may be defined by references to 
their characteristics that “have some validity across time and space and that distinguish a 
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person from others” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 12).  Similarly, organizational actors are 
distinguished from other organizational actors by discourse that describes what is “central, 
distinctive, and enduring” about the organization (Albert, Ashforth & Dutton, 2002).   One 
of the major findings of this project was a significant lack of discourse addressing the central, 
distinctive, and enduring traits of al Qaeda.  As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
analysis revealed very little discourse addressing al Qaeda as an organizational actor at all.  
Only two texts in the data set contained direct references to al Qaeda.  The first has already 
been described at the start of this chapter.  Zawahiri refers to al Qaeda as a “vanguard” but 
offers no further information about what being a vanguard means for the organization.  
Instead, the passage emphasizes aspects of the setting, specifically, framing the conflict:   
…It [al Qaeda] is also resisting all the apostate and agent regimes dominating our 
Muslim nation…With God's grace, Al-Qa'ida is growing in number, equipment, and 
operations.  It is enough to enumerate the number of operations it has carried out 
since the US Crusader campaign against Afghanistan. [00048] 
Al Qaeda, Zawahiri claims, is “getting stronger, growing in operations, resisting the 
apostate regimes dominating the Muslim nation.”  This passage supports the perception that 
the mujahidin are succeeding against the U.S. and allies more than it “distinguishes the 
organization from others like it” (Alvesson & Wilmott 2002, p. 15).  The second reference to 
al Qaeda as an organization in the data is also authored by al-Zawahiri and states:  
And you know that your Mujahid brothers, especially in Qaida al-Jihad, are -- by the 
grace of Allah -- the farthest people from ethnic fanaticism.  They have pledged 
allegiance to the Commander of the Believers, Mulla Muhammad Umar, as their 
commander, and he isn't an Arab.  [00042] 
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Other than denying apparent accusations of fanaticism, nothing distinguishes the 
organization.  Indeed, discourse directly addressing any ingroup actor - including the 
Believers - was scarce.  Instead, the Believers were largely addressed through other sites of 
identity such as group affiliation:  
The Believer should be particularly careful not to support falsehood because assisting 
infidels against other Muslims [even] if only verbally is flagrant unbelief, as has been 
determined by the scholars… [00037] 
Here Bin Laden urges Believers not to support falsehood since assisting infidels is itself an 
act of unbelief.  The stringent approach to rules defining Believers and the creation of 
mutually exclusive, dichotomous group affiliation categories is discussed in greater detail 
below.  The next section explores the presence and function of various outgroup identities in 
defining the Believers.  
Defining an actor by defining others.  Referencing outgroup actors and 
associating them with negative traits can, by implication, define ingroup members.  In the 
context of a violent ideologically driven conflict, the ingroup/outgroup distinction can be 
extreme.  Non-group actors may be associated with undesirable traits but also may be 
framed as - literally - evil.  Further, discourse positions outgroup actors in contrast to the 
Believers, rather than al Qaeda or the mujahidin.  The most prominent outgroup actor in the 
data is the United States.  The Companions and first generation of Muslims are also 
addressed.  
The United States/crusaders.  Positioned as the greatest threat to the Believers, 
the role of the United States in individual and organizational level identity narratives is 
isomorphic.  In the world view of al Qaeda leadership, the United States, along with NATO, 
the United Nations and Israel, are used to embody numerous traits antithetical to the 
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Believers identity and to reinforce the construction of a setting where Muslims are being 
threatened and harmed by these actors.  The U.S. - often referred to as the Crusaders, are 
responsible for torture, oppression, and numerous evils committed against Muslims.   
Today, as yesterday, America's armed forces [in Afghanistan and Iraq] engage in 
mass-casualty aerial bombings, much of which is now fully automated, as if you are 
dealing with money transfers and not matters of life and death.  And much of which 
depends on so-called intelligence from satellites and spy planes which -- sorry to say 
-- do not distinguish between friend, foe, and innocent by-stander, in the same way 
that white phosphorus and depleted uranium also pick their victims indiscriminately. 
Today, as yesterday, America's homesick, half-mad soldiers rape, pillage, and murder, 
then plant weapons and fabricate reports to cover up their evil deeds.  And today, 
more than ever before, America's military and intelligence services are guilty of the 
most atrocious forms of torture and arbitrary and unlawful detention of innocents in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and elsewhere, including on American soil. [00001] 
While Gadahn’s statement describes the U.S. armed forces as “homesick, and half-mad” the 
text also serves to reinforce the construction of a setting where the Believers are being 
bombed, assaulted, and illegally detained.  Gadahn further goes on to claim:  
America talks about truth, justice in the American way, and most Americans think 
that they are the nicest people and greatest nation in the history of the world, yet 
your government and military have for more than 230 years been one of the world's 
foremost and most prolific liars, as well as one of its most unjust regimes and one of 
the greatest violators of America's professed values. [00001] 
Liars is a significant criticism leveled against the U.S. and allies.  Labeling the U.S. liars 
reinforces the “truth/falsehood” dichotomy.  The U.S. is known for lying.  U.S. politicians 
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and military actors are liars.  This fact is just one more sign they are the antithesis of the 
Believers.  Bin Laden also goes to great lengths to attribute negative traits and actions to the 
U.S.    
You are a nation that permits the production, trading and usage of intoxicants. You 
also permit drugs, and only forbid the trade of them, even though your nation is the 
largest consumer of them…You are a nation that permits acts of immorality, and 
you consider them to be pillars of personal freedom.  You have continued to sink 
down this abyss from level to level until incest has spread amongst you, in the face of 
which neither your sense of honor nor your laws object…You are a nation that 
practices the trade of sex in all its forms, directly and indirectly. [00030] 
Traits are not the only way in which the U.S. is defined. Actions comprise a 
significant part of the way in which the U.S. is constructed as an actor.  In particular, al 
Qaeda rhetoric focuses on actions taken against Muslim populations.  
…history will not forget the war crimes that you committed against the Muslims and 
the rest of the world; those you have killed in Japan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Lebanon 
and Iraq will remain a shame that you will never be able to escape.  It will suffice to 
remind you of your latest war crimes in Afghanistan, in which densely populated 
innocent civilian villages were destroyed, bombs were dropped on mosques causing 
the roof of the mosque to come crashing down on the heads of the Muslims praying 
inside. You are the ones who broke the agreement with the Mujahidin when they left 
Qunduz, bombing them in Jangi fort, and killing more than 1,000 of your prisoners 
through suffocation and thirst.   [00030] 
Statements such as these exemplify the complex relationships of narrative and 
identity points in al Qaeda’s discourse.  Both quotes by bin Laden directly address the U.S. 
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as an outgroup actor in an antagonistic relationship with the mujahidin.  Both statements also 
contain data addressing the setting, reinforcing the claim that Muslims face physical and 
ideological threats from outgroup actors.  Further, the second passage offers an example of 
how actions are used to ascribe non-group actors.  The presence of multiple aspects of 
narrative, and multiple identity points, constructs a more vivid outgroup actor to contrast 
with ingroup identity, strengthening the overall claims regarding the setting in which the 
Believers exist.  The United States is presented as the ultimate antagonist.  Morally and 
religiously bankrupt, guilty of hypocrisy, lying, and continued violence against Muslim 
nations, the U.S. as an actor is constructed thusly to normalize the need for violent conflict 
in order to defend the Believers from U.S. policy actions against Muslims.   
Companions and first Muslims.  Analogous to individual level discourse, the 
companions and first generation of Muslims are addressed as an aspirational identity.  
Individual level discourse positioned the first Muslims as an aspirational other for individual 
mujahidin to emulate by providing examples of specific traits embodied by these historical 
figures.  Organizational level discourse, however, presents the companions as an aspirational 
identity for the Believers.  Data for this research question contains references to the Prophet, 
early Caliphs, imams and the first Muslims.  Less emphasis, however, is placed on specific 
traits embodied by these individuals.  Instead, most references to the companions contain 
action themes such as seeking knowledge (of God), worshipping God in a particular way, 
and fighting to protect Islam.    
The prophet, prayers and peace be upon him, motivated us to learn.  He, prayers and 
peace be upon him, said: Whoever seeks out a path to acquire knowledge (of the 
religion), God makes easy a path for them to paradise! [Hadith] He, prayers and 
peace be upon him, mentioned in other Hadith that all will be praying for the one 
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who seeks knowledge so as to be forgiven by God, even the whales in the sea, and an 
ant in its hole.  Knowledge has great merit and high status.  [00004] 
Adam Gadahn relates a Hadith (saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) urging 
Muslims to seek knowledge of Islam and that doing so will lead to reward, in this instance, a 
“path to paradise.”  Exhorting the audience to worship god and to fight to protect Islam are 
treated as synonymous.  From an article in a magazine published by AQAP:  
When the enemy attacked the house of Islam, our Prophet, God's prayers and peace 
be upon him, told his companions, encouraging and motivating them to obtain what 
God offers to he who defends Islam and the honors of Muslims, that: 'He who 
defends us against them [the enemies] will have his abode in Paradise, or he will be 
my companion in Paradise.' [00026] 
The author implies “fighting against criminals” is not an act reserved solely for a select group 
(such as al Qaeda) but rather an ideal action preferably undertaken by all Muslims.  A speech 
by Zawahiri further supports efforts to construct fighting the enemies of Islam as something 
incumbent on all Believers, rather than limited to the mujahidin.  
I call on every independent, honorable, and intelligent one to ask himself a 
courageous and brave question: were Imam Ali or our chief Hasan or our chief 
Husayn today present in Iraq or Afghanistan, would they have colluded with the 
Crusaders in the invasion of the lands of Islam, and then cooperate with them and 
fight the Mujahidin in defense of them?  Would they have participated in the 
governments put in place by the Crusaders and blessed by the United Nations, and 
would they have obeyed the orders of Bremer, Tommy Franks and Lakhdar 
Brahimi?  Or would they have declared Jihad against them and those who help them?  
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And I call on every independent, honorable, and intelligent one to ask himself: is this 
the Islam for which Imam Ali and Husayn sought martyrdom? [00042] 
Zawahiri calls on any Muslim who views themselves as “independent, honorable, and 
intelligent” to compare themselves to important historical figures.  He uses rhetorical 
questions to encourage the listener to come to the conclusion on their own that Imam Ali or 
Hasan or Husayn would not have “colluded” with the Crusaders but would instead have 
supported the mujahidin.   
Group affiliation: Believers or infidels.  Alvesson and Willmott (2002) argue that 
division of the social world into distinct categories of us “and by implication although more 
or less clearly pronounced, ‘them’ creates and/or sustains social distinctions” (p. 13).  For al 
Qaeda, there are only two groups: The Believers and infidels.  The “us” and “them” that 
define the social division in al Qaeda’s rhetoric are absolute.  As Zawahiri states: 
A Muslim abides by the conditions of tawhid [“oneness of God” or the fundamental 
concept of monotheism in Islam].  On the other hand, someone who does not 
adhere to the conditions of tawhid or who commits an act that contradicts tawhid is 
an infidel even though he claims he is Muslim.  [00043] 
Group affiliation is predicated on abiding by the fundamental concept that God is 
one, and singular.  This is an approach to monotheism that Islamic scholars argue 
differentiates Islam from Christianity, with its belief in the Holy Trinity.  Zawahiri claims, 
however, that self-identification as a Muslim is not sufficient to be included in the Believers.  
The distinction that it is “adherence to the conditions of tawhid” - or actions, rather than 
professed beliefs that makes a Muslim – implies that only Muslims who align themselves 
with al Qaeda elites’ approach to the conditions of tawhid can be considered ‘real’ Muslims.  
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Emphasizing actions as the dividing factor between infidels and Believers allows for stricter 
gate keeping with regard to group affiliation.   
The extent to which Believers and infidels are explicitly addressed complicates 
Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) assertion that group affiliation works through social events 
and “the management of shared feelings” rather than linguistic distinctions.  Linguistic 
distinctions of Believers and infidels rely on mutually exclusive group affiliations.  These 
affiliations derive from actions compatible with al Qaeda’s organizational goals.  For 
instance, Believers reject all laws but the divine.  Zawahiri writes, “the Muslim cannot 
possibly be a believer without litigating to Divine Law alone to the exclusion of all other 
laws.” [00042]. Recall that al Qaeda’s discourse positions democracy and democratically 
instituted law as antithetical to Islam.  Rejecting ‘all other law’ demands Believers reject 
notions of secular law and democratic processes.  Further, al Qaeda’s goals involve kinetic 
conflict with the U.S. and allies (the infidels).  Discourse defining group affiliation reflects 
that priority.  Usama bin Laden writes:  
Being on the side of the infidels against Muslims is one of the ten acts that nullify 
faith and turn the Muslim into an infidel.  The Muslim must utterly decry this act and 
disown those committing it, whoever they are.  Allah said: "Whoever rejects evil and 
believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy handhold, that never breaks.”  
[00039] 
For al Qaeda, there is no middle ground or neutral affiliation, and any act in support of the 
infidels is sufficient to exclude an individual from being a Muslim.  This position supports 
calls for conflict not only with the U.S, but with any Muslims suspected of working with 
allied troops since anyone working with the infidels cannot be Muslims.  If they are not 
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Muslims, they are infidels and, therefore, it is not only permissible, but considered necessary, 
to fight them.  From a magazine published by AQAP:  
The words "the enemies of Allah and your enemies" indicate that the infidels should 
be fought and terrorized because they are God's enemies in addition to being the 
enemies of the believers…The quest to terrorize the infidels is required initially 
because of their disbelief and their original enmity to the believers.  This is what sets 
the believers apart from the infidels…Because the believers fight in the cause of God 
and the infidels fight in the cause of an evil tyrant, the subjects of the merciful God 
were commanded to fight the loyalists of Satan. [00034] 
Specific actions are given meaning by their relationship to group affiliation.  Group 
affiliation is signified - in part - by particular actions that support al Qaeda’s goals, such as 
engaging in kinetic conflict with the U.S. and allies.  
Knowledge & skills, morals & values.  Knowledge, skills, morals, and values are 
rarely addressed in al Qaeda’s organizational level identity discourse.  Indeed, no instances of 
“skills” were coded in the data for this research question.  Knowledge and knowing, 
however, played a significant role in addressing Believers.  Significant intersection occurred 
between discourse addressing themes of knowledge and other identity points.  Knowledge 
reinforces group affiliation, supporting the distinction between the Believers and infidels and 
justifying actions taken in the name of protecting the Believers and Islam.  For example, this 
passage explicates the importance of knowledge for distinguishing the Believers from the 
infidels.  
When a person is ignorant, he might become involved in many problems.  He might 
become involved in polytheism, innovations, sins, and wrongdoings, all because he 
neglected acquiring knowledge.  Thus, knowledge became among the most 
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important necessities in the life of a believer.  We must acquire knowledge, otherwise 
how will we become close to God.  [00004] 
Without proper knowledge, the author warns that individuals may fall into polytheism and 
“wrongdoings,” which would make them infidels and enemies of Muslims.  Knowledge as a 
tool for the Believers is also important for more immediate reasons directly relating to the 
existing socio-political situation.  In a sermon, al Zawahiri states that: 
The Muslim Ummah must arm itself with an awareness guided by the light of the 
Shariah, in order for it to determine: who are its helpers?  Who are its enemies? Who 
are the sincere ones who sacrifice their lives for the glory of Islam and Muslims?  
And who are the traitors who forfeit the Ummah's rights, lands and sacred things for 
power, position, plunder and paychecks?  If the Ummah doesn't arm itself with this 
awareness, it will never move on to victory, either because its sacrifices will be stolen 
from it every time, or because it will obey leaderships unable to rise to the level of 
the battle who spin their followers on the merry-go-round of political mazes.  
[00042] 
Knowledge, or “awareness guided by Shariah,” is necessary for the Believers to avoid many 
of the threats they face.  Without knowing who are the enemies - “forfeiting the ummah’s 
rights, lands, and sacred things” - the believers will never be able to achieve “victory” and 
may instead fall prey to the numerous forces threatening them.  Zawahiri also mentions the 
“sincere ones” who are willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Islam and Muslims.  
While not explicitly stated, this is likely a reference to the mujahidin, as in another speech, 
Zawahiri, describing the “methodology” of the mujahidin claims that, “We believe that God 
will take a group of monotheists out of fire at the entreaty of the faithful, who intercede in 
favor of monotheists” [00043].  
  193 
Morals and values.  Discourse addressing morals and values was utilized almost 
entirely to support notions of group affiliation.  Only nine references to morals or values 
were recorded in the data for this research question.  Of those, very few elaborate on what 
values or morals entail.  Addressing morals and values primarily reinforces notions of group 
affiliation.  In particular, the United States is defined by a lack of morals and values.  In his 
“Letter to America” Usama Bin Laden addresses the U.S., stating:  
(iv) You are a nation that permits acts of immorality, and you consider them to be 
pillars of personal freedom. You have continued to sink down this abyss from level 
to level until incest has spread amongst you, in the face of which neither your sense 
of honor nor your laws object. [00030] 
In direct contrast, Muslims have knowledge of and embody those values that U.S. 
society lacks.  Adam Gadahn states that:  
Muslims know what true values are.  True values are those values which Americans 
ridicule and deride and cast doubt upon because they know nothing of them: values 
like adherence to God's true religion; like liberating oneself and others from 
oppression; like honor, dignity, and self-respect; like chastity and moral uprightness; 
like truth in word and deed; like showing mercy to the innocent defenseless and 
helpless and fighting for them; and like giving one's life for these values. [00001] 
This is one of the few passages that explicitly list values such as “chastity and moral 
uprightness.”  Representative of the complex relationships among points of identity in the 
data, this passage acts on three of Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) identity targets 
simultaneously: group affiliation, knowledge and skills, and morals and values.  These points 
reinforce each other, strengthening the overall construction of the Believers identity, despite 
there being no indication the Believers identity refers to specific individuals.  The values 
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listed are presented as belonging to Muslims - and Muslims are defined in part by knowing 
and considering these values important - but also as those things which American’s dismiss 
and are ignorant of.    
Summary.  In contrast to individual level identity work, and atypical of existing 
organizational identity scholarship, al Qaeda as a social actor is not ascribed by the data.  No 
organizational identity containing the central, enduring, and distinctive (Albert & Whetten, 
1985) traits of al Qaeda as a social actor is present in the data.  Instead, the main actors are 
presented in relation to the Believers, either antagonistic – the U.S. – or aspirational – the 
companions and first Muslims.  Group affiliation plays a greater role in organizational level 
discourse, starkly dividing the social world into Believers and infidels.  The next section 
explores the construction of actions in the data for this research question.  
Actions 
Narrative methodologies place actions at the center of analysis, providing a meaning 
structure that that organizes events and actions “into a whole, thereby attributing 
significance to individual actions and events according to their effect on the whole” 
(Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 18).  Narratives of identity assign significance to actions, providing 
value judgments that privilege some actions over others.  In an organizational context, more 
value is given to actions that serve organizational goals.  Actions that do not contribute to 
organizational success in some way typically have less value.  Al Qaeda’s emphasis on the 
Believers identity, rather than a typical organizational identity, results in significance assigned 
to actions that support the construction of the ideal Believer.  Utilizing Alvesson and 
Willmott’s (2002) identity targets as sensitizing principles, this section explores discourse 
addressing actions or norms of behavior considered necessary or ideal for Believers.  The 
relevant identity targets are “rules of the game” and “vocabulary of motives.”  
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Rules of the game.  Organizations construct and influence notions of what 
constitutes a successful organizational member.  For al Qaeda, “rules of the game” refer to 
ideal actions, the performance of which separates the Believers from the infidels.  Three 
primary guidelines addressing desired behaviors for the Believers emerged from the data:  
existing for God, performing Jihad and supporting the mujahidin, and uncoupling notions of 
victory from tactical success.  
Exist for God.  Believers must refuse to stray “from the right path.”  
…when Abraham's father insisted on being an infidel and maintained his delusion, 
strayed from the right path, threatened, and persisted in his deception, Abraham, 
peace be on him, said: 'And I will turn away from you (all) and from those whom ye 
invoke besides Allah. I will call on my Lord' [Koranic verse; Maryam, 19:48].  This is 
how a believer must be, believing in righteousness, and refusing to change.  A 
believer must not tie himself to land, people, jobs, money, a wife, or anything else in 
the entire universe, but must be totally devoted to please God Almighty, even if the 
whole world were to fight him, displace him, and force him away. He must exist for 
the sake of God Almighty.  Let this be for the sake of God Almighty. [00009] 
Al-Libi relates a fragment of the story of Abraham - the same Abraham referred to 
in the Bible - who is generally considered one of the first Muslims.  Even though Abraham 
lived before the revelation of the Quran, Islamic exegesis generally considers Abraham to be 
one of the first true monotheists, who worshiped the same God who revealed the Qur’an to 
the prophet Muhammad.  Abraham’s actions are presented as an example for modern 
Believers to emulate.  
The quote is another example of the intersection of identity targets throughout the 
data - addressing rules of the game and defining others simultaneously.  Abraham - a 
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historical Muslim - displays ideal actions for modern Believers to emulate.  Al-Libi also goes 
on to list explicit behaviors necessary for Believers - emphasizing the eschewing of material 
goods, wealth, and even a wife.  He argues Believers must devote themselves to God 
completely and that nothing, not family, material goods, employment, wealth or marriage, 
should come before a Believer’s devotion to God.  The implication being, that those who 
fail these criteria are not Believers, and therefore are infidels.  Thus, this excerpt also 
reinforces group affiliation and the extreme dichotomy between Believers and infidels.  
Existing for God is made possible through learning.  A sermon attributed to AQP 
religious leader Kahlid al Husainan demonstrates the intersection identity targets “knowledge 
and skills” and “rules of the game.”   
The first matter is that you struggle to acquire knowledge.  Learning the Shariah 
science needs patience, staying up late at night, research, and reading.  It requires a 
person to exert time and effort in order to learn this Shariah science.  Hence, we find 
our righteous ancestors, may God Almighty's blessings be upon them, gave us the 
most wonderful examples…We must acquire knowledge, otherwise how will we 
become close to God.  If a believer does not learn what God said, and what the 
messenger of God, prayers and peace be upon him, said, how will he become close 
to his God. [00004] 
Husainan emphasizes not just the preferred outcome - becoming “closer to his God” - but 
the act - framed as a “struggle” of learning itself.  The explicit references to patience, 
“staying up late at night,” and to exerting effort suggest that the action of learning is as 
significant as the outcome.  Indeed, gaining knowledge is connected to jihad, and Husainan 
goes on to tell the audience, “It is necessary that we struggle against this soul and train it day 
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by day, then, glory be to God, you will begin to love knowledge” [00004].  Struggle takes 
many forms, including kinetic conflict, which leads to the second “rule” for Believers.  
Jihad.  Commensurate with the results of the first research question, construction of 
jihad at the organizational level is dynamic and complex.  Organizational discourse 
emphasizes jihad as a kinetic struggle against outgroup actors, primarily infidels.  The 
components of that struggle vary, however, and physical fighting is not the only relevant 
aspect of jihad.  As suggested in the previous section, jihad may also involve learning, or it 
may signify “truth telling;” as an AQAP magazine article argues, “…declaring the truth to an 
unjust ruler is great jihad.  Declaring the truth is something dear. It is the behavior of the 
messengers and their followers.” [00020].  The majority of discourse addressing jihad, 
however, frames it as a kinetic act and a requirement of all Believers.  For example, Al-
Zawahiri states:  
Jihad becomes an individual duty if assailant infidels attack Muslims.  There is no 
condition to jihad, which should be launched by the means readily available.  Next to 
faith, there is nothing more important than repulsing an assailant enemy who ruins 
the religion and the world. [00043]  
Here Zawahiri focuses on jihad as a defensive action after an attack by assailants.  He frames 
jihad as being without condition or limitation and as second only to faith in importance.  The 
scope of the threat is also worth noting.  Zawahiri exhorts Muslims to repulse enemies who 
ruin the religion (reference to Islam) and “the world.”  He does not specify Muslim 
territories but suggests a much broader danger posed by actors, should they not be 
countered by jihad.  While not explicitly named in this passage, context suggests the text 
refers to the “Crusaders” i.e., the U.S. and allied forces.   
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Defense after an attack, however, is not the only impetus for jihad.  In an article 
published in an AQAP-produced magazine, the author states:  
Disavowal of the infidels and being their enemies is required by word of mouth and 
in one's heart. It is also required in the form of actual effort. The pinnacle of every 
effort is jihad in the cause of God. The strongest form of disavowal and enmity is 
when the swords are unsheathed and the armies clash. Terrorizing the infidels is also 
required to repulse them and keep them from attacking the believers. [00034] 
The author urges his audience to view jihad in both offensive and defensive terms or, 
essentially arguing that the best defense is a good offense.  Separation from the infidels or 
disavowing them with words is insufficient.  Insuring the safety of Muslims from the infidels 
requires effort in the form of kinetic conflict, effort that should be undertaken by every 
Muslim, not just a select few who have dedicated themselves to it.  An article from another 
AQAP publication states:  
A person who is capable of jihad has no excuse for not undertaking this path for fear 
of being imprisoned; this should make it [jihad] more of a duty.  Shaykh of Islam Ibn 
Taymiyyah, may God have mercy on his soul, says:  'Nothing is more obligatory, 
after faith, than repelling the enemy who corrupts religion and society.  Repelling the 
enemy is agreed by all to be a duty.' [00026] 
As discussed in chapter two, Ibn Taymiyyah was a significant influence on Sayd Qutb and 
thus on the formulation of al Qaeda’s ideology. Taymiyyah is credited with establishing the 
belief that it was Muslims’ duty to overthrow insufficiently “Islamic” rulers.  He was writing 
at the time of a wave of Mongol invasions of Syria, and though the Mongol rulers converted 
to Sunni Islam, they still governed using the Mongol “Yassa” code, rather than Shariah.  Ibn 
Taymiyyah argued this was unacceptable, writing that this choice meant the Mongols were 
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not truly Muslims and, ergo, should not be allowed to govern Muslims.  Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
work is also significant because it contested the prohibition of fighting other Muslims.  By 
claiming the Mongols’ conversion was insincere and they were not truly Muslims, Ibn 
Taymiyyah offered rhetorical justification for circumventing the convention against inter-
Muslim conflict.   
Taymiyyah’s perspective is reflected in al Qaeda’s rhetoric constructing the Believers 
as the only ‘real’ Muslims, while declaring any Muslim who aides or supports the infidels as 
no longer a Muslim and therefore claiming that it is permissible to fight them.  And, of 
course, jihad against infidels is one of the actions that denotes a Believer.  Although Jihad is 
difficult and may lead to suffering, injury, or death, a Believer continues to pursue it because 
that is the only way to ensure the success of Islam (God’ religion).  
The path of jihad is a path that human beings hate because of the ordeals and 
afflictions that it contains such as hunger, poverty, migration, massacre, injury, 
captivity and other things that result from it. But as much as a person is patient and 
content and knows that God is with him on his path, then he will know that the 
reward is good for it is the consolidation of God Almighty's religion whether at your 
own hands or at the hands of those who follow you and walk in your footsteps. 
[00009] 
As al-Libi writes, the “ordeals and afflictions” experienced during jihad are numerous.  
Believers, however, will remain “patient and content” until victory is achieved.  Victory in 
this instance is the spread of Islam.  This passage illustrates the intersection of rules of the 
game and vocabulary of motives.  The primacy of Islam is presented as a desired resolution 
for those engaging in jihad.  This construction of motivations is explored in more detail 
below; however, the passage offers another example of the intersection of identity points.  
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Support the mujahidin.  Jihad and fighting the infidels is the duty of every Muslim; 
however, if Believers cannot for some reason perform that duty, it is incumbent upon them 
to support those who do fight the infidels on behalf of all Muslims.  
…each Muslim must reform him or herself and those for whom he or she is 
responsible and must place his trust in God and ask his help, and must place his 
hand in the hands of the Muslim mujahidin, who are fighting the Americans and their 
puppets and proxies from Islamabad to Baghdad and beyond. And he must support 
them with everything he can, because in them is the Muslims' only hope after 
God…for deliverance from the satanic crusader-Zionist-Hindu-atheist-apostate 
nexus sitting on the Muslims' chests. [00001] 
Gadahn asserts that it is Muslims’ responsibility to support the mujahidin.  His speech also 
reinforces the construction of the setting where Muslims are being threatened.  Assertion of 
responsibility to support the mujahidin is echoed by al-Zawahiri, who writes: “I remind every 
educated Muslim that his role in confronting the Zionist Crusade is to bear arms.  If he 
cannot, then he must support and serve those who are bearing them…” [00042].  In another 
sermon, Zawahiri states: 
I therefore call on Muslims wherever they may be to support their brothers -- the 
Palestinians. This support should first be channeled to the mujahidin, then to the 
families of the martyrs and prisoners, and then -- after the mujahidin and the families 
of the martyrs and prisoners have had fulfilled their needs -- what remains can be 
channeled into social and livelihood areas so that the jihad may live on. [00049] 
Naturalization norms of behavior has implications for identity construction.  In corporate 
settings, rules of the game might suggest ways to be a better team player (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2002).  In the context of al Qaeda, these rules shape notions of what it means to 
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be a Believer and to be a Believer it is necessary to conduct jihad, or at least support the 
mujahidin who are fighting the infidels.  It is also necessary to uncouple notions of victory 
and rightness of the cause from tactical success.  
Uncouple success from victory.  Believers are encouraged to uncouple notions of 
victory from tactical success.  
Among the plagues that seep into people's creed regarding jihad is attaching the rite 
of jihad to a battle: Winning in that battle would indicate that the principle and 
premise were correct and losing would indicate that they were wrong.  This belief is 
wrong in terms of both reason and religion and arises from defeatism, insufficient 
faith, and a lack of patience and perseverance…another problem that people have in 
their understanding jihad is that if we win in this particular battle, then we were right 
in fighting jihad.  If we lose in that battle, then we were wrong in fighting jihad.  And 
we would find that he reiterates this point in more than one principle, because it is a 
serious problem.  People base their perception on jihad on the results.  So if a 
particular group of mujahidin win, then they're on the right path.  If they lose, then 
they're...they are on the false path and they shouldn't be fighting jihad.  And this 
is...this is a false perception. [00003] 
This excerpt, part of a much longer series of sermons by Anwar al-Awlaki, encourages 
audience members to avoid perceiving loss of a battle as an indication that the purpose of 
jihad is misguided.  Losing a battle, al-Awlaki claims, is not a sign that “principle and 
premise” of the overall conflict were wrong, and those who might believe otherwise are 
being “defeatists” and displaying “insufficient faith and a lack of patience.”  This strategy is 
congruent with individual level discourse.  This tactic re-defines notions of success to adapt 
to potential setbacks, suggesting that any sense of failure is due to the lack of ‘faith’ of the 
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audience, rather than holding the mujahidin accountable for providing tangible success.  Re-
defining notions of victory also supports the construction of a setting where the mujahidin are 
succeeding against tactically superior adversaries.  
 Faith in the mujahidin and their actions is the responsibility of the Believer and is 
unconnected from the organization delivering any tangible results.  The implication that 
questioning a lack of success negates the Believer identity reinforces the connection between 
“True Muslims” and al Qaeda.  The mujahidin are acting on behalf of Muslims and calling 
those actions into question suggests an individual lacks faith and is, therefore, not a Believer.  
Since there are only two groups of people - Believers and infidels - there is a not very subtle 
implication that questioning the rightness of al Qaeda’s actions makes one an infidel.  
Vocabulary of motives.  Management in corporate organizations constructs and 
promotes interpretive frameworks through which employees are encouraged to make sense 
of their work (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  A vocabulary of motives provides a 
sensemaking guide for members, normalizing the reasons for actions – particularly ideal 
actions that comprise “rules of the game.”  Discourse often addresses these two identity 
targets simultaneously.  In al Qaeda’s discourse, the most prominent action is jihad.  
Construction and promotion of a vocabulary of motives, then, offers members reasons for 
why jihad should be conducted.  Three main themes emerged in the data addressing this 
identity point: they are duty, to defend Islam and Muslim peoples, and for paradise and 
reward.  
Duty.  First, as suggested in the previous section, jihad is addressed as a duty, often 
connected to faith in God.  In a sermon focusing on jihad, al-Awlaki writes:  
…what is right is that we should wage jihad, for jihad is an obligatory worship 
whether we are defeated or victorious…We have to fight jihad because it is fard [a 
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duty] on us.  We're not fighting jihad to win or to lose. We are fighting jihad because 
we have to fight jihad; it's fard.  [00003] 
Al-Awlaki’s language is direct - essentially the ideological equivalent of “because.”  His 
statement reinforces the notion that fighting, and continuation of jihad, should be 
independent of victory or defeat.  Al-Awlaki even suggests that winning is irrelevant.  Jihad is 
a duty and no more reasoning is necessary.  Other speakers claim that jihad should be fought 
on behalf of God, that fighting the infidels is a duty because they are the enemies of God.  
An excerpt from an article published in an AQAP magazine states:  
This is a clear and irrefutable command, namely, to engage the worshipers of idols in 
battle and to call on them to embrace Islam.  There has always been a consensus on 
the correctness of this command.  In the early days of Islam there was no record of a 
single Muslim disagreeing with it…God commanded the believers to fight the 
worshipers of idols until idolatry had been erased…The words "the enemies of Allah 
and your enemies" indicate that the infidels should be fought and terrorized because 
they are God's enemies in addition to being the enemies of the believers…Every 
enemy of God is our enemy, and we are commanded to terrorize all those 
disbelievers… [00034] 
The speaker frames jihad - or “terrorizing the infidels”- as a duty, but provides a further 
motivation - “erasing idols and idolatry.”  “Idols” may reference the paganistic worship of 
early Arabic tribes in the pre-Islamic era.  The pagan tribes often warred with early Muslims 
and refused to accept the call to Islam.  By referencing the first generation of Muslims, the 
author reinforces the aspirational identity and encourages the audience to compare 
themselves to those ideal Muslims.   
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The comparison also invites the audience to consider who fills the role of 
“worshippers of idols” – since, if jihad is commanded until “the worshippers of idols” are 
erased, and jihad remains a duty, the implication is that idol worshippers remain.  In another 
text, Usama bin Laden takes the implication of the author above and connects the duty of 
jihad to current events.  
Jihad is obligatory now for the Islamic Nation, which is in a state of sin unless it gives 
of its sons, its possessions and its powers whatever is required to maintain Jihad, 
which will preserve all Muslims in Palestine and elsewhere from the military might of 
the infidels. It is incumbent on the Muslims to engage in Jihad so as to establish the 
truth and abrogate falsehood each according to his capability. [00037] 
Bin Laden reinforces the theme that jihad is obligatory, and he adds negative reinforcement 
for those who do not engage in it.  Refraining from jihad leaves the Ummah in a state of sin.  
Bin Laden lists explicit requirements for jihad: giving sons, possessions and “whatever is 
required.”  In addition, the text delineates desired outcomes of jihad - defending the 
Palestinian Muslims and “establishing truth and abrogating falsehood.”  This language recalls 
the construction of the setting of organizational narratives where the conflict al Qaeda is 
engaged in is a microcosm of a larger war between “truth” and “falsehood.”  By constructing 
jihad as obligatory, bin Laden implicates all Believers, suggesting that they will be in a “state 
of sin” unless they terrorize the infidels, i.e. support al Qaeda’s organizational goals.  This 
claim rests on al Qaeda senior leadership positioning the mujahidin as protectors of the 
Believers, which leads to the second motive for jihad: defending Muslims.  
To defend Muslims.  Jihad is also necessary to defend the Believers, Islam, and 
Muslim territories.  Defending Muslims from an enemy is more important than even da’wa - 
calling non-Muslims to join Islam.  In one of his published sermons, al-Awlaki argues, 
  205 
“when an enemy attacks your land, you do not have to give them the da'wa, you immediately 
attack, because you are fighting for the defense of Muslims, which is more important in the 
eyes of Allah…” [00003].  Notions of duty and defense are interconnected and mutually 
reinforcing.  Similarly, Ayman al-Zawahiri urges all individual Muslims to view supporting 
jihad as a duty, but this duty is in service of the ultimate goal of liberating Palestine.  
Supporting the jihad in Palestine with one's life, money, and opinion is the individual 
duty of every Muslim because Palestine was a land of Islam that was occupied by the 
infidels. This means that its liberation and the reinstatement of Islamic rule there is 
the individual duty of every Muslim as unanimously decided by the nation's scholars.  
And such is the case with every land occupied by infidels. [00049] 
Zawahiri advocates supporting jihad not only with “life” and “money” - indicating either 
direct participation or financial support - but also with “one’s opinion,” which suggests the 
importance of public relations and public opinion for al Qaeda.  He then connects 
Palestine’s situation to the larger struggle against the infidels.  Liberating every Muslim 
territory “occupied by the infidels” should be the ultimate duty of all Muslims.  In this way, 
jihad is framed as a means to the desired resolution, not the goal itself.  The implication of 
urgency in defending Muslim lands is also supports the construction of the setting.  Zawahiri 
further warns:  
What is taking place in Gaza and Al-Fallujah will be repeated tomorrow in all of our 
cities if we do not resist and work hard on this resistance and rally around for the 
sake of change, with all the devout; religious scholars, military men, writers, people 
of professions, and businessmen.  If we are not ready for sacrifice, jihad, and 
resistance for the sake of change, then we should wait for the Americans and the 
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Jews.  In fact, we should wait for the Americans and Jews as of now to storm our 
houses, bomb our cities over our heads and villages. [00048] 
In the above text, Zawahiri emphasizes that jihad is necessary “for the sake of 
change,” but he warns that the situation in Gaza and Iraq “will be repeated” if “all the 
devout” do not act.  Lack of action in this instance will lead, Zawahiri warns, to the 
Americans and the Jews “storming” Muslims houses and bombing cities.  In advocating for 
action, the language also reinforces the perception that Muslims exist in a state of oppression 
and danger and that the primary threat comes from the United States and Israel.  Discourse 
that ties narrative components like setting and action, or action and resolution, may 
strengthen the cohesiveness of the resulting narratives.  Recalling for an audience the threat 
faced by the Believers may further normalize the perception that action must be taken in 
order to counter that threat.   
Achieve paradise.  The final theme addressing the creation of a vocabulary of 
motives emphasizes notions of reward rather than threat.  Conducting jihad is a duty, and it 
is necessary to defend Muslims and Muslim territories, but those to undertake this action will 
be rewarded.  From a magazine published by AQAP, the author references the Prophet and 
companions to claim punishing infidels is an act of faith commanded by God, and those 
who undertake this action will achieve paradise.   
When the enemy attacked the house of Islam, our Prophet, God's prayers and peace 
be upon him, told his companions, encouraging and motivating them to obtain what 
God offers to he who defends Islam and the honors of Muslims, that: 'He who 
defends us against them [the enemies] will have his abode in Paradise, or he will be 
my companion in Paradise.'  He said so in a hadith narrated by Muslim. [00026] 
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This excerpt constructs actions and actors simultaneously.  The companions are addressed as 
an aspirational other for modern Believers to model their behavior after while the promise 
of paradise is offered for the audience who “defends against the enemies.”  While not as 
prominent a theme as in individual level discourse, notions of martyrdom, paradise, and 
victory continue to intersect in constructing a vocabulary of motives at the organizational 
level.  
Rostam said, what is the promise of Allah? He said: Paradise for those who are killed 
fighting those who refuse, [to accept the call to Islam] and victory for those who 
survive. He said jannah [paradise] for those who are killed and victory for the ones 
who are alive. This is the promise of Allah…so you can never lose.  If you are killed 
then you're a shahid; [martyr] if you live then you are victorious. [00003] 
Consistent with al Qaeda’s strategic definition of victory, al-Awlaki relates a historical 
event (of unknown veracity) which not only promises paradise to those who die fighting 
infidels (anyone who refuses the call to join Islam) but assures victory to those who live.  
This “no way to lose” approach to organizational action echoes the relationship of 
martyrdom to organizational hierarchy in individual level identity construction.  The promise 
of “victory or paradise” similarly connects martyrdom with notions of reward.  At the 
organizational level, however, it is not hierarchical position within the organization that is 
emphasized but motives that result in ideal resolutions - paradise for the individual, victory 
for the organization.  
Summary.  Analogous to individual level discourse, the construction of actions at 
the organizational level centers jihad.  The “rules of the game,” which provide guideposts for 
ideal behaviors for a successful Believer, urge existing for God.  Crucial to existing for God 
is conducting jihad - fighting the enemies of god who are, in al Qaeda’s narratives, primarily 
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the U.S. and allies.  If a Believer is incapable of conducting jihad themselves, then supporting 
the mujahidin who are engaged in jihad is also important.  And finally, to be a Believer, one 
must divorce notions of victory from tactical success.  A critical component of al Qaeda’s 
rhetorical strategy, this tactic may mitigate the justification for their cause being called into 
question should the organization suffer significant losses or tactical failures.   
Meanwhile, the interpretive framework established by al Qaeda’s discourse 
encourages Believers to understand the preferred actions described above as a duty 
incumbent on all Muslims.  Those actions addressed by the rules of the game are necessary 
for the defense of Muslims and Muslim territories and are key to ensuring the reward of 
paradise for individuals and victory for the organization.  The importance of victory is 
addressed again in the next section, which explores the construction of resolutions.  
Resolutions 
The following section examines the construction of resolutions to narratives in al 
Qaeda’s discourse.  In comparison to other narrative components, text addressing 
resolutions comprised a notably small part of the data.  Less overlap of identity points was 
also found in resolutions.  Where resolution did intersect with other aspects of narrative, it 
was usually setting.  A continuation of the connection between resolution and hierarchical 
position found in individual identity narratives was not present at the organizational level.  
The two significant themes that did emerge from the data constructing resolutions focused 
on victory for Islam and the mujahidin, and the liberation of Islamic territories.  
Islamic victory and the defeat of the infidels.  Narratives, Burke (1973) argues, 
can be understood as symbolic actions that begin in desire, and end in satisfaction of that 
desire.  The setting described in al Qaeda’s discourse is one where Islam and Muslims are 
under threat from the United States.  This setting creates a narrative ‘desire’ to reach a 
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condition where that threat ends.  Accordingly, resolutions in al Qaeda’s discourse focus on 
defeat of the U.S., removal of U.S. troops and influence from Muslim countries, and the 
subsequent “victory” of Islam as represented by the mujahidin.  The language used to 
describe the desired resolutions is often deterministic and focused on future states.  In a 
speech addressed to the United States as an actor, bin Laden states:  
If the Americans refuse to listen to our advice and the goodness, guidance and 
righteousness that we call them to, then be aware that you will lose this Crusade 
Bush began, just like the other previous Crusades in which you were humiliated by 
the hands of the Mujahidin, fleeing to your home in great silence and disgrace.  If the 
Americans do not respond, then their fate will be that of the Soviets who fled from 
Afghanistan to deal with their military defeat, political breakup, ideological downfall, 
and economic bankruptcy.  [00030] 
The relevance of repeated references to the Crusades has already been explored in the 
previous chapter.  The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan - more specifically the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan – appears in al Qaeda discourse framed as a victory for the 
mujahidin.  The passage above reveals a narrow framing of the Cold War emphasized by al 
Qaeda elites.  Larger geopolitical factors are irrelevant to making the explicit threat that the 
U.S. will be defeated in the same way the Soviet Union was.   
One of the prominent themes in the construction of the setting was the claim that 
the U.S. is losing to the mujahidin, experiencing political, ideological, and economic decay as 
an outcome of that loss.  The excerpt above comes from a text published in 2002.  Much of 
the data addressing the setting for organizational level discourse was published in later years.  
This connection points to consistency in the overall narrative trajectory of the conflict as 
constructed by al Qaeda’s public rhetoric.  Where speakers address current events, 
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resolutions are generally part of a single, cohesive story, such as with this example of a 
‘victorious battle story’ related by an AQAP publication.  
Saturday, 10 Rabi al-Thani 1433, [corresponding to] 3 March 2012: A martyrdom-
seeking operation with a booby-trapped vehicle targeted the Republican Guard 
headquarters in Al-Bayda Governorate.  The attack destroyed the entire headquarters 
and killed most of the personnel inside it.  This attack followed the increasing crimes 
committed by Republican Guard forces in Al-Bayda and as a result for this, the 
people took to the streets in rallies and demonstrations condemning the crimes 
committed by these forces. [00050] 
Victorious battle stories serve analogous functions at the individual and 
organizational level.  These short stories are homogeneous in form and exclusively feature 
events that ended advantageously for the mujahidin.  The veracity of the claims cannot be 
verified for this project, but as discussed elsewhere, veracity is not the primary goal of 
strategic communication efforts by al Qaeda or its affiliates.  Instead, efforts are directed 
toward constructing a narrative, the resolution of which sees the mujahidin victorious over 
the forces of unbelief in the form of the U.S.  In a statement attributed to Adam Gadahn:  
I tell everyone who hears my voice that, in spite of the trial and tribulations, a bright 
and promising future is in store for Islamic champions and a bleak and barren future 
is in store for unbelief and its advocates and helpers [00001]. 
A speech by al-Zawahiri makes a similar claim.  
The religious, military and political history of mankind shall bear witness that the 
strongest power in history was defeated by a power much stronger, greater and purer 
than it: the power of Mujahid Islam. [00042] 
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Positioning the current conflict as a microcosm of a larger war between the forces of 
Islam and unbelief suggests that the desired resolution would be victory for the actors 
representing Islam and defeat of the representatives of unbelief.  Consequently, significant 
rhetorical effort is dedicated throughout the organization’s strategic communication efforts 
to ensure that al Qaeda and its ideological allies are not perceived as ‘losing.’   
Notably, more data exists describing the ongoing conflict than addresses future states 
of resolution.  Far more instances were coded as constructing a setting where the U.S. was 
already suffering defeats than constructing what future victories would look like.  Emphasis 
on the present may support Czarniawska’s (1998) claim that organizational biographies 
cannot withstand setbacks.  Redefining success, then constantly claiming success is being 
achieved instead of focusing on future goals may serve to alleviate identity threats from 
outgroup sources (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006).   
Liberation of Islamic territories.  Removal of antagonistic actors from Muslim 
territories is presented as both a motive for action as described above and a desired 
resolution to the ongoing conflict.  Similar to notions of victory, less data concerns the 
liberation of Muslim territories as a resolution than as a vocabulary of motives.  Further, 
liberation of Muslim territories is often addressed as a conditional action.  Put another way, 
U.S. evacuation from Muslim territories is approached not as an end goal unto itself, but as a 
necessary step for the U.S. to take for al Qaeda to cease the ongoing conflict.  Zawahiri 
states this explicitly, claiming “…the mujahidin won't stop inflicting losses on you until you 
leave our lands, stop plundering our treasures, and stop backing the corrupt rulers in our 
countries.” [00042]  Other instances were even more direct. Adam Gadahn details a list of 
actions for the U.S. to take in order to end the conflict.  
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There are, however, some steps you can take to curtail your losses and prevent the 
number of American casualties at home and abroad from rising even higher…I 
strongly suggest you heed and implement them, for your own good and the good of 
your people.  1. Pull every last one of your soldiers, spies, security advisers, trainers, 
attaches, and so on out of every Muslim land, from Afghanistan to Zanzibar. Should 
so much as one single American soldier or spy remain on Islamic soil, it shall be 
considered sufficient justification for us to continue our defensive jihad against your 
nation and people…Put an end to all forms of interference in the educational 
curricula and information media of the Islamic world and impose a blanket ban of all 
broadcast to our region, especially those designed to alter or destroy the faith, minds, 
morals, and values of our people. [00002] 
Both Zawahiri and Gadahn frame the resolution so that it completes the narrative trajectory 
created by the construction of a setting where the U.S. has invaded numerous Muslim 
territories in acts of aggression.  
It is worth noting what is largely absent from the construction of resolutions: 
namely, the theme of Paradise.  Where martyrdom and paradise play a significant role in 
individual identity construction, only eight instances were coded in organizational level data.  
The impetus for this is not currently clear.  It may be the result of the emphasis on a 
hypothetical Believers identity.  Whereas individual level identity work centered existing 
organizational members for whom paradise might be a tangible reward, there is no indication 
the Believers constitute an existing audience.  Ergo, a tangible reward may be less relevant to 
al Qaeda’s overall stratcom efforts in organizational level narratives.  Organizational level 
discourse overwhelmingly positions al Qaeda as acting on behalf of the ummah who are 
threatened and oppressed by the forces of unbelief, personified by the U.S.  Thus, emphasis 
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on tangible, tactical goals - the defeat of U.S. and allies, and the removal of Western troops 
and political influence from Muslim territories - corresponds to the narrative ‘desire’ created 
with the construction of the setting.  
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the ways in which organizational identity is constructed 
through narrative in al Qaeda’s public discourse.  The most significant finding is the lack of 
typical organizational identity construction and little discourse addressing al Qaeda as an 
organizational actor.  Rather, al Qaeda’s public discourse constructs an idealized and 
potentially hypothetical “Believers” identity.  The Believers are being threatened and harmed 
by the U.S. and allied forces.  This state of threat is physical as well as ideological, as the 
U.S., along with Israel, is actively seeking to destroy and subjugate Muslim countries and 
Islam as a religion.  This state of danger necessitates an actor taking action on behalf of the 
Believers.  Al Qaeda’s discourse positions the mujahidin as that actor, without significant 
effort devoted to constructing a specific organizational identity.   
The results of this research question reveal narrative plays a significant role in the 
construction of an identity at the organizational level, albeit in ways that diverge from 
individual identity construction.  Similar intersectionality occurs between identity targets 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002) at the organizational level, albeit at different points.  Less data 
addresses resolutions, and Alvesson & Willmott’s “hierarchical location” is absent from 
organizational level data.  The next chapter summarizes the findings of this research project, 
discusses the theoretical and practical implications of those findings, addresses limitations 
and offers suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION  
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the narrative construction of 
individual and organizational identity in al Qaeda’s public discourse.  To accomplish this, a 
narrative analysis was conducted of public texts produced by al Qaeda prime (AQP) and its 
largest ideological affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  This concluding 
chapter briefly summarizes the project, highlights the significant findings of this project, and 
discusses the implications for theory and praxis - particularly with regard to countering 
violent extremism (CVE) efforts.  Limitations of this project are then acknowledged, and 
suggestions for future research are offered. 
Influences and Aims 
Motivation for this project was derived from the long-term kinetic conflict between 
al Qaeda and ideologically affiliated groups, and the United States and coalition forces.  The 
specific point of interrogation was influenced by the common perception in U.S. security 
and policy circles (Corman, Trethewey & Goodall, 2008; Combating Terrorism Center, 
2009) that al Qaeda’s stratcom efforts were a contributing factor to the organization’s 
continued operations, despite being at a tactical, strategic, and financial disadvantage 
(Kohlmann, 2008).  A trend in western security analysis has pointed to al Qaeda’s 
“branding” ability (Helmus, Paul & Glenn, 2007: Pham, 2011) and their use of narrative 
Zaharna (2016) as key components supporting a strategic communication (stratcom) 
capability that frustrated U.S. CVE efforts.  The effectiveness of “branding” as a theoretical 
lens to explore al Qaeda’s stratcom efforts was limited, however, by lack of consistency in 
approaches and largely unsupported by theoretically-grounded, empirical research.   
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Theoretical Grounding: Organizational Identity 
  Understanding branding as a process whereby an organizational identity is 
projected to various stakeholders (Zachary, McKenny, Short, Davis, & Wu, 2011) allows 
researchers to draw on the rich history of organizational identity scholarship in the 
communication field.  Organizational identity, first conceptualized by Albert and Whetten as 
the “central, enduring, and distinctive (CED) characteristics of an organization” (Whetten, 
2006, p. 220), answers the question “who are we?” for an organization.  Central to identity 
research from a communicative perspective is the connection between organizational 
identity and the process of member identification, or the incorporation of an organization’s 
identity into the construction of members’ individual and social identities (Ashforth, Rogers, 
& Corley, 2011: Asforth & Mael, 1989).  Stronger member identification may result in a 
higher likelihood that member decision making will coincide with organizational goals 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).  This internalization of organizational values occurs when “a 
member’s self-concept has incorporated a large part of what they believe is distinctive, 
central and enduring about the organization into what they believe is distinctive, central, and 
enduring about themselves” (Dutton et al, 1994, p. 242).  Cohesion between individual 
member identities and organizational identity has been linked to organizational existence and 
function (Foreman & Parent, 2008; Ran & Duimering, 2007) while poorly incorporated or 
conflicting identities can have repercussions for organizational operations (Foreman & 
Parent, 2008).  Organizational scholars, however, have been reluctant to interrogate more 
extreme forms of organizing, thus creating a gap in the literature, which this project can fill.  
The choice to utilize narrative methodologies was motivated by the rich tradition of 
narrative approaches to studying identity (Boje, 1994: Brown, 2006; Browning, 1991; Corley 
& Gioia, 2005; Mumby, 1987) and by external pragmatic influences.  Post 9/11, narrative 
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became a popular buzzword in security studies (Corman, 2011; Glazzard, 2017).  Lack of 
theoretical rigor and consistent definition of what constitutes a narrative, however, hindered 
U.S. stratcom efforts with regard to understanding and countering extremists’ message 
campaigns (Corman, 2011).  This project derives its approach to narrative from work 
conducted by the Center for Strategic Communication, where narrative is understood as a 
“coherent system of interrelated and sequentially organized stories that share a common 
rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience expectations according to the 
known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical form” (Halverson, Corman & Goodall, 2011, 
p. 13).  
In order to focus on processes of identity construction within al Qaeda’s narratives, 
Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) nine “identity targets” or sites of identity influence were 
used as sensitizing concepts to guide the analysis.  These identity targets were labeled: 
defining an actor directly, defining an actor by defining others, providing a specific 
vocabulary of motives, explicating morals and values, defining knowledge and skills, group 
affiliation and categorization, hierarchical location, establishing rules of the game, and 
defining the context.  To explore the narrative construction of individual and organizational 
identity, identity targets were grouped according to the component of narrative (setting, 
actors, actions, resolutions) they addressed.  Two research questions were proposed to guide 
the study.  
RQ1: How is narrative used to construct individual member identities in al Qaeda’s 
public discourse?  
RQ2: How is narrative used to construct an organizational identity in al Qaeda’s 
public discourse? 
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Methodology  
Data for this project were comprised of texts produced by individual senior 
members of al Qaeda (AQP), al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and by official 
organization media arms.  Text types included transcripts of speeches, interviews, and videos 
as well as print releases such as eulogies, magazine articles, battle reports, and public 
relations statements.  The final data sample consisted of 54 individual documents containing 
508 pages of single spaced text.  Of these, 33 were attributed to al Qaeda Prime (AQP), and 
21 were attributed to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  Data were coded via 
qualitative analysis software NVIVO using a multi-step coding process (Charmaz, 2006; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).   
Two central goals shaped this project.  First, this project sought to extend 
organizational identity literature to explore organizing in asymmetric conflict contexts.  
Second, this research was intended to provide CVE practitioners with theoretically grounded 
empirical research examining al Qaeda’s stratcom efforts and to offer an approach to 
narrative methodologies applicable to the study of other extremist groups.  The remainder of 
this chapter briefly reviews the results of these research questions, offers implications for 
theory and praxis, acknowledges the limitations of the study, and offers directions for future 
research.  
The Brave Mujahidin: Summary of Findings and Theoretical Implications for 
Individual Identity Construction 
Deetz (1995) and similar work (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002) influenced the approach 
to individual level identity construction in this project.  This perspective is concerned with 
the ways organizational control “is accomplished through the self-positioning of employees 
within managerially inspired discourses” about the organization “with which they may 
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become more or less identified” and, therefore, committed (p. 2).  This dissertation asks 
what the construction of those “managerially inspired discourses” and the resulting 
narratives of member identity might look like in an ideologically driven organization (IDO).  
The salience of member identity derives in part from its role in processes of identification, 
since greater member identification can lead to a reduced range of decision making 
outcomes.  “Member identification presents a less obtrusive, and potentially more effective, 
means to organizational control than methods that rely on external stimuli (Tompkins & 
Cheney, 1985, p. 262).  Understanding the construction of organizational and individual 
identity in an IDO may offer insight into one of the ways member control is accomplished 
in atypical organizations that lack traditional bureaucratic structures. 
The first research question explored how narrative was used to construct individual 
member identity in al Qaeda’s public discourse.  Individual organizational members - the 
mujahidin - were addressed through a cohesive, homogeneous identity narrative that 
produced a highly idealized individual organizational member.  Grounded in a setting where 
the global Sunni Muslim community is under attack, the ideal mujahid was described primarily 
by the possession and display of innate traits including bravery, selflessness, patience, and 
good humor.  Mujahidin were brave in battle, particularly when facing a larger and better 
equipped adversary.  They were patient and endured suffering - especially imprisonment and 
torture - without losing faith in God or defecting and aiding the “non-believers” and 
“Crusaders” - the U.S. and allied forces.  Mujahidin valued victory and martyrdom equally, 
eagerly seeking death in pursuit of jihad against the forces occupying Muslim territory, 
thereby ensuring themselves a place in Paradise.  
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Narrative Components 
Setting.  Discourse setting the scene for individual identity narratives contained two 
major themes.  The first theme addressed the state of the Muslim community.  The ummah 
in al Qaeda’s discourse are oppressed, attacked, and threatened by adversarial actors - 
primarily the United States and the state of Israel, referred to as “the Crusaders” or the 
“Zionist-Crusader alliance.”  The second theme reinforced the first, blaming this state of 
oppression in part on the ummah’s failure to adhere to a fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam 
endorsed by al Qaeda leadership.  The context in which al Qaeda operates is one where the 
global Sunni community has fallen into a state of modern ignorance - jahiliyyah - and is 
therefore being oppressed and attacked by the United States and other antagonistic actors.  
Actors.  The primary actors addressed in al Qaeda’s discourse were individual 
mujahidin, antagonistic outgroup actors like the United States and local governments working 
with the U.S., and the companions and first generation of Muslims.  Mujahidin were generally 
addressed directly through explicit, storied descriptions of their lives, actions, and the traits 
they exhibited.  Antagonistic actors included the United States, Shia Muslims, and local 
regimes who allied themselves with U.S. policy.  These actors were addressed in contrast to 
ingroup members, supporting Alvesson & Willmott’s (2002) suggestion that ingroup 
members can be defined through comparison to an outgroup member identity imbued with 
undesirable traits.  A second outgroup identity, however, complicates Alvesson and 
Willmott’s work.  The Prophet, his companions and the first generation of Muslims were 
presented as an ideal outgroup identity that mujahidin were explicitly encouraged to emulate 
and model their behavior and beliefs on.   
Actions.  Jihad constituted the primary action in individual identity narratives.  
However, jihad was also positioned as an organizational “product.”  “Rules of the game” and 
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the “explication of a vocabulary of motives” - Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) identity 
targets that concern actions for ingroup members - both encompassed actions that in turn 
supported jihad.  Group members were encouraged to make sense of their “work” as it 
contributed to jihad against outgroup members.  Mujahidin were encouraged to display 
patience and make sacrifices as this contributed directly to the effectiveness of carrying out 
jihad.  
Resolutions.  Construction of resolutions within individual identity narratives 
centered on the act of martyrdom.  Martyrdom intersected with notions of reward and 
achievement of paradise, but also with Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) identity target 
“hierarchical position.”  Where data were otherwise absent descriptions of 
intraorganizational rank, “martyr” was explicitly and repeatedly positioned as the highest 
achievement and rank a member of al Qaeda could achieve.  “Congratulations, O martyr, for 
earning the highest rank of Paradise with the glory of the Lord” states the author of a eulogy.  
Martyrdom and tactical victory in the ongoing kinetic conflict were framed as equally 
favorable resolutions to an individual’s story; however, considerably more data addressed the 
construction of martyrdom, suggesting organizational elites privileged its importance for 
members above tangible victory.  
Implications for Theory: Individual Identity Construction 
By exploring narrative construction of individual member identity in al Qaeda’s 
discourse, this project contributes to literature regarding organizational control as enacted 
through the constitution of individual identity.  Alvesson and Willmott (2002) suggest that 
regulation of identity in organizations serves as a focus for organizational influence - that the 
discursive production of the appropriate individual has significant implications for the 
relationship between individual member identity and organizational control.  The findings of 
  221 
this project extend and complicate Alvesson and Willmott’s research in several ways.  
Alvesson and Willmott (2002) posit that management of identity work will become 
increasingly salient to the employment relationship as job security and employment durability 
decrease.  The authors fail, however, to offer examples of how their proposed identity 
targets might function to produce said “appropriate” individual.  While al Qaeda is not a 
typical organization, extremist groups who engage in kinetic conflict can certainly be 
considered examples of organizations with low job security and employment durability. 
Richness of identity construction.  The results of the first research question are 
applicable, then, to organizational contexts with high job insecurity where bureaucratic 
structures may be sparse or lacking.  In such contexts, results suggest data used to ascribe 
individuals will be much richer than in more typical, corporate organizational contexts.  
Constitution of individual members throughout al Qaeda’s discourse did not rely on limited 
demographic data, as suggested by Alvesson and Willmott (2002).  Instead, members were 
addressed as complete individuals, ascribed through detailed, storied accounts highlighting 
their life histories, personalities, traits, and actions.  Further, these accounts were universally 
positive, even exaggerated, resulting in the production of a highly idealized individual 
member who was not just “appropriate” but quite literally inspirational, meant explicitly to 
serve as an example for existing (i.e. living) organizational members to model their own 
behaviors and identities on. 
The richness of the data ascribing individual mujahidin, and the homogeneity of the 
texts containing that data, suggests purposeful strategy on behalf of organizational elites.  
Thus, this project supports Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) claim that identity work is salient 
in organizational contexts with high need for employee commitment (such as an 
organization where martyrdom is considered a desirable member action) and suggests there 
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is a definitive relationship between expectations placed on ingroup members and the degree 
to which member identity construction will encompass the addressed individual.   
To summarize, findings of this project suggest a correlation between need for 
member commitment and the extent to which organizational members are discursively 
addressed.  The higher the need for member commitment, the richer the data, and the more 
identity targets used to address them.  Future research into the relationship between member 
commitment and identity construction in different types of organizations - whether 
corporate, or IDO - should pay attention to the presence or absence of identity targets and 
the richness of the data supporting each.  If, as growing business models suggest (Kantor & 
Streitfeld, 2015), organizations are increasingly invested in managing employee identity, then 
IDOs may offer a glimpse into the future of trends in identity work in corporate 
organizations.  
Organizing practices, Alvesson and Willmott (2002) suggest, “may have implications 
for identity without being narrowly or exclusively dependent upon the precise self-
understanding of an individual” (p. 16).  The authors offer an example of a McDonalds 
worker to suggest that such a worker does not need a fine-tuned self-identity as an assembly 
worker.  In contrast, the lengths to which al Qaeda senior leaders will go to create the ideal 
“brave mujahidin” identity implies that in high-demand contexts individual member identity 
(in this case, as a mujahidin) is highly salient.  The richness of member identity narratives also 
implies a certain receptiveness by members to those “managerially-inspired” narratives, since 
post 9/11 al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates continued to gain members (Hubbard, 2014). 
Interaction of identity targets.  A second way this project extends Alvesson and 
Willmott’s (2002) work is by revealing ways in which identity targets interact.  While 
Alvesson and Willmott suggest that “in practice, these forms of identity regulation occur 
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simultaneously, and may contradict as well as reinforce each other” (p. 15), they provide no 
further guidelines or specific examples for what that might look like in an organization’s 
discourse.   
The results of this research project support the assertion that identity targets occur 
simultaneously; however, no support was found for the claim that they may be 
contradictory.  All identity targets functioned in concert to address the mujahid as an idealized 
al Qaeda member.  One of the reasons for this lack of contradiction may be the result of 
authorship.  Data collected for this project were authored by organizational elites, the 
equivalent of senior managers or official media entities.  Thus, all discourse concerning 
identity targets was “officially” produced by senior members of the organization.  Due to 
practical constraints, the researcher was unable to gain access to accounts of rank and file 
organizational members.  Discourse authored by these members might address sites of 
identity influence in ways that contradict the “official” accounts of ideal martyrs.  However, 
collecting member accounts to compare to officially authored discourse is beyond the scope 
of this project and should be considered in directions for future researchers with higher 
security clearance, or for researchers studying non-violent IDOs like domestic political 
groups, social activist organizations, or religious groups.  
Salient to organizational research is that these identity targets were not just 
simultaneously present but actively intersected and often reinforced each other.  For 
example, at the individual level, significant intersection occurred between the identity targets 
“knowledge and skills,” “morals and values” and “addressing actor directly.”  Morals and 
values and knowledge in particular were often attributed as desirable qualities ascribed 
directly to martyrs, like this martyr text explicitly describing two deceased mujahidin stated, 
“They were raised on the values of honor, perseverance, bravery, and heroism.” [0007]. 
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Morals and values in martyr texts were overwhelmingly used to support direct discursive 
address of an individual member, furthering the construction of an ideal mujahid.    
Intersection between identity points also created connected referents supporting the 
arc of the ideal individual identity narrative.  One of the main themes constructing 
“motivations” through which organizational members can make sense of their work was the 
need to free the ummah.  Organizational members were encouraged to understand their 
work as helping to “free” the Arabian Peninsula from the oppressive forces currently 
threatening Islam and the Muslim people.  The function of this particular motive for action 
would have little salience without the presence and construction of another identity target - 
“defining the context.”  Without a setting in which the ummah are oppressed and threatened 
by adversarial actors, a motivation to free them has no relevance to individual motivations. 
Aspirational other.  Alvesson and Willmot (2002) also fail to account for the 
presence of an aspirational outgroup identity.  The construction of outgroup members was 
not limited to antagonistic actors but also contained an aspirational other - the companions 
and first generation of Muslims.  Alvesson and Willmott (2002) posit that individuals or 
groups may be identified indirectly by referencing characteristics of specific others.  
However, the ‘other’ is traditionally assigned negative attributes, inviting ingroup members 
to distance themselves from those outgroups and, by extension, the characteristics they were 
assigned.  Alvesson and Willmott do not account for non-contrasting outgroup identities, 
e.g., the companions and the first Muslims, who were not organizational members but were 
constructed as an idealized identity for ingroup members to emulate.  Al Qaeda’s discourse, 
however, constructs the companions of the Prophet and the first generation of Muslims as 
ideal examples of True (capital T) Sunni Muslims to create an aspirational identity for current 
ingroup members to imitate.   
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The importance of the aspirational or model outgroup identity has implications for 
research in corporate organizing as well as IDOs.  Explicating what is considered ‘ideal’ by 
an organization can offer clues to organizational goals, structure, and desired behaviors (even 
if that behavior is slightly more complex than ‘killing yourself’).  Through construction of an 
aspirational outgroup identity, organizational elites can create a kind of road map for 
reflexive identity construction.  The aspirational other may encourage ingroup individuals to 
interpret more aspects of their identity through this organizationally-approved lens.  The 
effectiveness of such an aspirational identity, however, could vary wildly.  Alvesson and 
Willmott (2002) suggest that in organizational contexts with higher levels of uncertainty, 
cultural mechanisms will be introduced or refined “in an effort to gain or sustain employee 
commitment” (p. 5).  In the context of al Qaeda, these cultural mechanisms take the form of 
deeply entrenched historical macro narratives such as the Crusades and immediately familiar 
historical individuals such as the Prophet and his companions.  It is highly probable that 
similar cultural mechanisms could influence member identity construction in other IDOs 
such as religious or political organizations.  However, the success of the aspirational other in 
al Qaedas discourse may not be generalizable to organizations that lack corresponding 
connections to cultural macro narratives.  Nevertheless, future research exploring the 
construction of member identity in multiple types of organizations should pay attention to 
the possibility of an aspirational other.  
Creation of coherent narrative of identity.  A final critique of Alvesson and 
Willmott’s (2002) work concerns the failure of the presented identity targets to sufficiently 
represent the “coherent narrative” (p. 10) of identity they claim.  Alvesson and Willmott 
group the nine nodes of regulation by the target they primarily act upon.  For Alvesson & 
Willmott, the sites of regulation are “the employee, action orientations, social orientations, 
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and the scene” (p. 15).  Findings of this project suggest the “broad view of how 
organizational control may operate through the management of identity,” (p. 15) offered by 
Alvesson and Willmott, is incomplete and could be revised and supplemented to offer a 
clearer view of the way these sites of identity regulation operate, interact, and produce 
narratives of individual identity.  
The research conducted in this project argues that grouping sites of identity as they 
support the constitution of narrative components - setting, actor, actions, and resolution - 
would better illustrate the processes by which narratives of identity are constructed.  
Therefore, an alternate proposal regarding the grouping of these sites of identity to better 
illustrate potential interaction to form identity narratives:  
Setting: 9. Defining the context  
Actors: 1. Defining the actor directly, 2. Defining the actor by defining others, 4. 
Morals and values, 5. Knowledge and skills   
Actions: 3. Providing a specific vocabulary of motives, 8. Establishing the rules of 
the game.  
Resolutions: here a complication arises.  As described in chapter six, al Qaeda’s 
discourse refers to hierarchical positions only in connection with achieving martyrdom - the 
ideal resolution to individual identity narratives.  The relationship between hierarchical 
position and identity narratives may not be salient in the context of IDOs that do not 
actively encourage their members to seek death – i.e., in organizations where hierarchical 
position is not correlated with the resolution of an individual’s story.  Ergo, the resolution 
component may not be adequately represented by the existing identity sites.  Future research 
could revisit Alvesson & Willmott’s (2002) work with the intention of creating new sites of 
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identity regulation and contrasting the ways different types of organizations influence those 
aspects of identity.   
Future research utilizing, and testing Alvesson & Willmott’s work also should 
consider notions of temporality with regard to identity.  How do individual members 
position themselves relative to the organization in the past and present, and where do they 
see themselves in the future? A tenth site of identity regulation could be proposed that 
encompasses a member’s future position within the organization, thereby addressing the 
‘resolution’ to the individual’s story.  For al Qaeda, the ideal member may very well see 
themselves as deceased, or still fighting for the organization’s goals.  
Organizational Identity Construction: 
Strategic Absence of an Organizational Actor Identity 
This dissertation draws on the social actor conception of organizational identity 
(Whetten & Mackey, 2002).  The foundational definition of organizational identity proposed 
by Albert and Whetten (1985) suggests that organizational identity is that which is most 
“central, enduring, and distinctive about an organization” (Whetten & Mackey, 2002, p. 395).  
Subsequent scholarship produced two distinct conceptions of organizational identity: 
identity within organizations vs identity of organizations (Whetten & Mackey, 2002).  Lacking 
access to organizational members, and motivated by a practical need for a more thorough 
understanding of al Qaeda’s outward facing stratcom efforts, this project was concerned 
with latter form of organizational identity.  The second research question sought to identify 
the role narrative played in the constitution of al Qaeda’s organizational identity.    
The significant finding of this research question is that no such identity emerged.  Al 
Qaeda as an organizational actor is absent from the data.  There is no coherent narrative 
producing an identity that addresses the central, enduring, and distinctive traits of al Qaeda 
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as a social actor.  Where organizational actions were present, they were attributed to the 
mujahidin as individual actors, not the organization.  Instead of addressing al Qaeda as a 
social actor, the majority of data for the second research question produced an idealized 
Sunni Muslim identity - the Believers.  The Believers, unlike the mujahidin, are an abstract 
discursive construction rather than specific, existing individuals.  For example, “… an infidel 
will remain an infidel, the unjust will remain unjust, the astray will remain astray and the 
believer will continue to be a believer.” [00009]  This excerpt from a speech by Abu Yaha al-
Libi, where he claims that faith in God and surrender “to his commandments” is what 
divides people into mutually exclusive groups, is indicative of the way the Believers are 
addressed throughout the data.  
Narrative Components 
 Setting.  Similar to individual level discourse, the context for the Believers’ identity 
narrative constructs a setting where the Believers are under attack, threatened, and oppressed 
by the U.S. and their allies.  Unlike the construction of individual member identities, the 
theme of jahiliyyah was not repeated.  Instead, a significant portion of discourse addressing 
the setting focused on the ongoing kinetic conflict between the U.S. and the mujahidin.  The 
conflict was approached in two primary ways.  The first emphasized the existing kinetic 
situation, where the mujahidin were engaged in violent conflict with U.S. forces and the U.S. 
was suffering tactical, financial, and political losses.  The second approach to describing the 
conflict between U.S. troops and the mujahidin positioned the fighting as a microcosm of a 
much larger, and historically ongoing, war between the forces of Islam (represented by the 
mujahidin) and the forces of “unbelief” (represented by the U.S. and coalition actors).  The 
rhetorical strategy of situating the U.S./al Qaeda conflict within a much larger ideological 
conflict is crucial as, when considered in conjunction with individual identity narratives, it 
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creates a context wherein the mujahidin are fighting a defensive war against the forces of 
unbelief on behalf of the Sunni Muslims.  
Actors.  Where individual level discourse contained rich data addressing actors 
directly, organizational level results were notable for a lack of data corresponding to 
Alvesson and Willmott’s (2002) first identity target, corresponding to the absence of al 
Qaeda as a social actor in the data.  Instead, actors featured in organizational level identity 
narratives were the Believers, the United States, and the companions and first Muslims.  
Without data directly addressing an ingroup identity, constitution of actors was 
accomplished primarily through identity points like group affiliation, knowledge and skills, 
morals and values, and rules of the game.  When the Believers were addressed, it was 
generally in the abstract’ for example:    
Allah's messenger said in Muslim's reliable book: [Hadith] 'Whosoever fights them 
[the enemies of Islam] with his arm is a believer, whosoever fights them with his 
tongue is a believer and whosoever fights them in his heart is a believer… [00037] 
This abstract form of address suggests that the Believers are not an existing group of living 
individuals but a discursive construct necessary for al Qaeda’s stratcom efforts. Discursive 
treatment of the U.S. and first generation of Muslims were isomorphic at both levels of data.  
The United States was positioned as the primary antagonist responsible for perpetuating acts 
of aggression against Islam, Muslim territories, and individual Muslims, and the companions 
and first generation of Muslims were presented as an idealized example for the Believers to 
emulate.  
  In contrast to individual level discourse addressing actors, however, results of the 
second research question revealed significant support for the presence of Alvesson and 
Willmott’s (2002) identity target “group affiliation.”  Group affiliation played a major role in 
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organizational level discourse.  All social actors were divided into two distinct and mutually 
exclusive categories: The Believers, and the infidels.  And, as described in greater detail in 
chapter seven, one of the actions ascribed to Believers is the duty to fight the infidels.  
Actions.  Fighting the infidels - jihad - still played a significant role in the 
constitution of actions at the organizational level.  In contrast to individual level discourse, 
however, action-relevant identity targets did not support jihad as a macro-action.  Instead, 
typical of Alvesson and Willmott (2002) proposed identity targets, at the organizational level 
rules of the game and vocabulary of motives supports the construction of the Believers 
identity.  Discourse emphasized existing for God, jihad and supporting the mujahidin, and 
divorcing markers of success from tangible, tactical victory.  Re-definition of success that is 
not reliant on tactical victories, but instead framed as the responsibility of the individual 
Believer, is a key component to al Qaeda’s stracom efforts, allowing notions of “success” to 
adapt to potential tactical setbacks.  This strategy also allows for the construction of success 
to value death or victory equally, which is important for the discursive construction of 
resolutions to organizational and individual level narratives.  
Resolutions.  In contrast to other narrative components, data constructing 
resolutions comprised a notably small part of the results.  Less overlap of identity points was 
also found in resolutions at the organizational level.  Where resolution did intersect with 
other aspects of narrative, it was usually setting.   The two significant themes that did emerge 
from the data constructing resolutions focused on victory for Islam and the mujahidin and the 
liberation of Islamic territories.  Unlike individual level discourse where death constituted an 
ideal end to a mujahid’s story, organizational level resolutions directly satisfied the desire 
created in the setting (Burke, 1973).  The setting described in al Qaeda’s discourse is one 
where Islam and Muslims are under threat from the United States.  This setting creates a 
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narrative ‘desire’ to reach a condition where that threat ends.  Accordingly, resolutions in al 
Qaeda’s discourse focus on defeat of the U.S., removal of U.S. troops and influence from 
Muslim countries, and the subsequent “victory” of Islam as represented by the mujahidin. 
Implications for Theory: Organizational Identity 
The primary theoretical implication of the current study is that it challenges the a 
priori assumption that organizations need to address the question “who are we?” as a 
singular social actor (Albert, Ashforth & Dutton, 2000).  As discussed in chapter seven, only 
four instances of al Qaeda being addressed as an organizational actor were located 
throughout the entire data set.  The majority of identity work emphasized either individual 
mujahidin or the abstract Believers.  These results suggest that some types of organizations 
may not need a social actor identity to function as long as there is a sufficiently cohesive 
proxy-identity around which identity narratives can be constructed.  In the context of al 
Qaeda, that proxy-identity is the Believers.  The explicit rhetorical connection between the 
Believers and al Qaeda members, the richness of individual member identity construction, 
and the presence of an aspirational outgroup identity (the companions) may serve in place of 
a cohesive organizational identity for purposes of member identification.  These components 
function in place of typical organizational identity to support al Qaeda’s stratcom efforts.  Al 
Qaeda’s continued operation and the number of groups willing to become affiliates of the 
group post 9/11, even during a period of intense kinetic conflict, suggest that this type of 
identity work, though atypical, was still successful, contributing to organizational function 
and recruitment in place of a traditional organizational identity.  
Another component contributing to the success of an atypical organizational identity 
may be the amount of discourse dedicated to addressing antagonistic actors.  Entities, 
Albert, Ashforth and Whetten (2000) argue, “need at least a preliminary answer to the 
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question ‘who are they?” (p. 13).  Al Qaeda’s discourse provides rich data constructing 
explicitly adversarial “they” identities.  “They” are the Crusaders and the Crusader-Zionist 
alliance; they are the Shia Muslims and NATO and local regimes who oppress and steal from 
the Believers.  “They” commit crimes against Muslims and seek to dismantle Islam.  The 
amount of data addressing antagonist outgroup actors suggests the importance of adversaries 
to individual and organizational level identity work in the organization.  The construction of 
the Believers in particular is highly dependent on the intersection between actors – the U.S. 
– and the setting – where the Believers are under attack by the U.S.  
The findings of this study lay the groundwork for future organizational research 
examining the role of outgroup identities in organizational identity construction.  The 
importance of an adversarial other is likely to have more salience to ideologically-driven 
organizing and thus would be salient to future work exploring political organizing and social 
movements. The type of organizational identity research conducted in this project is also 
positioned to make significant contributions to the study of domestic IDOs.  While al Qaeda 
represents an extreme and violent case study, the current socio-political landscape of the 
United States contains numerous ideologically driven organizations and examples of 
ideologically driven organizing.  These include churches, political parties, and recently, 
increasingly extreme political groups as exemplified by the neo-Nazi “alt-Right.”  Deeper 
exploration of the practices and processes “that are involved in aligning individual and 
organizational values” (Pratt, 2000, p. 457) has relevance not just for understanding atypical 
and ideologically driven forms of organizing, but for potentially countering more extreme 
and violent organizations on U.S. soil.   
In addition, the methodology applied in this project offers a framework for 
conducting comparative analyses among organizations’ identity narratives.  The resulting 
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analysis should highlight points of agreement or alignment and – more importantly for 
domestic CVE efforts – highlight points of contention or contradiction that could possibly 
be exploited by stratcom practitioners.  The next section discusses implications for non-
domestic CVE efforts.  
Contributions to Praxis: Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 
This project makes several contributions to praxis with regard to countering violent 
extremism (CVE) efforts.  In order to develop appropriate countermeasures when 
combating extremist groups, The U.S. Army and Marine Corp Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual instructs practitioners to: “Learn the insurgents’ messages or narratives…” (Nagl, et 
al., p. 162).  With regard to al Qaeda, research conducted in this project is a step toward 
satisfying that directive.  The primary contribution made by this dissertation is a rich and 
empirically grounded understanding of al Qaeda’s strategic communication (stratcom) efforts 
focusing on identity, the results of which have been detailed in chapters six and seven.  
These results have several implications for CVE practitioners.  First, they highlight the 
importance of taking an organizational identity approach over a branding one to the study of 
violent IDOs.  Second, this project highlights the importance of examining the processes of 
narrative construction and individual narrative components, rather than just the “end 
product” of extremist discourse.  
Countering a “Branding” Approach   
This dissertation’s findings contribute to ongoing U.S. CVE efforts by contesting the 
perception that al Qaeda’s ‘branding’ efforts made its stratcom efforts so effective (Archetti, 
2010a).  As described in chapter seven, no significant attempt was found to describe the 
CED traits necessary for a cohesive organizational identity (Albert, Ashforth & Dutton, 
2000).  This directly challenges common perception in public language from U.S. military 
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members and policy makers (Corman, 2011) regarding one of the key sources of al Qaeda’s 
stratcom effectiveness.  Rather than a strong, central organizational identity focusing on al 
Qaeda as an organizational actor, this research found the majority of identity work 
constructed the mujahidin and the Believers, two complimentary, idealized Sunni Muslim 
identities with a key rhetorical relationship: all mujahidin are Believers, but not all Believers 
are mujahidin, and the mujahidin act on behalf of the Believers, protecting them from 
antagonistic forces.  
Salient to CVE efforts at the organizational level is the prominence of the Believers 
in al Qaeda’s narratives.  Creating a setting that addresses the numerous ways the Believers 
are threatened by antagonistic outgroup actors, such as the U.S. and Shia Muslims, creates a 
sense of peril and urgency.  These strategies, in turn, allow al Qaeda to position 
organizational actions - jihad as conducted by mujahidin - as a defensive action.  Constructing 
the Believers in the abstract also allows al Qaeda leadership to conflate the Believers with 
Islam itself, thereby supporting a setting where the U.S. and allied forces (“The Crusaders”) 
are not merely attacking individuals or territories but are threatening Islam itself.  This threat 
to Islam from the infidels supports rhetorically positioning the localized kinetic conflict as a 
microcosm of the war between the forces of Islam and unbelief.  An emphasis on al Qaeda’s 
“brand” does not account for the richness or complexity of the organization’s identity work 
and fails to account for the functions of individual narrative components in overall identity 
work.  
Importance of Identity Components 
 Conducting an analysis emphasizing processes of narrative construction, rather than 
solely focusing on narratives as an existing ‘end product,’ highlights the need for CVE 
efforts to pay attention to narrative components and the relative importance placed on each.  
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Treating narrative as a singular ‘end product’ ignores the function of narratives as sites for 
meaning making (Rhodes & Brown, 2005a).  It also disregards the importance of individual 
components of narrative relative to each other.  For example, in the context of al Qaeda, at 
the organizational level, the majority of identity discourse was concerned with the “setting” 
in which the Believers, and Islam as a religion, are under attack by U.S. forces.  This setting 
then creates a narrative “desire” (Burke, 1979, Halverson et al 2011) that can only be 
satisfied by the liberation of Islamic territories from the “evil” forces of unbelief/the United 
States.  
Macro Narratives 
The significance of the setting in al Qaeda’s discourse leads to a second implication 
for praxis: the importance of understanding the ways in which extremist narratives are 
connected to culturally embedded macro narratives27 (Halverson et al 2011).  “Winning 
hearts and minds, as the U.S. military likes to phrase it, means recognizing the power of 
narratives…” (Bernardi et al 2012, p. 155).  Appreciating the “power” of narratives is only 
the beginning of successful CVE efforts.  As Bernardi and coauthors illustrate in their 
analysis, rich understanding of the particular components of narratives active in the 
‘communication landscape’ is vital in order to plan and implement successful 
countermeasures.  The construction of a setting where Sunni Muslims face social, religious, 
economic and physical threats has the ability to produce a narrative with significantly more 
traction if for no other reason than the amount of time al Qaeda has had to publicize and 
repeat these claims.  Regardless of veracity, repetition can contribute to the strength of 
narrative fidelity (Bernardi et al., 2012).  
                                                 
27 This project is not the first to make such a call, and the author acknowledges their perspective is influenced 
by their time working with and being mentored by scholars who have taken similar positions (Corman, 2011; 
Halverson, Corman & Goodall, 2011; Bernardi et al., 2013; Trethewey, Corman & Goodall, 2009) 
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The identity narratives that result from these components are extremely resilient to 
counter efforts.  Indeed, stratcom CVE efforts could result in reinforcing the narrative 
system al Qaeda leadership has constructed.  For example, U.S. claims that the conflict 
would be short term and only directed at “terrorist groups” is countered by al Qaeda’s 
construction of a setting where the conflict is a microcosm of a larger war between the 
forces of Islam and unbelief.  Al Qaeda’s discourse often gains more traction with local 
stakeholder audiences because it draws on macro narratives (Halverson et al, 2011) deeply 
embedded in local culture and history that resonate with stakeholder audiences.  As 
discussed in chapter six, referring to the U.S. and allies as Crusaders is not an empty insult, 
but a purposeful strategy connecting contemporary discourse concerning an existing conflict 
with a thousand-year-old narrative of conquest and oppression of Muslim people and lands.  
Explication of the constitution of actors also has significance for CVE efforts.  Al 
Qaeda leadership divides the social world into Believers and everyone else, and everyone not 
a Believer is an infidel.  Creating mutually exclusive, inflexible categories for social division is 
the ultimate ‘either with us or against us’ strategy, resulting in an organizational ideology that 
outright refuses compromise or common ground and positions any potential moderate 
actors in the same group as “the infidels.”  Discourse then positions the mujahidin in relation 
to the Believers.  The mujahidin act on behalf of the Believers, and the Believers support the 
mujahidin.  This strategy poses significant complications to efforts - particularly those by 
Western and non-Islamic actors - to draw distinctions between Sunni Muslim populations 
and al Qaeda members.  Constructing cohesive identity narratives for the Believers as 
representative of ‘True’ Sunni Islam, al Qaeda made it difficult for outgroup actors to attack 
the organization directly.  In short, there is little in the organization’s discourse for CVE 
stratcom efforts to gain traction against.   
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The construction of resolutions also hinders efforts to lesson or minimize conflict.  
At the individual level, ideal resolutions are tactical victory or martyrdom, while at the 
organizational level, defeat of infidels and freedom of Muslim territories comprises the 
desired “endings” to organizational stories.  Constitution of these resolutions leaves no 
room for compromise or other possible outcomes - like ceasefires or integrating into 
legitimate forms of governance, like the Muslim Brotherhood (Leiken & Brooke, 2007; 
Rutherford, 2013).  The only government al Qaeda recognizes derives directly from the 
Quran and Hadith.  Democracy is framed explicitly as a religion antithetical to Islam, thus, 
U.S. discourse regarding creation of democratic societies in Afghanistan and Iraq is framed 
as a direct assault on Islam.  Countering this narrative construction will be difficult.  Ideal 
CVE stratcom efforts would be stratified, addressing not just “a” narrative, but the 
individual components used to construct the Believers.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Findings from this study suggest multiple directions for future research exploring 
organizational identity in the context of IDOs.  While extending current organizational 
identity research and offering a rich understanding of al Qaeda’s use of narrative, there were 
limitations to the scope of the study. 
Lack of access to organizational members led to a focus on identity of organizations 
rather than identity in organizations (Brown, 2006).  Significant practical limitations 
necessitated this - the vast majority of al Qaeda members are deceased, imprisoned, or 
inaccessible to western researchers.  Data analyzed for the study were publicly available and 
presented both the organization and its members to various stakeholder audiences 
(Moingeon & Soenen, 2002, p. 17).  How ingroup members construct their own identity as 
mujahidin is not ascertainable from the data studied for this project. 
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Future research should explore further whether there is a proportional relationship 
between an organization’s need to encourage member engagement and the number of 
identity targets present in organizational discourse and the depth to which they are 
addressed.  For example, organizations with higher need for member loyalty (perhaps 
because they lack bureaucratic structures, their operational environment is chaotic, or 
competition is high) likely seek to address more identity targets than organizations with more 
traditional bureaucratic tools for enforcement of behavior.  
Another limitation of the study is the focus on only two of al Qaeda’s franchises.  Al 
Qaeda’s franchises often evolved from existing groups who made agreements with al Qaeda 
to operate under the organization’s name, such as in the case of al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (Farrall, 2011).  Presumably these organizations also have produced and publicized 
ideologies.  Future research could usefully interrogate organizational identity construction in 
these organizations as well, perhaps comparing and contrasting points before and after the 
group took on the al Qaeda name.   In such studies, particular attention should be given to 
the construction of setting and any points of contrast or contestation between these groups 
and al Qaeda prime, particularly in light of the fact most Islamist organizations before al 
Qaeda were regionally focused.   
Concluding Remarks 
To conclude, this dissertation offers insight into the narrative construction of 
individual and organizational identity in the context of ideologically driven organizing, using 
al Qaeda as a focus of study.  Findings illustrate significant intersection of identity points and 
story elements in the construction of identity narratives.  Findings also contest the 
applicability of traditional organizational identity theory to the context of ideologically driven 
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organizing and challenge popular assertions in the security community that part of al Qaeda’s 
effectiveness in strategic communication rests on its “brand.”  
Indeed, this project found no significant efforts to develop a coherent brand for the 
organization.  Instead, organizational level identity work addressed a hypothetical, idealized 
Sunni Muslim identity known as “the Believers.”  The majority of organizational discourse 
then constructed a setting where the Believers were being endangered by the United States 
and its agents.  Al Qaeda is then positioned in relationship to the Believers, acting on their 
behalf to defend the Believers, and Islam as a religion.  It is the existence and persecution of 
the Believers that is the foundation of al Qaeda’s stratcom efforts, which may have 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of US and allied stratcom efforts against the organization 
itself.   
This study should be considered an initial effort, encouraging future scholars to 
focus on identity construction in different types of IDOs.  Finally, this study hopefully 
contributes to future CVE efforts and highlights the importance of empirically grounded 
research for developing coherent and effective stratcom efforts. 
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